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ABSTRACT. This article provides an overview about the main facts and analytical options in the 
domain of determiners and quantifiers in Spanish. It covers the main classification of determiners 
and their basic syntactic and semantic properties (§1), the differences in behaviour between 
quantifiers and determiners in the strict sense (§2), the notion of definiteness and the contrasts in 
the use of the definite and indefinite articles (§3), the notion of specificity (§4) and the main types 
of quantifiers and how they can be identified (§5). In terms of analytical problems, it discusses 
whether determiners should be considered heads or not (§6), the areas within the determiner and 
quantifier domain (§7), the nature of the indefinite article as an element that shares properties with 
existential quantifiers (§8), the problems posed by proper names (§9) and the possible existence of 
phonologically null determiners in Spanish (§10). Conclusions are presented in §11. 
 
Keywords: determiners, quantifiers, definiteness, specificity, DP-hypothesis, bare nominals, 
proper names 
 
RESUMEN. Este artículo proporciona al lector una revisión detallada de los principales fenómenos 
y opciones analíticas que tienen que ver con el dominio de los cuantificadores y determinantes en 
español. El trabajo discute la clasificación básica de determinantes y cuantificadores en sus 
propiedades sintácticas y semánticas fundamentales (§1), las diferencias de comportamiento entre 
cuantificadores y determinantes en sentido estricto (§2), la noción de definitud y los principales 
contrastes del español en el uso del artículo definido e indefinido (§3), el concepto de 
especificidad (§4) y los principales tipos de cuantificadores y qué pruebas permiten identificarlos 
(§5). Con respecto a las opciones analíticas, discute si los determinantes deberían considerarse 
núcleos o no (§6), las áreas sintácticas dentro del dominio de cuantificadores y determinantes (§7), 
la naturaleza del artículo indefinido como un elemento que comparte propiedades con los 
cuantificadores existenciales (§8), los problemas analíticos que producen los nombres propios (§9) 
y la posible existencia de determinantes fonológicamente nulos en español (§10). Se presentan 
conclusiones en §11. 
 
Palabras clave: determinantes, cuantificadores, definitud, especificidad, hipótesis del SD, 
nominales escuetos, nombres propios 
 
 
1. Introduction: determiners and quantifiers in natural languages 
Most natural languages contain some items that combine with nouns and whose role is to 
provide information about their reference or to restrict the statements about such nouns to 
groups or quantities (Leonetti 1999, 2016; Gutiérrez Rexach 2016). Some of these items in 
the case of Spanish are listed in (1). 
 
(1) este 'this', el 'the', un 'a', dos 'two', muchos 'many', ningún 'no'... 
  
In a wide sense, traditional grammars referred to these items collectively as adjectivos 
determinativos 'determinative adjectives' or determinantes 'determiners', by virtue of a couple 
of central syntactic properties that will be discussed in §1.1, common to all of them. However, 
more restrictively the notion of determiner is restricted to the items that, in combination with 
nouns, are used to define their reference giving rise to notions such as specificity or 
definiteness, which, to put it bluntly, depend on whether the speaker identifies the reference 
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of the entity or not, and whether the speaker presupposes that the hearer will be able to 
identify the reference or not. The items in (2) are determiners in this restrictive sense: 
 
(2) el 'the', un 'a', este 'this', aquel 'that', mi 'mine'... 
 
In this restrictive sense, the items whose role is to define the number of entities in a group 
or the quantity of an entity are quantifiers. In general terms, quantifiers in combination with 
count nouns define the number of units in a group in more or less precise ways (3), while the 
quantifiers that combine with mass nouns provide information about their quantity (4). 
 
(3) a. tres estudiantes 
     three students 
 b. muchos estudiantes 
     many students 
 c. ningún estudiante 
     no     student 
(4) a. poca sal 
     little salt 
 b. demasiada poesía 
     too-much  poetry 
 c. suficiente agua 
     enough    water 
 
There is a division of labour both from a syntactic and a semantic perspective between the 
noun and the determiner or quantifier. In a nominal constituent like el chico 'the boy', the 
common noun chico 'boy' is used to identify a class of entities through descriptive properties, 
namely those that we associate to the entities that in the world we would call 'boy' –that is, the 
noun is responsible for expressing the relevant concept–. In contrast, the determiner el does 
not provide any information about the descriptive properties of the entity, but is used as a 
formal mark that indicates that the hearer must look for a known referent that corresponds to 
the description of boy in the context of interpretation. Translated into practical terms, the 
determiner tells the hearer that the boy discussed is a specific boy that he or she should be 
able to identify from the information that he shares with the speaker.     
As we will see, some quantifiers double as nouns or adjectives. The so-called 
quantificational light nouns (6; cf. RAE& ASALE 2009: §12.5) take prepositional 
complements that correspond to the common noun that they affect.  
 
(6) a. un montón de amigos 
     a   lot         of friends 
 b. una botella de vino 
     a     bottle   of wine 
 c. la mayoría de votantes 
     the majority of voters 
 
Because these quantifiers can also be used as lexical nouns, they can produce ambiguities 
that normally are solved by the linguistic context. Out of context, una botella de vino 'a bottle 
of wine' can describe two different things: a glass object designed to contain wine –where 
botella is interpreted as a lexical noun– or a specific quantity of wine that corresponds to the 
measure of a standard bottle –where botella is used as a quantifier–. The difference between 
the two readings becomes apparent, for instance, in the type of predicates that select each one 
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of them. In the first interpretation, the noun botella is a lexical noun and combines with verbs 
that select actions that can be performed –roughly– on glass objects (7). 
 
(7) a. Rompí una botella de vino. 
     broke.1sg a bottle of wine 
 'I broke a bottle of wine' 
  b. Lavé una botella de vino. 
     washed.1sg a bottle of wine 
 'I washed a bottle of wine' 
 c. Me golpeó con una botella de vino. 
     me hit.3sg with a bottle of wine 
 'He hit me with a bottle of wine' 
 
The second interpretation, where botella is a quantifier, has the noun vino 'wine' as the 
element responsible to define the class of entities through their descriptive properties, and 
therefore combines with predicates that denote events that can be performed with alcoholic 
liquids (8). 
 
(8) a. Me bebí una botella de vino. 
     me drank.1sg a bottle of wine 
 'I drank a bottle of wine' 
 b. Derramé una botella de vino. 
     Spilled.1sg a bottle of wine 
 'I spilled a bottle of wine' 
 c. Échale una botella de vino al ponche. 
     put-it   a     bottle of wine to.the punch 
 'Add a bottle of wine to the punch' 
 
 Still, some predicates are compatible with both readings. 
 
(9) Me compré una botella de vino.  
 me bought.1sg a bottle of wine 
 'I bought a bottle of wine' ('I bought a bottle to put wine' or 'I bought the quantity of 
 wine that fits in a bottle') 
 
See §1.2. for the case of adjectives that act as quantifiers or deteminers under certain 
conditions. 
 
1.1. The role of determiners and the role of quantifiers in syntax and semantics 
Determiners in the wide sense –that is, both quantifiers and determiners in the strict sense– 
can be identified in Spanish by one crucial property: they are necessary to license the 
preverbal subject. In contrast to Germanic languages like English, that allows preverbal bare 
nouns in generic interpretations (10), Spanish needs that in such syntactic position the noun is 
accompanied by a quantifier (11a) or determiner (11b) –see (13)-(16) for some exceptions to 
this generalisation–. 
 
(10) Dogs bark. 
(11) a. El perro ladra. 
     the dog  barks 
 'The dog is barking' 
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 b. Ningún perro ladra. 
     no       dog    barks 
 'No dog is barking' 
 c. *Perros ladran. 
       dogs   bark 
   Intended: 'Dogs bark' 
 
This licensing role cannot be performed by adjectives, in general (12). This implies that the 
traditional name given to determiners and quantifiers, determinative adjectives, is at best 
misleading in suggesting that they should be considered adjectives in a grammatically 
relevant sense. Members of the class of adjectives that can license the preverbal position of 
subjects in Spanish are not considered proper adjectives –and in fact they lose some of the 
properties that are definitionally related to adjectives–, as we will see in §1.2.  
 
(12) *Perros blancos ladran. 
   dogs    white    bark 
 Intended: 'White dogs bark' 
 
It is important to note, however, that there are systematic exceptions to the generalisation 
that any noun must be combined with a determiner in order to be a preverbal subject. First of 
all, proper names in Spanish can always appear in this position without an overt determiner or 
quantifier. 
 
(13) a. Arizona es seca. 
     Arizona is dry 
 b. Pedro tiene dos hermanas. 
     Pedro has two sisters 
 
Common nouns can also function as subjects in preverbal position in three cases. The first 
one is when the noun is restricted by modifiers that delimit the class of entities, such as 
restrictive relative clauses, participial constructions or prepositional phrases. This suggests 
that in such cases the restricting capacity of the modifiers is enough to delimit the denotation 
of the common noun to a specific subkind of the noun, and that is enough to license the 
preverbal position.  
 
(14) a. Niños que habían sido abandonados han firmado esta petición. 
     children that had been abandoned have signed this petition 
 'Children that had been abandoned have signed this petition' 
 b. Estudiantes con beca no deben pagar las tasas. 
     students with scholarship not must pay the fees 
 'Students with a scholarship must not pay the fees'   
 
The availability of subjects such as those in (14) is facilitated when the statement is modal 
in nature, something that imposes a non-specific reading to the subject. In (14b) it is implied 
that we refer to any student with a scholarship, not to concrete members of that group. Still, 
readings where the group denoted is specific are possible (14a), but note that in such case the 
relative clause refers to a specific, episodic event that defines that group, thus providing the 
information that the group is formed by specific individuals –those that participated in that 
instance of the event–.  
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Second, coordination of two bare common nouns also allows them to appear as preverbal 
subjects. In such cases, it is also the case that the nouns are interpreted non-specifically, as 
any member of the groups. 
 
(15) a. Niños y mayores disfrutaron del espectáculo. 
     children and adults enjoyed the show 
 'Both children and adults enjoyed the show' 
 b. Españoles y franceses llevan siglos enfadados unos con los otros. 
     Spaniards and Frenchmen carry centuries angry ones with the others 
 'Spaniards and Frenchmen have been angry to each other for centuries' 
 c. Perros y gatos salieron de la cueva. 
     dogs and cats exited of the cave 
 'Dogs and cats came out of the cave'. 
 
Third, if the preverbal subject is also interpreted as a contrastive focus, it can be available 
in preverbal subject position. We mark in capital letters the emphatic intonation of the focus. 
 
(16) PERROS vinieron, no gatos. 
 DOGS came, not cats 
 'It was dogs that came, not cats' 
 
Once these exceptional cases are controlled for, the fact that determiners and quantifiers 
license preverbal subjects is perhaps the most reliable criterion to identify the members of this 
class. This criterion allows us, for instance, to determine that even if the quantificational 
nouns mentioned in (6) above are interpreted in some semantic respects as quantifiers, they 
should not be entirely assimilated to the class. As (17) shows, they still need to combine with 
a proper quantifier (17a) or a determiner (17b) to license the noun in preverbal position. 
 
(17) a. Dos botellas de vino son demasiado. 
     two bottles of wine are too-much 
 b. La botella de vino que te bebiste es demasiado. 
     the bottle of wine that you drank.2sg is too-much 
 c. *Botella de vino es demasiado. 
      bottle of wine is too-much 
  
1.1.1. Classes of determiners and quantifiers: main guidelines 
Several subtypes of determiners and quantifiers can be identified following the test that we 
have mentioned above. Among determiners, most grammars single out the following classes: 
definite articles (18a), indefinite articles (18b; but see §8), demonstratives (18c) and 
possessives (18d).  
 
(18) a. el 'the' 
 b. un 'a' 
 c. este 'this, ese 'that', aquel 'that' 
 d. mi 'my', tu 'your', su 'his/her/their', nuestro 'our', vuestro 'your' 
 
There are many differences in syntax and interpretation among the classes in (18), but we 
will discuss them in the sections below.  
With respect to quantifiers, a few remarks should be made before we proceed with the 
presentation of the subclasses. The definition that we have provided of quantifiers, as opposed 
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to determiners, is semantic in nature –we will see below in §2 that some more fine-grained 
tests also are semantic in nature–. This makes some classes of units that do not combine with 
nouns fall within the definition of quantifier, which is perhaps unfortunate when one attempts 
a syntactic description of the phenomenon. Specifically, the semantic definition of quantifier 
extends to degree adverbials such as those in (19), which combine with adjectives and operate 
on the values that they express within their semantic scales. 
 
(19) a. muy frío 
     very cold 
 b. demasiado caliente 
     too           hot 
 c. bastante rojo 
     quite      red 
 d. un poco verde 
     a   bit     green 
 
Even though many of the degree adverbials are also used as quantifiers in combination 
with nouns (cf. 20), we will not treat them in this article. Even though the unification of 
quantity and degree seems intuitively plausible, there are technical problems that complicate 
any attempt in this direction. For instance, degree elements take values of a property, while 
quantifiers do not operate over values in any obvious sense: they count units or define 
measures of a substance. It is unclear what type of semantic operator would give well-formed 
semantic formulas with both types of objects. 
 
(20) a. demasiada agua 
     too-much water 
 b. bastante sal 
     enough salt 
 c. un poco de azúcar 
     a   bit     of sugar 
  
Second, in the literature on quantifiers, the adverbials in (21), known as presuppositional 
or focal quantifiers, are also mentioned. 
 
(21) tampoco 'neither', también 'also', hasta 'even', solo 'only'... 
(22) Juan también aprobó el examen. 
 Juan also       passed the test 
 
While these quantifiers are unable to license preverbal subjects on their own, they 
presuppose some form of quantification over one of the nouns in the sentence. In (22), for 
instance, it is presupposed that there was another individual, not just Juan, that passed the 
exam. We will leave also these quantifiers aside, and focus solely on the items that meet the 
semantic requisites for being a quantifier and additionally license common nouns in preverbal 
subject position. 
Once the set of items is thus restricted, there are two main classes: indefinite quantifiers, 
that express an imprecise quantity without giving it a numerical value (23a), and quantifiers 
that specify the number of items, which correspond to the class of cardinal numerals (23b).  
 
(23) a. muchos 'many', pocos 'few', suficientes 'enough', varios 'several'... 
 b. dos 'two', tres 'three', dieciséis 'sixteen', cien 'hundred'... 




Indefinite quantifiers can accompany both mass and count nouns (24), while numerals are 
restricted to count nouns, and in combination with nouns that are possibly mass trigger count 
readings (25).  
 
(24) a. mucha sal 
     much salt 
 b. muchos libros 
     many books 
(25) a. tres libros 
     three books 
 b. tres sales 
     three salts 'three types of salt' 
 
Among the indefinite quantifiers, the main division is between universal quantifiers and 
existential quantifiers, that are also called 'indefinite' in the strict sense. Universal quantifiers 
express that, given the set of properties defined by the common noun, the statement applies to 
every element contained in that class (26), while existential quantifiers restrict the quantity to 
only a subset of such elements (27). 
 
(26) Cada estudiante trajo un libro.  
 each student brought a book 
 'Each student brought a book' (='For everybody that was a student, it is true that that 
 student brought a book') 
(27) Varios estudiantes trajeron un libro. 
 several students     brought a book 
 'Several students brought a book' (='For at least some that were students, it is true that 
 they brought a book')   
 
The existential quantifiers can further be divided in two groups, depending on whether 
they imply some sort of evaluation about the quantity that they express –whether it exceeds 
some standard, is enough for some purpose, etc.–. Those that incorporate this evaluation 
component are called evaluative quantifiers (28a, 28b). An example of the class that lacks this 
component is (27), or (28c). 
 
(28) a. Demasiados estudiantes suspendieron. 
     too-many     students failed 
 'Too many students failed' (='More students than it was desirable / expected failed') 
 b. Pocos estudiantes suspendieron. 
     few     students     failed 
 'Few students failed' (='Less students than usual / expected failed'). 
 c. Algunos estudiantes suspendieron. 
     Some      students     failed 
 'Some students failed' 
 
1.1.2. The syntax of determiners and quantifiers: main claims and questions 
Going now to more theoretical claims, the main debate that refers to determiners and 
quantifiers has to do with the notion of headedness within nominal constituents. While we 
will discuss this issue in detail in §6, in this subsection we will give some general guidelines 
that will be useful to consider the discussion that follows. 
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In traditional terms, determiners and quantifiers are seen as modifiers of the noun, which is 
the head of the construction –hence the use of 'adjective' to characterise both classes in 
traditional grammars–. However, since Abney (1987) a completely different position has 
emerged whereby the determiner –and by extension the quantifier– acts as a head that has the 
common noun in its complement. (29) corresponds to a representation following Chomsky 
(1965: 129); (30) represents the structure after Abney (1987), with the determiner heading the 
construction. 
 
(29)  NP 
 
 D  N 
 the  man 
 
(30)  DP 
 
 D  N 
 the   man 
  
With many ramifications that we will explore in §6, the basic difference between the two 
proposals refers to three aspects of the relation between nominal constituents and the elements 
that take them as arguments. 
 
a) Whether the presence of the determiner is necessary in order to turn the common noun –
itself a predicate, expressing a set of properties– into an object that can saturate an argument 
position of the element that it combines with. If the role of the determiner is to turn the 
predicate into an argument, it would be expected that the head should be the determiner. 
b) Whether the formal selectional restrictions of the heads that pick nominal constituents 
are satisfied by the determiner or by the common noun. Notice that here we talk about formal 
restrictions, not those referring to conceptual semantics: obviously, a nominal expression like 
una cerveza 'a beer' would combine better as the object of a verb like beber 'drink' than a 
nominal expression like una bombilla 'a lightbulb', but this can be explained by the different 
concepts that the nouns beer and lightbulb express, the former satisfying better our world 
knowledge understanding of what things are usually drunk. By 'formal restrictions' we rather 
refer to whether there are predicates that select specifically for nominal constituents with a 
determiner, or even for a determiner of a particular type. One potential case would be 
psychological predicates like gustar 'like', which require internal arguments with a determiner 
in Spanish even when they occupy a postverbal position (31). If this restriction is interpreted 
correctly as the verb selecting for a determiner, it would support the view that nominal 
constituents are projections of DP and not of NP –notice that there are no cases where a head 
selects for the modifier of another head–.  
 
(31) Me gustan *(las) manzanas. 
 me like.3pl the   apples 
 'I like apples' 
 
c) Whether the presence of a determiner is crucial for syntactic formal processes such as 
movement, case checking or case assignment, so that it can be argued that the syntactic label 
of a nominal expression without determiners is different from the one of a nominal expression 
that contains determiners. This aspect is complicated by the possibility that some nominal 
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expressions that do not have overt determiners might in fact have phonologically null versions 
of them, as we will see in §6. 
 
These three problems have been discussed in proposals about the internal syntax of 
determiners. The current situation is that a growing number of scholars do not accept the DP-
hypothesis of Abney (1987), which in contrast was virtually undisputed within generative 
syntax studies during the 90s and 00s.  
There is a second dimension to this debate, and it is the possibility that not all types of 
determiners and / or quantifiers occupy the same positions. Even on the assumption that 
Abney (1987) was essentially right in his DP proposal, several basic facts suggest that one 
cannot simply assume that all determiners and all quantifiers occupy the same position within 
the nominal constituent. Consider, to begin with, the fact that in Spanish a cardinal numeral 
can, but does not have to, combine with a determiner. 
 
(32) a. Dos chicos vinieron. 
     two boys came 
 b. Los dos chicos vinieron. 
     the two boys came 
   
There are two interesting aspects of this contrast. The first one is that (32a) shows that the 
cardinal can act as a 'determiner' in the wide sense that it, alone, can license the preverbal 
subject position of an argument; however, in (32b) the determiner position is occupied by the 
definite article. Thus, the cardinal numeral can either appear in two different positions –
related by movement or not–, or we must conclude that elements that do not occupy the D 
position can also license an argument. The second interesting aspect is that (32b) strongly 
suggests that within the structure of a nominal constituent we must make at least two 
positions available for determiners and quantifiers, so that there is syntactic space to host both 
los and dos in the same constituent. 
Moreover, while a cardinal has to follow the article if it combines with it, a universal 
quantifier like todos 'all' must precede it: 
 
(33) Todos los chicos vinieron. 
 all       the boys came 
 
It seems, again, that an additional position has to be made available within a nominal 
constituent, in the area of elements that are able to license the constituent in preverbal subject 
position.  
These facts have triggered a second, parallel syntactic debate that we will address in detail 
in §7: how complex is the syntax of the space where determiners and quantifiers are hosted? 
Most authors that have studied the internal syntactic organisation of determiners and 
quantifiers have proposed a number of syntactic layers that correspond to different classes of 
elements, and have argued that these layers are ultimately responsible for the readings that 
determiners and quantifiers produce; as we will see in detail, Zamparelli (2000) proposes an 
organisation where non-universal quantifiers are below the position of determiners, while 
universal quantifiers are above them. Non-specificity, specificity and definiteness are defined 







(34)  DPdefinite 
 
 Quniversal D 
 
  D  QPindefinite 
 
   Qindefinite ...NP 
 
This research program gives rise to a number of questions that are the object of different 
debates, beyond the obvious question of how many layers should be postulated in syntax.  
 
a) Assuming the existence of different layers in the determiner and quantifier domain, how 
is the work divided between syntax and the lexicon in order to make the different readings 
emerge? For instance, with respect to the cardinal numeral, is it inherently non-specific and it 
can only acquire specific readings by moving to the DP layer? This question is particularly 
relevant, in the context of Spanish, in the case of un 'a', which descriptively shares properties 
with both quantifiers and determiners. We will discuss this specific case in §8. 
b) How are the layers ordered? What type of logic determines how they are ordered, and 
what are the combinations of layers that produce grammatical results? 
c) Is the organisation of these layers autonomous or does it show significant parallels with 
the better studied and perhaps better understood organisation in the sentential domain? Abney 
(1987) in fact cited as supporting evidence for his DP proposal that it was a first step towards 
a parallel analysis of the functional structure in clauses and in nominal constituents, and 
Wiltschko (2014) has argued in some detail that nominal projections should be understood as 
conceptually different instantiations of the same basic primitives that are used to build 
clauses. In intuitive terms, DP is a projection whose role is to anchor the reference of the 
nominal, perhaps deictically, to the context of utterance. Tense, in the clausal domain, can be 
interpreted as essentially performing the same role, to anchor the truth value of a statement, 
perhaps deictically inside the temporal dimension, to the context of utterance. 
 
We leave here the presentation of the main syntactic questions related to determiners and 
quantifiers, and move now to the semantic issues. 
   
1.1.3. The semantics of determiners and quantifiers: main claims 
As we have seen, there is a wide notion of determiner which puts together both quantifiers 
and determiners in the narrow sense, and which is justified by the fact that both elements can 
be used to license preverbal subjects. Not surprisingly given the existence of a parallel 
syntactic function, from the semantic side there have been attempts to find also a unified 
semantic account of the two groups. But before we discuss this issue, a small background is 
relevant with respect to the standard semantic analysis of quantifiers.  
Semantically, quantifiers are viewed as binary functions that relate two sets (Lindström 
1966, Montague 1969, Barwise & Cooper 1981, van Benthem 1984, Keenan & Stavi 1986). 
In Montague's notation, where the semantic type <e> represents an individual and the type 
<t> represents a proposition, quantifiers are of type <<e,t>, <<e,t>,t>. Let us unpack what this 
means.  
The formula expresses that a quantifier is a function that eats objects of type <e,t> –
predicates– and produces a function of type <<e,t>,t> –that is, a function from another 
predicate to a proposition–. Doing it step by step, the first part of the function is satisfied by 
the noun phrase that the quantifier combines with. For instance, when the quantifier dos 'two' 
combines with the noun phrase chicos 'boys', it takes the noun phrase as a predicate and the 
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combination obtained is of type <<e,t>,t>. (35) expresses this assuming the quantifier heads 
the combination 
 
(35)  QP <<e,t>t> 
 
 
 Q  NP 
<<e,t>,<<e,t>t>> <e,t> 
 
The second set, and the second predicate of type <e,t> is external to the DP structure. It is 
the predicate that takes the DP as an argument, for instance the verb cantar 'sing' in a sentence 
like Dos chicos cantan 'Two boys sing'. Again, schematically (36): 
 
(36)  VP <t> 
 
 QP  V 
    <<e,t>,t> <e,t> 
 
The quantifier, then, expresses a relation between two sets: the set of entities that satisfies 
the description of 'boy' and the set of entities that satisfies the description of 'sing'. The 
quantifier restricts the relation between the two sets with a number or a measure. In the 
particular case of dos 'two', the relation is obvious: there are two entities that both satisfy the 
description of 'boy' and 'sing', that is, there are two entities that are both boys and sing.  
From a slightly different perspective, quantifiers are operators. Operators are semantic 
objects that have the capacity to manipulate the interpretation of constituents they are not 
directly combined with. Continuing with dos 'two', notice that in (37) it is possible to interpret 
that the expression un libro in actuality denotes two different books, each one read by one of 
the two boys.   
 
(37) Dos chicos leyeron un libro. 
 two boys    read      a    book 
 'Two boys read a book'  
 
Operators impose a particular type of semantic structure in natural language. Any operator 
must find a variable of the appropriate type, which is the constituent whose meaning is 
manipulated by it. In (37), the variable is un libro. The variable defines the scope of the 
quantifier, which is the syntactic constituent with which the operator is linked. Any operator 
that does not find a variable of the appropriate type produces ungrammatical results; 
technically, the situation where there is an operator but no variable associated to it is known 
as an infraction on the Condition on Quantifier Binding ('Every quantified phrase must 
properly bind a variable', May 1977) or Vacuous Quantification (Partee et al. 1990). (38) 
illustrates this situation: cada 'each' is a quantifier, and it does not find any variable in its 
scope to manipulate. 
 
(38) *Cada chico vio   a        Juan. 
   each  boy    saw DOM Juan 
 
As we saw above, any operator needs to combine with a predicate within the nominal 
structure. This predicate internal to the structure is its restrictor, that is, a set of properties that 
delimits the types of entities that the operator quantifies. In our example dos chicos 'two boys' 
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the restrictor is the set of properties denoted by chicos 'boys'. Of course, the set of properties 
that restrict the operator does not need to be necessarily restricted to the noun used: any 
modifier that adds descriptive properties to the denotation of the NP will be included. In an 
example like dos chicos con gafas 'two boys with glasses', the quantifier does not simply 
count how many boys were there, but specifically how many boys with glasses. This makes 
adjectives, prepositional phrases used as modifiers and relative clauses all relevant to define 
the restrictor of an operator. 
Some pronominal expressions cover both the operator and the restrictor: for instance, the 
pronoun nadie 'nobody', which is also quantificational, expresses both the quantifier ('zero') 
and the restrictor (roughly, 'humans'). In general, quantifiers that are expressed as pronouns or 
adverbs, and therefore do not combine with nouns, subsume the restrictor lexically (eg., 
nunca 'never' is restricted to time intervals, nada 'nothing' is restricted to non-animate entities. 
(39) summarises the three components of a quantifier structure with another example: 
 
(39) (Muchos)  (chicos)  (suspendieron una asignatura.) 
 many  boys   failed           a     course 
 [OPERATOR RESTRICTOR] [SCOPE   ] 
 
So what happens with determiners in the strict sense, such as el 'the' or este 'this'? Here is 
where the semantic unification we mentioned in the first paragraph becomes relevant. The 
idea is that, despite some differences that we will discuss in §2, the semantic contribution of a 
strict determiner is essentially the same as the one we just described for quantifiers. This 
proposal is known as the theory of Generalised Quantifiers (Barwise & Cooper 1981, with the 
philosophical antecedent of Mostowski 1957; see also Higginbotham & May 1981, Keenan 
1981). 
Take the case of el 'the', and let us examine, following Barwise & Cooper (1981: §3), what 
the meaning contribution of this determiner is in a sentence like (40). 
  
(40) Los estudiantes aprobaron. 
 the  students   passed 
 'The students passed' 
 
Assume that there is a defined set of students composed of 15 members, and that the 
subject in (40) refers to this group, which we assume the hearer can identify. Intuitively, the 
meaning of this sentence is not satisfied if 12 of the students passed and 3 failed, or if only 
one of the students passed. This situation in the real world is better described as (41), where 
we have changed the determiner. 
 
(41) Unos estudiantes (del grupo) aprobaron. 
 some students        of-the group passed 
 'Some students of the group passed' 
 
This shows us that using los 'the' or unos 'some' has implications for the relation between 
the set defined by estudiantes 'students' and the set defined by aprobaron 'passed'. In other 
words, choosing one or another determiner alters the interpretation of how many members are 
both in the set of being a student and in the set of passing an exam. If we use the definite 
article, each one of the 15 students has passed the exam, and if we use the indefinite article in 
the plural it is enough if only a subset of them passed. This is exactly the same contribution 
that we have described for quantifiers: expressing a relation between two sets. In §3 we will 
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go back to this property of the two types of articles, developing their quantificational 
character as Russell (1905) first proposed. 
Consider now the interpretation of (42), where the contribution of the article is a bit more 
subtle. 
 
(42) El estudiante aprobó. 
 the student    passed 
 
Intuitively, this sentence is only true if there is an entity that is a student, that entity passed 
the exam and, moreover, the entity that is a student is uniquely identified in the context (see 
§3.2 below for more details about this): if in the context there is no unique student, but we 
have talked about three, the hearer would react to this formulation and would at least ask us to 
clarify which one of the three students we refer to. This implies that in the singular the 
definite article is giving the indication that there is one single entity that, in the context, 
satisfies the description of the restrictor. If that single entity, the only student that can be 
interpreted given the context, also happens to have passed the exam, then (42) is true.  
The proposal, then, is that the objects of natural language that we have called strict 
determiners should also be treated semantically as quantifiers in at least the following 
respects: 
 
a) they are used to relate two sets (one of them denoted by the noun phrase they combine 
with) 
b) they can provide information with respect to a quantity, as it is the case with the definite 
article 
 
We will see in §2 that, despite these similarities in their semantic analysis, there are clear 
differences in their grammatical behaviour. The reader should keep in mind while reading 
these pages that the extent to which it is possible –without twisting the facts– to unify 
quantifiers and strict determiners into a single class from a syntactic perspective is debatable. 
 
1.2. D-like and Q-like adjectives 
Before going deeper into the differences between determiners and quantifiers, a few 
remarks are in order with respect to a restricted number of adjectives that can also display 
some of the properties of determiners and quantifiers. The adjectives are the following (taking 
as a starting point RAE & ASALE 2009: §13.9a): 
 
(43) Adjectives that share properties with quantifiers 
 a. numeroso 'numerous' 
 b. distinto 'different' 
 c. diferente 'different' 
 d. múltiple 'several' 
(44) Adjectives that share properties with determiners 
 a. cierto 'certain' 
 b. determinado 'determined' 
 c. dicho 'said' 
 d. tamaño 'such' 
 e. semejante 'such' 
 
We are excluding from this list one class entirely: the one of adjectives that share 
properties with pronouns –in the specific sense that they can express identity with an 
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antecedent or are used in reflexive constructions–, such as mismo 'self / same' or propio 'own'. 
We restrict ourselves to the adjectives that double as quantifiers or determiners in the strict 
sense. Moreover, with respect to RAE& ASALE (2009) we exclude from these lists 
adjectives that, even if they develop a use that is distinct from their use as adjectives, do not 
arrive to the syntactic stage where they can license preverbal subjects. Notice that all the 
adjectives listed have this capacity, sometimes restricted to the plural. 
 
(45) Adjectives that share properties with quantifiers 
 a. Numerosos fontaneros vinieron. 
     many  plumbers came 
 b. Distintos actores vinieron. 
     several    actors   came 
 c. Diferentes políticos vinieron. 
     different    politicians came 
 d. Múltiples estudiantes vinieron. 
     several     students came  
(46) Adjectives that share properties with determiners 
 a. Cierto partido ha cometido una estafa.  
     certain party   has committed a fraud 
 'A certain party has committed a fraud' 
 b. Determinado partido ha cometido una estafa. 
     determined    party    has committed a fraud 
 'A particular party has committed a fraud' 
 c. Dicho partido ha sido ilegalizado. 
     said    party    has been banned 
 'The party just mentioned has been banned' 
 d. Tamaña tontería me ofende. 
      such      nonsense me offends 
 'Such nonsense offends me' 
 e. Semejante tontería me ofende. 
     such           nonsense me offends 
 'Such nonsense offends me'  
 
In contrast, other adjectives whose meaning also describes a quantity or some condition 
related to the identificability of the nominal constituent lack this capacity. Among the 
adjectives listed in RAE & ASALE (2009) here are a few of those that belong to this group. 
 
(47) a. *Cuantiosos estudiantes vinieron. 
       considerable students came 
 b. *Nutridos estudiantes vinieron. 
       considerable students came 
(48) a. *Susodicho partido fue ilegalizado. 
       above-said party was banned 
 b. *Consabido partido fue ilegalizado. 
       well-known party was banned 
 
These adjectives do express quantities (47) or inform the hearer about whether their 
referent is identifiable –and sometimes, how it is identifiable–, but they are not 
grammaticalised as determiners from this perspective. In fact, in some cases these adjectives 
still allow degree modification: 




(49) a. una fortuna muy cuantiosa 
     a     wealth  very considerable 
 'a very considerable wealth' 
 b. un grupo muy nutrido 
     a group very   considerable 
 'a very considerable group' 
 
In contrast, the adjectives belonging to the group that can be used as proper quantifiers and 
determiners reject degree modification when they are used as such; this property can be used 
to differentiate between their proper adjectival use and their use as these functional items 
(50). This contrast shows that, in contrast to the group in (47) and (48), it is not just the 
meaning they express that connects them with determiners and quantifiers, but also their 
grammatical behaviour. 
 
(50) a. un grupo muy numeroso 
     a   group very large 
 b. *Muy numerosos estudiantes vinieron. 
       very numerous   students came 
(51) a. una respuesta muy distinta 
     an  answer     very  different 
 b. *Muy diferentes estudiantes vinieron. 
       very different   students came 
(52) a. una respuesta muy cierta 
     an  answer     very true 
 b. *Muy cierto partido fue ilegalizado.  
                  very certain party was banned 
(53) a. una razón muy determinada 
     a     reason very concrete 
 b. *Muy determinado partido fue ilegalizado. 
       very determined party was banned  
 
There is, in general, an obvious relation between the meaning of the word as an adjective 
and the use as a quantifier or a determiner. Obviously, given that determinado 'determined' 
refers to the property of being concrete and identifiable, it is not surprising that it can be used 
as a determiner; because numeroso 'numerous' expresses a quantity, it is not surprising either 
that it can double as a quantifier. That said, the lexical meaning of the adjective is not all that 
counts, and sometimes the connection between the adjectival meaning and the determiner use 
is lost –as it is the case with cierto 'certain' in contemporary Spanish, even though it is 
possible to track a historical relation with the meaning that it has in constructions like (54), 
where it expresses a vague similarity to the class denoted by the noun it modifies (cf. Eguren 
& Sánchez  2007).  
 
(54) una cierta desazón 
 a    certain unease 
 'something that is an unease from some perspective' 
 
Notice, along the same lines, that even though cierto and determinado express specificity 
without presupposing that the hearer can identify the referent (Eguren & Sánchez 2007), other 
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adjectives that would obviously be able to describe the specificity of an object, such as 
específico 'specific' cannot be used as determiners. 
 
(55) *Específico chico vino.  
   specific      boy   came 
 
Therefore, the semantics is not all that counts. The meaning of the adjective must be of a 
type that makes it compatible with the semantic function of quantifiers and determiners, but 
beyond this there has to take place a formal grammaticalisation process that allows the item to 
be used as a member of the relevant functional category. See also, along these lines, Eguren & 
Sánchez (2003) on the historical evolution and synchronic grammatical behaviour of otro 
'other'.   
It is possible to state a generalisation that distinguishes between the quantifier-like 
adjectives and the determiner-like adjectives. All the quantifier-like adjectives display this 
role in the plural. Notice that all the examples in (45) above involve plural subjects. (56) 
shows that as soon as the subject is singular the quantifier-like adjective cannot be used to 
license the subject in preverbal position. 
 
(56) a. *Numeroso fontanero vino. 
       many  plumber came 
 b. *Distinto actor vino. 
     several    actor   came 
 c. *Diferente político vino. 
     different    politician came 
 d. *Múltiple estudiante vino. 
     several     student came  
 
One could blame the meaning expressed by the adjective in two of these cases: (56a) and 
(56d), given that the lexical meaning assumes a plurality of entities. However, this 
explanation is not so obvious in the case of (56b) and (56c), given that –when used as 
adjectives– both elements allow a reading in the singular where the distinction is established 
between the singular DP they build and an entity assumed in the discourse, perhaps 
previously mentioned (see Laca & Tasmowski 2003 for this restriction in French, and Eguren 
& Sánchez 2010 for a discussion of this in Spanish). 
 
(57) Tienes que leer un libro distinto. 
 must.2sg to read a book different 
 'You must read a different book'  
 
This restriction does not extend to the adjectives that double as determiners in the strict 
sense; note that in (46) above the subjects are singular. The exception for some speakers is the 
adjective determinado 'determined'. As Eguren & Sánchez (2007) note, in the singular some 
speakers cannot license the preverbal subject with this adjective and must add a determiner 
(47). 
 
(58) Un determinado partido ha sido ilegalizado. 
 a    determined party has been banned 
 
In an informal study we conducted with speakers of European Spanish, we saw that there 
are at least two groups. The first group agrees with Eguren & Sánchez (2007) in preferring 
DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS IN SPANISH: TYPES, TESTS AND THEORIES 
  
 17 
(58) to (46b), while the second group accepts both. For both groups, the plural version does 
not require another determiner, that is, (59) is equally acceptable for both groups. 
 
(59) Determinados políticos vinieron. 
 determined     politicians came 
 
Both groups allow also the singular version without a determiner in object position, or after 
prepositions. 
 
(60) Vi a determinado político. 
 saw.1sg DOM determined politician 
 'I saw a certain politician' 
 
We have, thus, an instance of microvariation in the use of this adjective. 
Leaving the potential complication of determinado behind, the fact that all quantifier-like 
adjectives are restricted to the plural is reminiscent of a similar restriction in the domain of 
quantifiers: cardinal numerals. Notice that every numeral –we leave aside un 'one' for reasons 
that will be discussed in §8– forces the NP it combines with to be grammatically plural (Borer 
2005). 
 
(61) a. cero libros 
     zero books 
 b. uno coma dos libros 
     one point two books  
 c. veinte libros 
     twenty books 
 
This fact suggests that the syntactic position of quantifier-like adjectives should be the 
same, or closely related to, the one occupied by numerals –the difference, obviously, being 
just in the lexical meaning of each one, given that quantifier-like adjectives do not express 
precise cardinality values–.  
In contrast, in the domain of determiners in the strict sense there is no documented case –to 
the best of our knowledge– where the determiner is forced to combine with a plural noun 
phrase. If the position occupied by determiner-like adjectives is the same, or closely related 
to, the one that items like el or un occupy, the fact that they are available both in singular and 
plural becomes easier to understand. 
This class of adjectives have been studied in detail by Eguren & Sánchez in a series of 
articles (2003 for otro, 2007 for cierto and other adjectives used to express specificity, and 
2010 for diferente and distinto). Their analysis in all cases provides a detailed description of 
their semantic and syntactic distribution, and the grammaticalisation process that explains the 
evolution from adjective to deteminer or quantifier, but it does not provide a formal account 
of how both uses survive in contemporary Spanish. Fábregas (2018) attempts to provide a 
formalisation of why both uses can persist. The ingredients of the analysis are the following: 
 
a) Adjectives are modifiers, but they are not necessarily restricted to one type of semantic 
object. While most adjectives are introduced in the NP area, adding descriptive properties to 
the denotation of a common noun, nothing blocks in principle that –if they express the right 
semantic notion– they can also be used as modifiers of other notions such as quantification or 
even definiteness / specificity.  
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b) However, the semantic is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The double role of the 
adjective must be somehow codified grammatically, specifically as part of the information 
about the features that the lexical element can identify in the structure. 
c) The main difference between quantifier-like and determiner-like adjectives is syntactic: 
the first group is introduced in the quantification area, in the same position as cardinal 
numerals, and the second group is introduced as modifiers in the determiner area. 
d) When used as determiners or quantifiers, the items identify not just the features 
corresponding to the modifier, but also those expressed by the head that they modify. 
Technically, Fábregas (2018) assumes Phrasal Spell Out (Caha 2009): a lexical exponent can 
identify any syntactic constituent, not just terminal nodes (heads).  
 
(62) presents the lexical entry of diferente. When used as an adjective, the exponent only 
spells out the specifier (of category AP; cf. 63); when used as a quantifier, it spells out the 
whole constituent, and therefore occupies the space that a quantifier could have occupied 
(64). 
 
(62) diferente <-----> NumP 
 
  AP    Num 
 
 A  √   Num   
     
 
(63)    XP    
 
  AP      X 
 
 A  √1806    X  NP 
     
 diferente    N  ... 
 
 
(64)    NumP   <--- diferente 
 
  AP    Num 
 
 A  √1806   Num  PlP 
     
      Pl  ... 
 
 
Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of a determiner-like adjective, such as cierto 
'certain'. In this case, it is introduced as a modifier of a D head responsible for specificity. We 
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(65)  ciert- <---->  SpeP 
 
  AP    Spe 
 
 A  √1929   Spe  IndP 
     
      Ind  ... 
 
(66)      XP 
 
  AP      X 
 
 A  √    X  NP 
     
       N  ... 
 




    SpeP    <--- ciert(o) 
 
  AP    Spe 
 
 A  √   Spe  IndP 
     
      Ind  ... 
 
 
Independently of whether this technical approach is fine, the goal it tries to achieve is to 
provide an explanation of why not any adjective that expresses a property related to quantity 
or identificability can be used as a determiner: the meaning has to be compatible with the 
heads responsible for cardinality and specificity, but in addition to that the specific lexical 
item must be listed in the language as able to spell out the complex structure that involves 
also the relevant functional head, not just the AP structure. 
With this background in mind, we will now develop the details of the questions and issues 
that we have introduced already. The next section will discuss the differences between 
quantifiers and determiners in the proper sense. 
  
2. Determiners against quantifiers: tests and properties 
In section §1 we showed that it is possible to call of a macroclass of determiners in the 
wide sense that puts together two types of entities that combine with common nouns: 
quantifiers and determiners in a restricted sense. This macroclass is granted by two 
characteristics, one syntactic and another semantic: both types of elements license preverbal 
subjects, and both elements have been proposed to be amenable to an analysis in terms of 
generalised quantifiers. In addition to these two similarities, there are other more superficial 
parallelisms in the behaviour of the two classes –more superficial because they involve 
properties that are not exclusive of the two elements–. In Spanish, most quantifiers and most 




(68) a. el    chico 
     the.m.sg  boy 
 b. la   chica 
     the.f.sg  girl 
 c. los   chicos 
     the.m.pl  boys 
 d. las   chicas 
     the.f.pl  girls 
(69) a. mucho  calor 
     much.m.sg  heat 
 b. mucha  agua 
     much.f.sg  water 
 c. muchos  chicos 
     many.m.pl  boys 
 d. muchas  chicas  
     many.f.pl  girls   
 
However, most adjectives also follow this agreement pattern –a fact that also justifies that 
traditional grammars use the term 'determinative adjectives'–.  
However, this does not mean that the behaviour of quantifiers and strict determiners should 
be seen as entirely homogeneous. This section addresses the differences between the two 
subclasses of elements, and provides a few tests that allow to determine where an item should 
be classified. 
 
2.1. Scope and scope ambiguities with quantifiers 
We noted that quantifiers are operators, and as such they take variables under their scope. 
The operator manipulates the meaning of the variable, and if the operator is quantificational in 
nature this means that the operator can modify the interpretation of the number or measure of 
the variable.  
Consider (70). 
 
(70) Cinco chicos trajeron tres libros. 
 five     boys   brought three books 
 
This sentence has two interpretation; in the first one, we end up with 15 books, and in the 
second one we end up with only 3 books. In the interpretation where we have 15 books, the 
quantifier cinco 'five' manipulates the nominal tres libros 'three books' as a variable, and 
multiplies its number –three– by the number it expresses –five–, producing the reading that 
there are 15 books (3x5). This is a typical situation for an operator: the notion that it expresses 
is extended to the interpretation of a constituent that is inside its scope, acting as its variable. 
Let us call this long-distance manipulation of meaning. 
The second property that is illustrated by (70) and is considered typical of quantifiers is 
that (70) displays a scope ambiguity (Klima 1964, Chomsky 1975, Reinhart 1976, May 1977, 
1985, Kiss 1991, Bartos 2000). The interpretation described in the paragraph above is the one 
triggered when the nominal tres libros 'three books' stays in the scope of the operator cinco 
'five'. But because that nominal contains itself an operator, tres 'three', it can escape from the 
scope of the operator cinco 'five', in which case we obtain the reading that there are also three 
books: the sentence is interpreted as 'There are three x, where x is a book, such that five y, 
where y is a boy, brought them'. An expression that contains a quantifier, therefore, can 
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produce scope ambiguities depending on whether it stays under the scope of another 
quantifier, or it escapes from it.  
Therefore, one direct way of identifying whether something is a quantifier is to see 
whether it gives rise to meaning ambiguities in interaction with an object that we already 
know is a quantifier. Among the typical objects that have been argued to act as quantifiers in 
natural language we have the negation (71a), modal operators (71b) and of course pronouns 
like todos 'all' (71c). 
 
(71) a. No vinieron muchos estudiantes. 
     not came many students 
 'Many students did not come' 
 b. Debes leer dos libros. 
     must.2sg read two books 
 'You must read two books' 
 c. Todos los hombres quieren a dos mujeres. 
     all       the men       love     DOM two women 
  'Every men loves two women' 
 
Let us examine the scope ambiguity in each case. In (71a), if the quantifier muchos 'many' 
stays under the scope of the negation, we obtain a reading where we say that few students 
came (that is, 'not many' or in a frequent way of representing the scope, 'not' > 'many'). If 
muchos escapes from the scope of the negation, we say that there were many students that did 
not come –for instance, that we expected a particular set of students to come, and they did not 
show up– (that is, 'many' > 'not').  
In (71b), the reading where dos libros 'two books' is below the modal operator ('must' > 
'two'), we say that you have to read two books, but we have no specific books in mind when 
we say this. It does not matter to me whether you read It and The Shining or whether you read 
Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility. When we have the inverse scope relation 
('two' >'must') we say that there are two books in particular such as you must read them: for 
instance, you must read Catcher in the Rye and To Kill a Mockingbird, and any combination 
of two other books would simply not work. 
In (71c) the reading where dos 'two' is in the scope of todos 'every' essentially says that for 
every man his love is shared with two different women, no matter what their identities are. In 
the inverse scope reading ('two' > 'every'), each man loves exactly the same two women –for 
instance, Marie Curie and Vera Rubin–.  
Evidence that this scope ambiguity depends on the presence of a quantifier that combines 
with the noun phrase comes from the absence of an ambiguity in the cases where the noun 
phrase lacks any type of determiner or quantifier –that is, with so-called bare noun phrases–. 
 
(72) No vinieron estudiantes. 
 not came      students 
 'No students came' 
 
In (72) the only interpretation is that no member of the class that can be described as 
'students' came. Bare noun phrases must always stay under the scope of operators that are 
above them in the syntactic structure, and have no possibility to escape from it. If the bare 
noun could escape from the scope of the negation in (72) we would have obtained a reading 
along the lines of 'there were students that did not come', something that does not correspond 




2.2. Limits of the notion of scope and scope ambiguities with strict determiners 
Let us now move to the strict determiners, such as este 'this' and el 'the', and examine how 
many of these behavioural properties they also display. In general, while individual members 
of the class might share some of this behaviour, the conclusion will be that they do not act 
like quantifiers in every respect in a systematic way. 
Let us start with whether the strict determiners are able to affect, in long distance, the 
interpretation of other nominal expressions, taken as variables. On the surface, it seems that 
the definite article has this possibility in an example like (73), where perhaps not by chance 
los 'the' is interpreted in a similar way to todos 'all': it expresses a group of entities, unique 
and identifiable, and it denotes that the predicate is true of every single member of that group. 
 
(73) Los chicos leyeron un libro. 
 the boys read a book 
 'The boys read a book' 
 
Importantly, there is one interpretation of this sentence where each boy read a different 
book, that is, where despite the singular nature of un libro 'a book' the nominal constituent is 
interpreted as referring to a group of books, perhaps as many as boys are in the group. This is 
similar to the effect that a quantifier has.  
However, note that even in this situation it cannot be claimed that the determiner extends 
to the other nominal all its properties. As we have already mentioned, the definite article 
conveys the idea of identifiability through uniqueness, and carries definiteness –essentially in 
all cases–. This uniqueness requirement and the definiteness are not extended to the other 
nominals in their syntactic context. In (73), the interpretation of un libro 'a book' is 
necessarily indefinite, that is, the meaning of this nominal is not manipulated in such a way 
that we refer to a book that is uniquely identifiable in the context.  
A similar observation can be made with respect to demonstratives. (74) allows for an 
interpretation where there is more than one book, like the article. Demonstratives, as opposed 
to articles, incorporate lexically a deictic meaning. Deixis (Fillmore 1975) is a pragmatic 
notion used to describe the situations where the reference of an expression is determined by 
taking into account the context of utterance, that is, the place and time where the speaker and 
the hearer are located when the proposition is asserted. In this sense, estos 'these' identifies the 
reference of the nominal by their proximity to the speaker –in time or place within the speech 
context, or the extralinguistic reality– (Eguren 1999).   
 
(74) Estos chicos leyeron un libro. 
 these boys read a book 
 'These boys read a book' 
 
Note that the deixis information is never extended to the other nominals. That is: un libro 'a 
book' in (74) is never interpreted as taking its reference deictically by proximity to the 
speaker. Consider now possessives. 
 
(75) Tus amigos leyeron un libro. 
 your friends read a book 
 'Your friends read a book' 
 
Like demonstratives, possessives can incorporate a deictic component, in this case 'person': 
the distinction between the first and the second person generally corresponds to a distinction 
between speaker and hearer, which are notions that must be necessarily defined in the context 
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of utterance. They trigger definite readings where the reference of the nominal is identified by 
their relation to the deictically anchored person. Again, this person deixis is never extended to 
the nominal un libro 'a book' in this example: there is no entailment that the book belongs to 
the hearer, or that it is to be taken as definite.  
This situation suggests that, to the extent that some determiners in the plural are able to 
operate over the reference of a variable, this might be a property related to plural number and 
not to the determiners themselves. The readings that we have identified where in the same 
sentence there is a plural determiner and another nominal in singular that is interpreted as 
plural are distributive readings: given a group of entities, the event is performed by each one 
of these entities individually, not by all of them collectively –and therefore it is possible that 
each one of them read a different book–. Link (1983) famously proposed a distributivity 
operator responsible for these readings, in relation to the presence of a plural expression in the 
linguistic utterance. This could be a way of accounting for the pattern of facts we have just 
seen. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that even if it turned out to be the case that strict 
determiners themselves are able to control the interpretation of variables, this capacity does 
not extend to their uniqueness or their deictic information. At best, from this perspective 
determiners would contain an operator responsible for their quantificational aspects, and in 
addition to that other syntactic or semantic components that do not act as operators in the 
same sense that we described above. 
However, the proposal that strict determiners do contain a component that acts like the 
quantifiers that we have described above faces an important challenge. We have seen that 
another property of quantifiers is that they allow the nominal that contains them to escape the 
scope of another quantifier, triggering scope ambiguities. We have also seen that this 
ambiguity is not triggered when we have a bare noun. The question now is whether a nominal 
that contains a strict determiner also shows this flexibility. Let us see this –we will not use at 
this point examples containing the form un 'a', given the debate about whether it belongs to 
the class of quantifiers or the class of strict determiners (cf. §8)–.   
Let us start with the definite article (76). 
 
(76) Algunos chicos vieron al profesor.  
 some     boys   saw    DOM-the teacher 
 'Some boys saw the teacher' 
 
(76) displays an ambiguity between a distributive and a collective reading (respectively, 
'The boys saw the teacher individually, at different times' and 'The boys saw the teacher all at 
the same time, together'), but in both cases the expression el profesor 'the teacher' is 
intepreted as a unique, singular entity that the hearer is assumed to identify. No ambiguity 
alludes to a difference in interpretation in what the nominal expression refers to.  
Similarly, there is no ambiguity with demonstratives and possessives of first and second 
person. 
 
(77) a. Algunos chicos vieron a este profesor. 
     some     boys     saw    DOM this teacher 
 'Some boys saw this teacher' 
 b. Algunos chicos vieron a mi profesor. 
     some      boys    saw     DOM my teacher 




Does this necessarily mean that the semantic proposal of generalised quantifiers is wrong? 
Not really. One alternative account would be to say that strict determiners –with the potential 
exception of the indefinite article, if it belongs to this class– can never function as variables 
under the scope of quantifiers, and therefore their interpretation can never be affected by the 
presence of an operator above. This would not exclude that they contain a quantifier inside 
their structure, but such quantifier would be just one of the components of their meaning, and 
in addition to it there would be information about how reference is obtained –deixis, 
uniqueness, etc.– that is not showing the behaviour that we would expect of operators at least 
in the sense that they do not extend the interpretation in long distance. 
In fact, if we look at third person possessives we automatically see that they do allow an 
interpretation as variables bound by a higher operator (in contrast to first and second person 
pronouns, that do not act as variables except for some restricted contexts described in detail in 
Kratzer 2009). (78) allows an interpretation where each boy brought his own book to the 
class, and therefore where the nominal su libro 'his book' is interpreted with plural reference. 
 
(78) Todos los chicos trajeron su libro a clase. 
 all       the boys   brought their book to class 
 'All the boys brought their (own) book to class'  
 
Taking this option to a syntactic extreme could imply that strict determiners contain a 
quantifier within their structure, roughly along the lines in (79): (79a) would be the projection 
of quantifiers –call it QP for the time being, and we will go back to the issue in more 
theoretical terms in §7– and (79b) would correspond to a strict determiner, where the operator 
structure is dominated by layers responsible for reference-related notions such as definiteness 
and specificity. 
 
(79) a.  XP    b. YP 
 
 Q  ...   D  XP 
 
       Q  ... 
  
One potential problem of this approach is that strict determiners can in fact combine 
overtly with some quantifiers –not in all cases, though–. For instance, cada 'each' does not 
combine with any overt determiner, but muchos 'many', dos 'two' and the other cardinals, or 
pocos 'few' are able to do so. 
 
(80) a. *{el / este / mi} cada chico 
        the this     my each boy 
 b. sus muchos amigos 
     his many     friends 
 c. estos dos estudiantes 
    these two students 
 d. las pocas explicaciones que ha dado 
     the few      explanations   that has given 
  
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that these quantifiers, rather than being heads 
materialising Q, are in fact modifiers of that head. One piece of evidence that these elements 
should be seen as modifiers that are closely related to the quantification area is that they can 
be coordinated with other modifiers. 




(81) a. muchas y grandes voces 
     many    and loud   screams 
 b. dos y únicos motivos 
     two and only motives 
 c. pocas e insuficientes explicaciones 
     few and unsatisfying explanations 
  
We will go back to the nature and position of quantifiers in the nominal domain in §7. 
Thus, to conclude this discussion, the strict determiners contrast in their surface behaviour 
with quantifiers with respect to their scope possibilities. This can be taken as an empirical test 
to determine the adscription of items to one of the two classes, even if it does not refute 
entirely the proposal that in semantic terms strict determiners share a type with quantifiers as 
<<e,t>,<<e,t>t> functions. What is also clear, from a semantic perspective, is that strict 
determiners add information about reference that is not codified in the meaning of a 
quantifier, something that is potentially related to the fact that they cannot be taken as 
variables by another quantifier. 
 
2.3. De dicto and de re readings with the definite article  
The fact that strict determiners contain information used to determine the reference of the 
nominal constituent produces two types of interpretations that nominal structures that lack a 
strict determiner do not produce. The distinction is automatically visible with noun phrases in 
combination with the definite article el 'the', such as (82). 
 
(82) el presidente de Francia 
 the president of France 
 
(82) can be used in two senses: in order to refer to the individual that at the moment of 
utterance fits the description of the NP –that is, in August 2018, Emmanuel Macron– or to 
describe a set of properties that at each moment would be matched by a single individual 
whose concrete identity varies across time. The first interpretation, where (82) equals 
Emmanuel Macron, is called de re reading –literally, 'reading about the entity'–. The second 
reading is called de dicto –literally, 'about the saying'–. This distinction was discussed by 
Russell (1905) and further developed in Quine (1960), although this second author treated it 
in a sense that overlaps with the distinction between specific and non-specific interpretations 
(§4 below) which also allowed to talk about the difference in the case of indefinite 
quantifiers.1  
Speakers can use (82) in either meaning, but the two readings are not identical. Quine 
(1960) noted that the distinction can be tested by embedding the proposition that contains (82) 
under an attitude verb –such as creer 'believe', pensar 'think', querer 'want', recordar 'know', 
that is, verbs used to describe the content of the mental states of humans, be it their 
perceptions, their desires, their beliefs, etc.–. Take a sentence like (83): 
 
                                               
1 Specifically, Quine (1960) argued that the distinction is behind the two interpretations that can be given to the 
sentence in (i): that John believes that some particular person is a spy (de re, in Quine's description) and that 
John believes that there is at least one person that is a spy –that is, that spies exist–. However, these two readings 
are closer, as we will see, to the distinction between specific and non-specific interpretations of indefinite 
quantifiers, where in the specific reading the speaker has some concrete entity in mind. 
 
(i) John thinks that someone is a spy. 
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(83) María cree que ha visto al presidente de Francia. 
 María believes that she has seen DOM.the president of France 
 'María believes that she has seen the president of France' 
 
This sentence can mean in fact two different things, depending on the de dicto or de re 
reading of el presidente de Francia. In the first reading, María believes that she has seen the 
person described by the NP 'president of France', and in the second reading María believes 
that she has seen Emmanuel Macron. Only in the second case is (83) truth equivalent to (84). 
 
(84) María cree que ha visto a Emmanuel Macron. 
 María believes that she has seen DOM Emmanuel Macron 
 'María believes that she has seen Emmanuel Macron' 
 
If María believes, incorrectly, that the current president of France is Nicolas Sarkozy and 
she has seen Emmanuel Macron, (83) is false in the de dicto reading, but true in the de re 
reading, simply because María has seen the individual that is the president of France now, but 
she did not believe that the person she was seeing was the one that matches the description 
'president of France'. 
To continue with the distinction, note that the most natural interpretation of a generic 
sentence is de dicto (85).  
 
(85) El presidente de Francia nombra al primer ministro. 
 The president of France appoints the Prime Minister 
 
What (85) says is that whoever, at a particular point, satisfies the description 'president of 
France' has the power to appoint the Prime Minister. When Emmanuel Macron stops 
satisfying this description, he will still be the same person –de re–, but he will not have the 
power to appoint the Prime Minister. 
These two readings are a property of so-called definite descriptions, which are noun 
phrases combined with a definite determiner, article or otherwise. Note that possessives and 
demonstratives can also trigger the two readings, even if they are less clear in the second case 
due to deixis. 
 
(86) Mi pareja decide adónde vamos de vacaciones. 
 My partner decides where go.1pl of holidays 
 'My partner decides where we go on holidays' 
 
(86) has the same two readings as before. Imagine that my partner is called Hortensia. In 
the de re reading, I say that Hortensia is the one that decides where we go on holidays; she 
might have done that before being my partner and might continue doing so if we break up; no 
other person tells me where to go on holidays. In the de dicto reading, I say that whoever is 
my partner at a particular moment decides where we spend the holidays. If now my partner is 
Hortensia, she is the one that decides, but before her it was Heliodora that decided, and if we 
break up someone else will.  
 
(87) Este escritor me gusta mucho. 
 this writer me likes a.lot 
 'I like this writer a lot' 
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Here, the two interpretations might even influence in what properties the speaker likes 
about the person referred to by este escritor 'this writer'. In the de re reading, the speaker likes 
the person –assume that is Stephen King–, while in the de dicto reading the speaker likes 
whoever wrote a particular text, perhaps ignoring who that person is. In the case of an 
anonymous text like Lazarillo de Tormes, only the de dicto reading makes sense in (87), 
unless the speaker has some knowledge about the identity of the author of that book which the 
rest of us lacks –in which case the de re reading can be available–.  
In the case of quantifiers, the existence of the two readings is not always possible. 
Consider (88), with a universal quantifier. 
 
(88) María cree que conoce a todos los estudiantes del curso. 
 María thinks that knows DOM all the students of.the course 
 'María thinks that she knows every student of the course'  
 
María's belief can be that she knows everybody that satisfies the description 'student of the 
course' (de dicto) or that she knows a set of individuals that corresponds to the students of the 
course, say Juan, Luis and Mónica, even if María might ignore that they are students in that 
course (de re). Thus, the two readings are possible, but note that the nominal expression is 
definite: it contains los 'the'. In the use of todo 'each' without the definite article, only the de 
dicto reading is available. 
 
(89) María cree que conoce a todo estudiante del curso. 
 María believes that knows DOM every student of.the course 
 'María believes that she knows every student of the course' 
 
Something similar happens with cada 'each'. 
 
(90) María cree que conoce a cada estudiante del curso que ha tomado una asignatura con  




 'María believes that she knows each student of the course that has taken a subject with 
 her'. 
 
Evaluative indefinite quantifiers like muchos 'many', pocos 'few', suficientes 'enough' or 
bastantes 'quite' can also trigger the de re reading. (91) is naturally interpreted as María's 
belief being that a particular quantity of entities that satisfy the description of 'student' did 
something, but it can also mean that a group of definite individuals (Juan, Luis, Pedro...) that 
is evaluated as big, small, etc. performed the action, without María necessarily knowing that 
they are students. 
 
(91) María cree que {muchos / pocos / suficientes / demasiados} estudiantes fueron a la  
 María believes that many  few       enough        too.many   students went to the 
 fiesta.  
 party 
 
Also, the cardinals allow the two readings. (92), for instance, can mean that María's belief 
is that the stealing was performed by two people, who had to be students, or that she believes 
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that the stealing was performed by Mariano and Soraya, who happen to be two students in the 
course. 
 
(92) María cree que dos estudiantes han robado la estatua. 
 María believes that two students have stolen the statue 
 'María believes that two students have stolen the statue' 
   
In this case, what might be behind the two readings is the existence of partitive readings 
({many, few, enough, two} of the students in a particular group), which relates in turn to 
specific interpretations. We will get back to the two interpretations in §4. 
The conclusion is, then, that unless a notion related to identifiability, such as definiteness 
or specificity, is involved in the interpretation of the nominal expression, there is no 
possibility to have the two readings that we have described. Any definite noun phrase has the 
two options, but quantifiers that can also get a specific reading also display a similar contrast. 
The two readings are therefore directly related to the referential properties defined by strict 
determiners. The question, which we leave open now, is how indefinite quantifiers come to 
express notions like specificity, which in fact relate to the domain of reference. §7 will offer 
some proposals about this property. 
  
3. Definite and indefinite determiners: tests and properties 
Now that we have described the main differences between quantifiers and strict 
determiners, we will use the following two sections to discuss in detail the notions that strict 
determiners express, with particular attention to two concepts: definiteness and specificity. 
This section concentrates on how definiteness is codified grammatically in Spanish, while the 
next one will treat in detail the notion of specificity, which is almost completely restricted to 
indefinite noun phrases –with exceptions that we will point out in due course, and which 
depend on a particular understanding of what should count as specificity–. After presenting 
the notion of definiteness and the tests that allow to differentiate between definites and 
indefinites (§3.1.) we will present in detail the distribution of the definite article (§3.2.) and 
the so-called indefinite article (§3.3.).  
  
3.1. General issues 
The main difference between the form el and the form un has to do with the syntactic and 
pragmatic notion of definiteness; before describing in detail the distribution of the two 
determiners in Spanish, let us discuss what definiteness is about. 
 
3.1.1. The notion of definiteness 
Intuitively and in vague terms, definiteness is the property of some referential expressions 
that convey the information that the addressee should be able to identify the referent. Despite 
the straightforward appearance of this definition, it is filled with problems that have been the 
object of many discussions (among others, Vendler 1968, Hawkins 1991, Du Bois 1980, 
Neale 1990). Part of the problem is that –to the extent that the definition above makes direct 
reference to the addressee, a participant in the speech act– the notion is put in pragmatic 
terms, which brings up the problem of what type of information is conveyed grammatically in 
a language that has determiners in order to produce the desired pragmatic effect. On the 
assumption that pragmatics is not directly grammaticalised in a syntactic structure, as opposed 
to semantics, the question is what semantic notion underlies definiteness. 
The first proposal in order to account for this property is Russell (1905), who bases his 
definition in the notion of uniqueness: a sentence containing a definite expression of the form 
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el x 'the x' is true if there is exactly one entity that satisfies the description of x in the relevant 
context of utterance.  
 
(93) El perro ha ladrado. 
 the dog has barked 
 
(93) is therefore true if there is exactly one dog in the context of utterance (and that dog 
has barked). Following Heim (2011), (94) represents the denotation of the definite article for 
Russell (1905) –note that here the uniqueness condition is represented as part of the 
denotation, not as a presupposition–.  
 
(94) [[el]] = lP.lQ.∃x[∀y[P(y)<--> x=y] & Q(x)] 
 
That is, the definite article –following the theory of Generalised Quantifiers that we 
discussed in §1– is a binary function that takes two predicates (P and Q) and additionally has 
quantificational force –there exists one x–. The uniqueness condition is enforced by the 
biconditional statement that, in that context, any object y that satisfies the property described 
by the common noun is identical to x. Strawson (1950), following Frege (1892), revised 
Russell's analysis proposing that the uniqueness condition is not part of the denotation, but a 
presupposition (95). This position is assumed by most contemporary semanticists. Notice that 
in (95) the uniqueness statement that any y that satisfies P is identical to x is restricting the 
function that applies the predicate P, so that if the condition is not satisfied the formula does 
not output a truth value. 
 
(95) [[el]] = lP:∃x∀y[P(y)<--> x=y].lQ.∃x[P(x) & Q(x)] 
 
 This proposal faced an immediate challenge with plural noun phrases combined with the 
definite article: that is, if we talk of los perros 'the dogs' and we assume that there are four 
dogs, the uniqueness requisite is not satisfied by any of the individual dogs. The solution 
proposed for these cases (Sharvy 1980) was to invoke maximality: if the dogs are a, b, c and 
d, the formula Maximal([[dog]]) consists of the element a+b+c+d, which is a singleton. 
Maximality guarantees then that the uniqueness condition is satisfied by the maximal group 
a+b+c+d, which is unique in the context of speech. This corresponds to our intuition about the 
meaning of (96): that every entity that is a dog in the context has barked. 
 
(96) Los perros han ladrado. 
 the dogs have barked 
 
The specific way in which uniqueness should be interpreted is also subject to debate, in 
many ways to turn it into a notion that can be operationalised in pragmatics. Ariel (1988, 
1990) relates uniqueness with the notion of discourse accessibility, defined following Sperber 
& Wilson (1986) in terms of how easy it is to recall that notion from the previous discourse or 
the context of speech –more accessible assumptions are those that are easier to recall–. Abbott 
(2010) points out that this notion is insufficient to the extent that accessibility already 
presupposes uniqueness (accessing a referent in memory already implies that said referent is 
definite, that is, identifiable by the addressee). Gundel et al. (1993) take a different route 
based on the givenness degree associated to the nominal expression: an expression has a 
higher degree of givenness if the addressee, at that particular context, is able to indentify the 
intended referent of that nominal expression based solely on the description provided by the 
noun phrase. For this reason, the notion of definiteness is associated to entities that have been 
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activated in the discourse, as in the example (97), where the definite nominal refers 
anaphorically to an indefinite expression: 
 
(97) [Un perro]i ladró.    [El perro]i tenía el pelo blanco. 
 a     dog      barked   the dog     had   the hair white 
 'A dog barked. The dog had white hair' 
 
Birner & Ward (1998), however, point out that the definite article is used in some contexts 
where it is not implied that the hearer can identify the referent –maybe the speaker does not 
know the identity either–. (98) offers a couple of examples. 
 
(98) El ganador del concurso viajará a Noruega. 
 the winner of.the competition will.travel to Norway 
 'The winner of the competition will travel to Norway' 
  
In (98) nobody can identify the winner before the competition has taken place. Birner & 
Ward (1998) therefore substitute the notion of identificability with one of individuation, 
which is weaker: individuation means that the speaker believes that the addressee is able to 
individuate the referent under discussion from others within the context. Individuation is 
performed by a property that differentiates that referent from all the other referents in the 
discourse, for instance that the referent is the unique winner of the competition, and that he or 
she will travel to Norway.  
From the perspective of uniqueness, then, the proper way in which this notion connects 
with the pragmatic use of definiteness is unclear, but uniqueness is not the only approach to 
what definiteness expresses. 
One approach that is particularly common in traditional grammars (for instance, Alcina & 
Blecua 1975) is to base the distinction in (discourse) familiarity. From this perspective, the 
main property of definite expressions is that they designate discourse referents that have 
already been established in the discourse. Indefinite expressions introduce new discourse 
referents, as in (97), while the definite expression refers to those referents at the point at 
which they have already been introduced (see in particular Heim 1982 for a modern 
formulation of this idea). This perspective also needs to use the discourse and the discourse 
context as a tool to describe the meaning of the grammaticalised definite and indefinite 
markers, and in principle cannot deal with cases where the definite expression lacks an 
antecedent –that is, when the definite article can be used in the first mention of a nominal 
expression–. (99) presents a few examples of this. 
 
(99) a. No te caigas al suelo. 
     not you fall to.the floor 
 'Don't fall to the floor' 
 b. El sol está rojo. 
     the sun is red 
 'The sun is red' 
 
These cases are, interestingly, directly accounted for in a theory of uniqueness, because 
they refer to entities that under normal circumstances are always unique in the discourse –in 
our planet there is only one object that satisfies the description 'sun', and wherever we are 
there is only one specific space that satisfies the description 'floor'–, but within Heim's (1982) 
theory they cannot be directly interpreted. Heim proposes a rule of accommodation for this 
cases without an antecedent such as that the addressee must find a contextually relevant 
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referent that satisfies that description and can be an already established discourse referent 
because it is part of the common knowledge of speaker and addressee.  
Löbner (1985) is an extension of Russell (1905) that directly opposes Heim's view: in this 
theory, the primary function of definiteness is dissociated from familiarity, but in order to 
convey the information that the nominal expression –by virtue of its description– 
unambiguously refers to an entity within the domain of discourse. The approach is 
particularly successful in accounting for the use of definite expressions such as (98) or the 
following. 
 
(100) a. el presidente de Francia 
     the president of France 
 b. el estudiante más alto 
     the student most tall 
 'the tallest student' 
 c. la cabeza de Pedro 
     the head of Pedro 
 
The expressions in (100) contain an NP whose descriptive properties can only be satisfied 
by one referent in the world –on the assumption that in the real world France only has one 
president and Pedro only has one head–, so they refer unambiguously. There is a clear 
connection between the uniqueness-based approach and this one. 
This theory can easily accommodate also the examples that have to do with familiarity –to 
the extent that familiarity is a form of producing unambiguous reference–. However, it cannot 
account for cases such as (101), pointed out by Lewis (1979), where any form of uniqueness 
or absence of ambiguity in reference automatically fails. 
 
(101) El perro se peleó con otro perro. 
 the dog SE fought with another dog 
 'The dog got in a fight with another dog' 
   
Here there are two distinct dogs within the same context of speech, so it is impossible to 
say that any of them is unique in the sense described above. There are two NPs with exactly 
the same descriptive content, each one of them introducing a different referent. Other relevant 
cases are those where the definite article is used deictically, that is, in order to refer to an 
entity that is present in the context and which the speaker might be pointing towards. In (102) 
there could be multiple glasses in the context of utterance, and the speaker is pointing to one 
of them. 
 
(102) El vaso se va a caer. 
 the glass SE goes to fall 
 'The glass is going to fall' 
 
Lewis (1979), thus, proposes that any intuition about the uniqueness associated to the 
definite article is in fact reducible to the notion of salience. Salience, in broad terms, is the 
relative relevance that something has within the communication between the speaker and the 
hearer. Something is more or less salient depending on the relevance that it has within the 
discourse. If among all the glasses in the table the speaker overtly points to one of them, that 
is the most relevant glass and therefore the most salient one; in (101) the definite subject 
might refer for instance to the dog that had been mentioned before, a dog that is owned by the 
hearer or the speaker, or a dog that has some salient property that is contextually significant. 
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This notion of definiteness is clearly pragmatic in nature because it involves a notion that 
unlike uniqueness has no relation with quantification, and unlike familiarity has no designated 
grammatical constructions that can express it –for example, topic-hood–. Salience is not even 
something that corresponds to a grammatical constituent: something salient might be directly 
mentioned in the grammatical construction or not, and when it is directly mentioned it does 
not necessarily correspond to a syntactic, phonological or morphological constituent. 
Thus, to summarise: definiteness is, in broad terms, used to convey that the hearer should 
be able to know the referent that the speaker is talking about. The discussion is about which 
notion of knowing the referent is the one that better describes the distribution of definite 
determiners: salience, absence of ambiguity, familiarity, individuation, givenness, 
accessibility, among other conceivable options. A second point of disagreement is whether 
definiteness should be taken to be a purely pragmatic option –as Lewis (1979) does– or is 
better conceived as a grammatical notion that has precise pragmatic effects –as the other 
authors except Russell (1905) do; currently nobody denies that there is a pragmatic side to 
definiteness, and as we saw above all the theories need to make reference more or less 
strongly to the context of utterance, at the minimum through the assumptions that the speaker 
makes about the knowledge that the addressee has–.  
 
3.1.2. Tests for (in)definiteness 
Let us know consider the grammatical and pragmatic tests for (in)definiteness that can be 
used to determine whether an expression is definite or indefinite. The main one is the so-
called Definiteness Effect. The Definiteness Effect, which is subject to some cross-linguistic 
variation, is the incompatibility between presentational predicates like hay 'there is' and 
definite nominals (cf. Milsark 1977, Rando & Napoli 1978, Higginbotham 1987, Keenan 
1987, 2003, Comorovski 1995, Ward & Birner 1995, Zucchi 1995, McNally 1998). The 
pattern of data for Spanish is that expressions that trigger definiteness produce ungrammatical 
results, including proportional expressions containing a partitive coda (103c, 103d) and 
universal quantifiers (103e, 103f). 
 
(103) a. *Había el chico en el jardín. 
       there.was the boy in the garden 
 b. *Había ese chico en el jardín. 
       there.was that boy in the garden 
 c. *Había la mayoría de estudiantes en el jardín. 
       there.was the most of students in the garden 
 d. *No había ninguno de los estudiantes en el jardín. 
       not there.was none of the students in the garden 
 e. *Había todos los estudiantes en el jardín. 
       there.was all the students in the garden 
 f. *Había cada estudiante en un jardín.  
      there.was each student in one garden 
 
In contrast, indefinite determiners and quantifiers can combine with the presentational 
predicates, including in Spanish those that are specific. 
 
(104) a. Había un estudiante en el jardín. 
     there.was a student in the garden 
 b. Había cierto estudiante en el jardín. 
     there.was certain student in the garden 
 c. Había varios estudiantes en el jardín. 
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    there.was several students in the garden 
 d. Había cincuenta estudiantes en el jardín. 
     there.was fifty students in the garden 
 e. Había menos de cinco estudiantes en el jardín. 
    there.were less than five students in the garden 
  
There is an interesting contrast between the interrogative determiners qué 'what' and cuál 
'which': the second one presupposes that the expected answer comes from a definite, familiar 
and known set of potential options. For instance, asking ¿Cuál de los libros quieres? 'Which 
one of the books you want?' implies that the hearer can identify a specific group of books and 
pick one as the answer, while ¿Qué libro quieres? lit. 'What book do you want?' does not 
restrict the set of possible answers to a known group (Pesetsky 2000).   
The set of potential answers makes a difference between the two interrogatives also with 
respect to the definiteness effect, as can be seen in (105): 
 
(105) a. ¿Qué libro hay en la mesa? 
      what book there.is on the table? 
 b. #¿Cuál hay en la mesa? 
         which there.is on the table? 
 
Note, however, that (105b) is not as bad as one would expect. The reason is that, as we 
said, the interrogative cuál 'which' is related to the presupposition that there is a defined set of 
potential answers from which the hearer has to pick one, and this relates to the so-called 'list 
reading', which is one of the contexts where the definiteness effect is avoided in a language 
like Spanish. The so-called list reading is one specific instance of a variety of contexts where 
the definiteness is not associated to the existence of a specific referent, previously given in the 
discourse, but is associated to situations where the hearer is able to assume saliency or 
uniqueness due to the prototypical or characteristic nature of the entity mentioned inside the 
situation. In this sense, the nominal expression is more descriptive of the components or 
members of an enumeration, and typically are interpreted as expressing different kinds of 
entities –not tokens taken from those kinds– (RAE & ASALE 2009: §15.6p). Imagine that we 
ask a waiter to give us the list of dishes that compose a menu; in that situation, the nominal 
expression refers to kinds of elements, foods, and the goal is to describe the menu, not to 
identify a specific token that might have been given previously in the discourse. (106a) shows 
that the definiteness effect is better in this context, and (106b) and (106c) provide other 
comparable cases. 
 
(106) a. Hay la paella, la sopa de fideos, la tortilla... 
     there.is the paella, the soup of noodles, the omelette... 
 b. Hay la esperanza y la desesperanza. 
     there.is the hope and the despair   
 c. Hay los que quieren hacer más y los que no quieren hacer nada. 
     there.is those that want do more, and those that not want do nothing 
 'There are those that want to do more and those that do not want to do anything' 
 
Other cases where the prototypical character of the entity, with a kind interpretation and 
without a previous discourse referent, allows for definite expressions include nominal 
constituents with expressions such as consabido 'well-known', típico 'typical', de costumbre 




(107) a. Había el típico calor de agosto. 
     there.was the typical heat of August 
 b. Había el ruido de siempre. 
     there.was the noise of always 
 c. Había el esperable malestar. 
     there.was the expected discomfort 
 
When the nominal expression is used to present a set of properties or a particular quantity, 
and therefore there is no specific token corresponding to that description that is being referred 
to, the adjective mismo 'same' also avoids the definiteness effect (RAE & ASALE 2009: 
§15.6n). 
 
(108) a. Había los mismos problemas que antes. 
     there.were the same problems as before 
 b. Había la misma ternura en sus ojos. 
     there.was the same tenderness in his eyes 
 
A second family of constructions where the definiteness effect is avoided are cases where 
the definite noun expression is used to express a quantity, not to identify a specific referent 
given in the previous discourse. This involves for instance light nouns that are used to express 
quantities –as we mentioned in §1 above–; contrast this with proportional quantifiers, that 
cannot be used to avoid the definiteness effect, as was noted in (103) (RAE & ASALE 2009: 
§15.6j). 
 
(109) a. Había solo la mitad. 
     there.was only the half 
 b. Había la tira de personas. 
     there.was the strip of people 
 'There were a lot of people' 
 
Also, some superlatives used to describe the quantity of something that is involved in the 
statement avoid this effect. Note that in (110a), for instance, one is not identifying a specific 
piece of information that might have been mentioned in the discourse, but a specific quantity 
of information that is minimally sufficient (examples adapted from RAE & ASALE 2009: 
§15.6k-l). 
 
(110) a. Hay la suficiente información para hacer esto. 
    there.is the sufficient information to do this 
 b. No hay el menor problema. 
     not there.is the smallest problem 
 c. No hay el consenso necesario. 
    not there.is the agreement necessary 
 
All in all, the crash in the definiteness effect seems to be one that involves, on the one side, 
the presentational nature of the predicate used (hay) and the uses of definiteness that 
specifically involve referring back to a previously mentioned entity that by then is given in 
the discourse –and therefore has already been presented–. The ways of avoiding it involve 
either situations where the uniqueness or salience requirement of definite expressions is 
satisfied by the prototypical character of the entities mentioned, perhaps restricted to the kinds 
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of objects that compose a list, or the existence of a quantity that, in itself, does not have a 
specific referent.  
Leaving these exceptions aside, the test allows us to conclude that proper names are always 
definite: 
 
(111) *Hay Pedro y María. 
   there.is Pedro and María 
 
 
Similarly, it shows that prenominal possessives (112a) are definite, as opposed to 
postnominal ones (112b), which do not trigger definiteness by themselves. 
 
(112) a. *Hay mi madre. 
       there.is my mother 
 b. Hay problemas míos. 
     there.are problems mine 
 'There are some problems of mine' 
 
Another case where the test is useful is in a case like ambos 'both', which given that it 
refers to groups that are exactly composed of two members could have been considered, 
intuitively, as an indefinite quantifier similar to dos 'two'. The test also diagnoses as definite 
the quantifier ambos 'both', which then is more appropriately considered as is a universal 
quantifier that is restricted to groups composed of exactly two members. 
 
(113) *Hay ambos estudiantes. 
   there.are both students 
 
While the definiteness effect is the main test in determining whether a nominal expression 
is definite or not, it is not the only test that works in Spanish: cataphoric reference under 
ellipsis also can be used. Cataphora is different from anaphora despite the fact that in both 
cases we talk about the referential relation between two nominal expression, such as one of 
them takes its reference from the other. In the case of anaphora, the expression that is 
mentioned in the second place takes its reference from the first one, while in cataphora it is 
the opposite. (114a) is a case of anaphora, while (114b) is a case of cataphora (Bosque 1993). 
 
(114) a. Un ejemplo de anáfora es este. 
     an example of anaphora is this.one 
 b. Este es un ejemplo de catáfora. 
     this is an example of cataphora 
 
As we can see, indefinite expressions can be involved in both, but not if ellipsis is also part 
of the construction. If a cataphoric expression elides the common noun because it is identical 
to the one of the expression that is used to define the reference, as in (115), the cataphoric 
expression must be definite.  
 
(115) Los øi de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
 the      from Madrid are some students wonderful 




This explains the ungrammaticality of (116) vs. the grammaticality of (117) in the intended 
reading. 
 
(116) a. *Algunos øi de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
       some      from Madrid are some students wonderful 
 b. *Dos øi de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
       two     from Madrid are some students wonderful 
 c. *Ninguno øi de Madrid es un estudiantei estupendo. 
       none           from Madrid are some students wonderful 
  
(117) a. Estos øi de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
    these      from Madrid are some students wonderful 
 b. Todos los øi de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
     all       the      from Madrid are some students wonderful 
 c. Los øi míos de Madrid son unos estudiantesi estupendos. 
     the      mine from Madrid are some students wonderful 
  
With this, we finish the discussion about the general notion of definiteness and move to the 
description of the distribution of the two articles in the case of Spanish. 
  
3.2. Properties and uses of el 
The article el 'the' conveys definiteness, and as such –generally speaking– it is specialised 
in uses of a nominal expression whose common trait is that the addressee is expected to be 
able to identify the referent –with the complications involved in the notion of 'identification' 
that is actually behind definiteness, discussed in §3.1.1–. In a sense, the different uses of the 
definite article have to do with the different ways in which the identification can be 
performed: for instance, by anaphoric reference to a previously mentioned entity, by 
association with an entity that had already been introduced, or by the information contained 
inside the nominal expression itself. We will follow closely here Alarcos (1967), Lázaro 
Carreter (1975), Álvarez Martínez (1989), Eguren (1990), Roca (1996), Leonetti (1998, 
1999a, 1999b) and RAE & ASALE (2009: §14.5-8). The definite article is the prototypical 
example of a definite determiner because it lacks other parts of meaning associated to 
demonstratives (deixis), possessive pronouns (person and the relation with another entity) or 
universal quantifiers, so to some extent the discussion about its uses in the works cited 
reproduces the debate about how definiteness should be characterised. For instance, Bello 
(1847) and Lázaro Carreter (1975) emphasise the relation between the definite article and the 
notion of familiarity, as Heim (1982) does, while Leonetti (1998) emphasises its relation to 
uniqueness in terms similar to Löbner (1985).  
One first basic use of the definite article is the so-called anaphoric one, where –as we saw 
in some examples above– the nominal that contains this determiner has a referent that 
coincides with a previously introduced entity in the discourse; this previously introduced 
entity is generally introduced with a nominal expression with the indefinite article. 
 
(118) Ha pasado [una vaca]i. [La vaca]i tenía la piel parda. 
 has passed  a     cow.      the cow had the skin brownish-gray 
 
In these cases, a few conditions have to be met: (i) the definite expression correlates with 
an another overtly expressed nominal expression; (ii) there should be identity between the 
kinds denoted by the NPs in those expressions –that is, if the second one talks about a cow, 
the other expression must also talk about a cow– and (iii) the definite expression must be 
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introduced after the other expression that it establishes a relation with. If all but the third 
condition are met, we can be talking about cataphora, as was discussed above. 
 
(119) La de María es una habitación estupenda. 
 the of María is a     room    wonderful 
 'The one of María is a wonderful room' 
 
A version of the identification-by-anaphora situation where the second condition is not 
respected, but the first and the third are, is the so-called 'associative anaphora' situation 
(Kleiber 1990). In this situation, there is no identity between the types of entities that each 
nominal expression describes, but the definite one describes a concept that can be directly 
associated –through world knowledge– to the class that has been introduced in the previous 
discourse. In other words: even if the two expressions do not describe exactly the same 
concepts, the two concepts are associated to each other in a way that introducing the first is 
able to evoke the second concept in the mind of the addressee. Let us give a few examples to 
illustrate this. 
In (120) the first time that a door is mentioned it is accompanied by the definite article, 
conveying the meaning that it can be identified by the hearer. The reason is that a house has 
been introduced in the previous speech, and our world knowledge tells us that houses have 
doors: so in a sense introducing the house involves introducing, by association, all the other 
entities that our world knowledge tells us are typically related to a house. This connection 
between the two concepts is further confirmed by the fact that in order to interpret the door as 
definite, one must assume that it is the door of the house that has just been introduced. 
 
(120) Vimos [una casa]i. [La puerta]i estaba abierta.  
 saw.1pl a    house   the door      was    open 
 
Here the association involves a part-whole relation –because a door is part of a typical 
house–, but this is not the only way to establish the connection. Objects of the personal sphere 
of a human can also trigger the same connections, as the one that is established in (121) 
between the client and the coat that he was wearing. 
 
(121) Entró [un cliente]i, y dejó [el abrigo]i en la mesa. 
 entered a client      and left the coat    on the table 
 
In general, any type of world knowledge relevant to establish connections between 
concepts that the speaker and hearer share is enough to license identification by associative 
anaphora: if one knows that any thesis requires a tutor, (122) is a perfectly natural sequence. 
 
(122) Han dejado [una tesis]i en secretaría para que la firme [el tutor]i. 
 have left       a     thesis in secretary's-office so that it signs the tutor 
 'Someone left a thesis at the secretary's office so that the tutor signs it' 
 
However, previous mention in any form is not the only way to make something identifiable 
by the hearer. As we saw, since Russell (1905) a number of proposals argue that definiteness 
has the notion of uniqueness at its core. This is empirically supported by the existence of 
contexts where in the first mention a nominal expression is definite because it refers to an 
entity that is unique in the context. 
 
(123) a. Ha salido el sol. 
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     has come the sun 
 b. Ha venido el Papa. 
     has come the Pope 
 c. Cuidado con el agujero. 
     beware with the hole 
 
Importantly, in most of these cases one has to assume that the context is restricted to a 
subset of the entities in the real world; for instance, in the most clear case of this, (123c) does 
not imply that there is only one hole in the universe, but rather that in the context that is 
immediately relevant for the utterance there is only one hole that can constitute a risk for the 
hearer. This contextual restriction is also relevant for (123a), because depending on the planet 
where we are which star counts as the sun can vary and some of them, like Tatooine, might 
have two suns, and in (123b), because in the whole history of humanity there have been 
several individuals that have been Popes, and in fact as of August 2018 there are technically 
two different individuals in possession of that title. 
In some cases, it is not the world knowledge alone that reduces the set of potential 
referents to one: the information provided inside the definite expression itself is contributing 
to this. Consider (124): in any plausible contextual restriction, we typically still have more 
than one president, more than one wish and more than one relative. However, we only have 
one president of the company where I work; only one wish that is identified with wanting to 
go to the movies tonight, and only one relative that is the oldest of them all. The modifiers 
and complements of the noun that restrict the reference to only one are internal to the nominal 
expression –underlined in (124)–, and they are responsible for the uniqueness interpretation. 
Such situations are known as endophoras, that is, cases where the definite article is licensed 
by the material that is internal to the same nominal expression where it appears. 
 
(124) a. el presidente de la compañía en que trabajo 
     the president of the company in which I.work 
 b. el deseo de ir al cine esta noche 
     the desire of go to.the cinema tonight 
 'the wish of going to the movies tonight' 
 c. el pariente más viejo de la familia 
    the relative most old of the family 
  
We saw that uniqueness, however, has its challenges –those that triggered analyses of 
definiteness based on the notion of salience–. Beyond examples like (125), where there are 
two entities that satisfy the same set of properties in the sentence, Leonetti (1999a: 793) 
mentions cases like (126) where our world knowledge tells us that under normal 
circumstances there would be at least two objects of the same type in the relevant context. 
 
(125) a. El perro se peleó con otro perro. 
     the dog  SE fought with other dog 
 'The dog got into a fight with another dog' 
 b. El alumno ha hecho el trabajo con otro alumno. 
     the student has written the essay with another student 
(126) a. Puso la mano sobre la mesa. 
     put.3sg the hand on the table 
 b. Cuando llegamos ella estaba en la ventana. 
     when arrived.1pl she was at the window 
 c. La había besado en la mejilla. 
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     her had.3sg kissed on the cheek 
 
One way to avoid giving up the notion of uniqueness is what Leonetti (1999a) proposes: 
the uniqueness is satisfied in the communicative context by the role described by the NP part 
of the definite expression within stereotypical or semi-stereotypical situations: what is 
relevant for the identification in (126a) is not which one of the two hands is put on the table, 
but that the subject is performing an action that is identified by placing one hand on the table. 
The notion is stereotypicality of the situation is clear in some cases like (127).  
 
(127) a. ir a la cárcel 
     go to the jail 
 b. ir al médico 
    go to.the doctor 
 c. tomar el autobús 
    take    the bus 
 
Beyond these core cases of uses of the definite article, there are others that are less 
prototypical because they convey meanings that are similar to other types of definite 
expressions. The definite article in combination with plural NPs can have a meaning similar 
to a universal quantifier (128). In (128), in principle it is strongly implied that the student saw 
all the movies directed by Hitchcock, something that in this interpretation gives the same 
denotation as (129), with a universal quantifier. 
 
(128) He visto las películas de Hitchcock. 
 have.1sg seen the movies by Hitchcock 
(129) He visto todas las películas de Hitchcock. 
 have.1sg seen all the movies by Hitchcock 
 
However, the two expressions are not synonymous: in (128) the idea that one refers to the 
entirety of the elements that compose the set of movies directed by Hitchcock is just an 
implicature that can be cancelled with an overt expression (130a), but in (129) this idea is part 
of the entailments and cannot be cancelled (130b).  
 
(130) a. He visto las películas de Hitchcock, pero no todas. 
     have.1sg seen the movies by Hitchcock, but not all 
 b. He visto todas las películas de Hitchcock, (*pero no cada una de ellas). 
     have.1sg seen all the movies by Hitchcock, but not each one of them 
 
This is expected: referring to every member in a set is a way of satisfying the identification 
conveyed by the definite article –if all the members in a set are such that the predicate applies 
to them, the speaker can know that any member in the set is such that the predicate applies to 
it–, but it is not the only way to satisfy the requirement. In contrast a universal quantifier 
directly expresses the idea that the entire set is included in the extension of the predicate, so 
the propositon is contradictory if it is explicitly added that the predicate does not apply to all 
the members. 
A weaker form of universality is genericity: in a generic statement a set of characteristic 
properties are ascribed to all the members of the class denoted by the NP (Chierchia 1995, 
Krifka et al. 1995), but exceptions are tolerated. In Spanish, definite expressions can have a 
generic reference without the help of additional operators –see the next subsection for the 
generic use of the indefinite article, where we discuss which operators trigger this meaning in 
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such cases–. In the absence of that type of operators, generic reference is expressed with 
definite noun phrases in Spanish. In such cases a whole kind of entities is identified; (131a) is 
the direct translation of the generic bare noun in the English sentence (131b). 
 
(131) a. La pizza es mala para la salud. 
     the pizza is bad for the health 
 b. Pizza is bad for your health. 
 
See §10 below for the distribution of noun phrases without determiners in Spanish. 
The definite article can also have so-called deictic uses where their meaning contribution is 
similar to the demonstrative determiners. As we already say, deixis is a form of identification 
which takes the immediate context of utterance to anchor the reference. Adverbials like ahora 
'now', luego 'later' or aquí 'here' refer to entities by locating them with respect to the utterance 
coordinates: 'now' is 'the time at which this utterance takes place', 'later' is 'some time after 
this utterance takes place' and 'here' is 'the place at which this utterance takes place'. The 
deictic use of the definite article involves cases where the identification is made possible 
without any previous mention or enough descriptive content at the NP level to restrict the set 
of potential referents, just by the sheer fact that the intended referent is present in the 
situational context where the definite expression is used. If we are in a kitchen we can utter 
(132) even if there are several knifes there and we did not mention one before, perhaps 
disambiguating by pointing directly to the knife we want the hearer to give us. 
 
(132) Dame el cuchillo. 
 give-me the knife 
  
In such context, (132) is equivalent to (133), with a demonstrative. 
 
(133) Dame ese cuchillo. 
 give-me that knife 
 
In fact, historically the definite articles in Spanish come from the distal Latin 
demonstratives ille, illa, illud, which doubled as anaphoric expressions (Penny 1993: 145-
147). The deictic use of the definite article is particularly frequent with temporal expressions 
(RAE & ASALE 2009: §14.8c-d): 
 
(134) Vendrá el lunes. 
 will.come.3sg the Monday 
 'He will come on Monday' 
(135) Vendrá este lunes. 
 will-come.3sg this Monday 
 'He will come this Monday'   
 
Let us now consider this variety of uses from a slightly more theoretical perspective. Part 
of the literature has distinguished three main uses of definite expressions (Vergnaud & 
Zubizarreta 1992, Longobardi 1994, Beyssade 2013, Aguilar-Guevara 2014, Espinal & 
Cyrino 2017): strong referential definites, weak definites and expletive definites. The strong 
referential definites have the wider distribution and convey the notions of familiarity and 
uniqueness. The anaphoric uses –excluding the associative anaphora uses– are examples of 
this, as it is also the deictic use (136 provides a second instance of this).  
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(136) La profesora quiere hablar con tu padre. 
 the teacher    wants  talk    with your father  
  
The strong definites, as in (136), can be in preverbal position, while the weak definites are 
restricted in Spanish to postverbal positions, and they do not convey uniqueness. (137) is one 
of the examples provided by Espinal & Cyrino (2017); as we can see, here –as in the cases 
that Leonetti (1999a) argued satisfy uniqueness due to the stereotypicality of the situation– it 
is not implied that the surgeon had only one finger.  
 
(137) El bebé cogía el dedo del cirujano. 
 the baby grabbed the finger of.the surgeon 
 'The hand of the baby grasped the finger of the surgeon' 
 
In §2 we discussed that most definite determiners are unable to act as variables under the 
scope of a quantificational operator, but we noted that some exceptions could be found with 
respect to the definite article. The distinction between strong and weak definites is relevant 
for this: strong definites can never be under the scope of a quantifier, while weak definites are 
there. In the two interpretations in (138) –that each student talked to the same teacher, unique 
in that context, or that each student talked to a different teacher, his or her own– the first one 
corresponds to the strong definite reading, while the second does not.  
 
(138) Todos los estudiantes hablaron con el profesor. 
 all       the students      talked with the teacher 
 'Every student talked to the teacher' 
 1. 'There is exactly one teacher such that every student talked to him' 
 2. 'Each student talked to his / her own teacher' 
 
In correspondence with the positional distinction we have just mentioned, the same 
referential expression in (139) only allows the reading where the same teacher talked to each 
student –the first interpretation above–. 
 
(139) El profesor habló con todos los estudiantes. 
 the teacher talked with all the students 
 'The (same) teacher talked with all the students' 
 
Many cases of weak definites relate to the associative anaphora contexts above, and it is 
typically the case that their definitenss is obtained by association with an entity that relates to 
them.  
An even more restricted distribution is presented by so-called expletive definites. In 
Spanish, these are restricted not only to postverbal position, but also to combinations with 
relational nouns that can establish an inalienable possession relation with another participant 
in the context, and there is no presupposition of uniqueness, and they do not even presuppose 
any form of definiteness. Many of the stereotypical situations that license the use of the 
definite article in Leonetti's (1999a) sense are expletive uses, as are also the ones in (140): 
 
(140) a. Juan apagó el ordenador. 
     Juan switched.off the computer 
 b. Los chicos se rompieron la pierna. 




There is no sense in which in (140a) we talk of a known, familiar, unique or salient 
computer in the context of utterance; (140a) can be the first sentence in a novel that talks 
about a big office where there are multiple computers. What matters here is that we associate 
the computer with Juan, as the computer that Juan was using or the he found there. In (140b), 
notice that it does not matter which one of the two legs each student broke, and there are 
multiple legs –non unique– that should be involved in the truth meaning of the sentence. Of 
course, both nouns describe entities that are either in a part-whole relation with the subject or 
belong to their personal sphere. Like weak definites, expletive definites are under the scope of 
quantifiers (140b, which forces the reading where each boy broke his or her own leg), but 
unlike weak definites they do not even contribute any referentiality to the nominal. For this 
reason, the use of the definite article in combination with proper names –a use that is 
documented in several varieties of colloquial Spanish– is also expletive, on the assumption 
that the proper name is able to refer itself. 
 
(141) La María no ha venido. 
 the María not has come 
 'María has not come' 
  
 Thus, in general, the definite article in its strong interpretation is related to familiarity and 
uniqueness, which can be obtained in a variety of forms, and cannot be the variable of an 
operator. The weak and expletive uses can be taken as variables, and do not contribute 
familiarity; if anything, they involve a weaker notion of uniqueness that is dependent on 
context. 
Let us now move to the properties and uses of the indefinite article. 
 
3.3. Properties and uses of un 
One first salient property of the indefinite Spanish article is that it comes historically from 
a numeral –unus, una, unum 'one' (Penny 1993: 146)– and it still seems to be used as such in 
the singular. This raises the issue of whether this form should be considered a quantifier that 
doubles as a determiner, a quantifier only or a determiner that can trigger cardinality readings. 
We will, at this point, only describe its distribution, including the apparently cardinal uses, 
while we will leave the analytical debate of how the indefinite article should be analysed to 
§8. 
In the works that have concentrated in the indefinite article (see for Spanish Alonso 1933, 
Alarcos 1967, Lapesa 1975, Ridruejo 1981, Álvarez Martínez 1986, Leonetti 1999a, 1999b, 
Gutiérrez 2008, RAE & ASALE 2009: §15.3-8), five main uses have been singled out. Unlike 
what was the case with the definite article, where some broad notion of identificability 
underlied all the different uses, here it is more difficult to find one common denominator for 
the five uses –unless we want to use the negative property 'non-identifying' to play that role–.  
In contrast to the idea that the definite article can convey familiarity in some cases –for 
instance, the anaphoric ones– one of the uses of the indefinite article is as a presentational 
article, that is, the form used when the speaker wants to introduce a new referent in the 
discourse. This first mention use is illustrated in (142): 
 
(142) Ha llegado un estudiante. 
 has arrived a student 
 
In (142) the information conveyed implies that the addressee should not be able to identify 
the particular student that arrived. However, first mention is not all there is to the indefinite 
article, because it also seems to carry a notion of non-uniqueness. On the assumption that 
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(given our cultural norms) a woman has only one husband, (143) is weird precisely because 
we expect the husband that we are mentioning for the first time to be unique to that woman. 
 
(143) #Ha llegado un marido de tu clienta. 
   has arrived a   husband of your client 
 
A better characterisation of the first mention use would then be that the indefinite article 
conveys the idea that the speaker should not be able to identify a unique referent for the 
nominal expression that carries it; the first mention context is likely to ask for the indefinite 
article precisely because, being the first mention and all things being equal, we do not expect 
the addressee to be able to single out a unique referent; if the cultural norms or some other 
procedure of the kind discussed above –associative anaphora, endophora, etc.– is at play, then 
the indefinite article is not appropriate. 
A different way in which the requisite that the addressee is able to identify a unique 
referent can be avoided is when the nominal expression is used as a predicate –that is, to 
introduce properties that describe a discourse referent, and not to introduce or refer to one of 
them–. This is the descriptive or predicative use of the indefinite article, that is quite typical in 
the function of complement of copulative verbs: 
 
(144) Mi hermano es un hombre muy atractivo. 
 my brother is a man very attractive 
 'My brother is a very attractive man' 
 
Other instances of the same situation, but where the nominal expression does not 
syntactically constitute the predication in the clause, are presented in (145). 
 
(145) a. Me has causado un problema enorme. 
     me have.2sg caused a problem huge 
 'You have caused me a huge problem' 
 b. Llegó Juan, un simpático andaluz.  
     arrived Juan, a cheerful Andalusian 
 c. Tengo un resfriado de campeonato. 
     have.1sg a cold of championship 
 'I have a huge cold' 
 d. Me echó una mirada preocupada. 
     me threw.3sg a look worried 
 'He threw me a glance that conveyed worry' 
 e. Vive una vida piadosa. 
     lives a     life devout 
 'He lives a devout life' 
  
This use is also facilitated by NPs whose descriptive content is evaluative, such as 
catástrofe 'catastrophe', desastre 'disaster', éxito 'success', locura 'stupidity', maravilla 
'marvel', etc. (RAE & ASALE 2009: §15.4e).  
 
(146) Esto es una {maravilla / catástrofe / estupidez}. 
 this is a        wonder        catastrophe stupidity 
 
This descriptive use relates to the so-called emphatic or evaluative use of the indefinite 
article (Fernández Lagunilla 1983), where –with or without modifiers– it is implied that the 
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quality or quantity of the notion described by the nominal expression exceeds some 
expectation; this use is also able to produce consecutive structures. 
 
(147) a. Llevo un día... 
     carry.1sg a day 
 'I am having such a day....' 
 b. Tengo un hambre que asusta. 
     have.1sg a hunger that frightens 
 'I am so hungry that it is frightening' 
 c. Tiene unos ojos preciosos. 
     has     some eyes beautiful 
 'She has such pretty eyes' 
 
The third contrast between the definite and the indefinite article has to do with 
quantification. If the use of the definite article with plurals implies –ceteris paribus– the idea 
that all the members of the set are included there, the use of the indefinite article in the plural 
implies that not all the members of the set are included. 
 
(148) He visto unas películas de Hitchcock. 
 have.1sg seen some movies of Hitchcock 
 'I have seen some movies by Hitchcock' 
 
In such use, the quantifier alguno 'some' in the plural is equally acceptable. 
 
(149) He visto algunas películas de Hitchcock. 
 have.1sg seen some movies by Hitchcock 
 
Again, this meaning is cancellable in the context: 
 
(150) He visto algunas películas de Hitchcock; de hecho, las he visto todas. 
 have.1sg seen some movies of Hitchcock; in fact, them have.1sg seen all 
 'I have watched some movies by Hitchcock; in fact, I have seen them all'  
 
In the singular, the indefinite article can have uses where it is used to express a cardinality 
of one; this is the use whose relation to the determiner uses is unclear. This use is clear in 
contexts such as (151), where it is clear that the sentence makes a statement about the number 
of suitcases that one can take to the flight, not just about whether an identifiable suitcase is 
mentioned or not. 
 
(151) Tiene derecho a embarcar una maleta. 
 have.3sg right to board one suitcase 
 'You have the right to carry one suitcase' 
 
In contrast, this cardinality value is irrelevant in the most normal interpretation of (152): 
 
(152) Han dejado aquí una maleta. 
 have.3pl left here a suitcase 
 
For obvious reasons –given that the cardinality value is 1– this use of the indefinite article 
is impossible in the plural. (153) excludes the cardinality interpretation. 




(153) He encontrado unas maletas. 
 have.1sg found some suitcases 
 
Among the linguistic marks of the cardinal use, we can highlight the quantifier solo 'only' 
or the adverb exactamente 'exactly', and other expressions that imply the presence of precise 
numerical references (RAE & ASALE 2009: §15.3i-l). (154) are instances where the cardinal 
meaning is forced. 
 
(154) a. Trajo exactamente una botella. 
     brought exactly one bottle 
 b. Tengo un solo problema. 
     have.1sg one single problem 
 c. Tengo solo un problema. 
     have.1sg only one problem  
Another trait of this cardinal use is that, like other numerals, licenses partitive 
constructions: 
 
(155) a. una estudiante de las cinco que vinieron 
     one students    from the five that came 
 b. dos estudiantes de las cinco que vinieron 
     two students from the five that came 
 
See §10 for the analytical problem of whether this cardinal interpretation should be viewed 
as a semantic extension of the indefinite use or vice versa. Ultimately the problem is whether 
the indefinite article should be considered as belonging to the family of quantifiers, like the 
cardinal numerals, or to the family of determiners, like the definite article.  
The fifth and last use of the indefinite article is generic, as it was the case with the definite 
article. However, in contrast with definite generic expressions, the indefinite article does not 
express in Spanish genericity by itself: it is necessary that in the linguistic context there are 
other elements, typically operators, that trigger the generic meaning in the indefinite 
expression. Consider the contrast in (156). 
 
(156) a. La vivienda costó más cara a partir de 1990. 
     the housing costed more expensive at coming of 1990 
 'Housing became more expensive from 1990' 
 b. Una vivienda costó más cara a partir de 1990. 
     a      housing costed more expensive at coming of 1990 
 'A house become more expensive from 1990' 
 
The first sentence allows for a generic reading of the subject where we do not talk about a 
particular house, but refer to the whole class of objects that can be used for housing –
admitting exceptions, as we saw–. The second sentence can only be interpreted in a non-
generic way: we talk about a particular house that got more expensive while, perhaps, all the 
other houses lowered their prices.  
Imperfective aspect, for instance the imperfectum indicative or the present, allow the 
generic reading (157a, 157b); also, adverbs like normalmente 'normally', típicamente 
'typically' or frecuentemente 'frequently', that do not quantify over temporal intervals but over 
instances of situations (157c); also, individual level predicates (Carlson 1977) (157d) (RAE & 
ASALE 2009: §15.8j).   
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(157) a. Una vivienda cuesta más cara en este barrio. 
     a      housing costs more expensive in this neighbourhood 
 'Housing is more expensive in this neighbourhood' 
 b. Una ardilla podía cruzar España de árbol en árbol. 
     a squirrel could cross Spain from tree in tree 
 'A squirrel could cross Spain jumping from tree to tree' 
 c. Un español típicamente bebe vino. 
     a    spaniard typically drinks wine 
 d. Un español es amable. 
     a    spaniard is kind 
 
In all these cases, it seems that the indefinite article has the capacity to be under the scope 
of quantifiers that trigger genericity: the present tense, adverbs that quantify over situations, 
or individual level adjectives, associated to genericity themselves (Chierchia 1995).  
 
4. Specificity: tests and properties 
A core division within indefinites has to do with the notion of specificity. While –broadly 
speaking– all definite expressions are also specific, indefinite expressions can be either 
specific or non-specific. This section will discuss the concept of specificity, illustrate the 
division between the two groups and give a few tests in Spanish to identify if a nominal is 
specific or not. 
Even though there are between three (Leonetti 1999a) and seven (von Heusinger 2011) 
notions of specificity, there are some common properties to all of them. When a nominal 
expression is specific, the speaker intends to refer to a particular entity that he or she has in 
mind. This contrasts with definiteness that, as we saw, was addressee-oriented in the sense 
that it made an assumption about the addressee being able to identify the referent of the 
definite expression. Specificity, on the other hand, is oriented towards a discourse participant 
or another salient entity in the discourse that can hold attitudes, beliefs and thoughts, so that it 
is possible for him or her to keep a particular entity in mind that the specific nominal refers to. 
 
4.1. Notions of specificity 
The literature about specificity is very extensive; an antecedent is Quine (1960), with the 
distinction that we already discussed (§2) between de re and de dicto readings –in fact, some 
theories of specificity, such as Partee (1970), claimed that specificity is just the manifestation 
of the same distinction, but in the domain of indefinite expressions–. Other central 
contributions about this notion are Baker (1966), Karttunen (1968, 1969), Fodor (1970), 
Farkas (1981), Fodor & Sag (1982), Pesetsky (1987), Enç (1991), Diesing (1992), Ruys 
(1992), Abusch (1994), Reinhart (1997), Chierchia (2001), von Heusinger (2002, 2011), 
Leonetti (2004) and Ionin (2006). The way in which specificity should be exactly interpreted, 
however, varies from author to author, sometimes in radical terms that allow for definite 
expressions to also show a distinction between specific and non specific interpretations. 
Leonetti (1999a: 858-860) singles out three different versions of the notion of specificity. 
The one that he calls pragmatic depends on whether the speaker intends to refer to a particular 
entity with the expression, even if he or she cannot identify it. In (158), adapted from Leonetti 
(1999a), the indefinite is specific because the speaker knows that there is a particular 
coworker of his friend that has phoned, even if he might be unable to know the identity of that 
person. 
 
(158) Te ha llamado un colega del trabajo. 
 you has phoned a colleague from.the job 
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 'One of your coworkers has phoned'  
 
In contrast, (159) is non specific in the interpretation that the friend has to talk with any 
coworker, and the speaker does not have in mind one particular coworker that he recommends 
that should be contacted. 
 
(159) Habla con un colega. 
 talk with one colleague 
 'Talk to a coworker' 
 
A second notion of specificity, that is related more to the philosophical tradition inside 
logic, has to do with the relation between the indefinite expression and the scope of 
quantifiers in the same linguistic context. A specific expression is one that is not taken as a 
variable in the scope of a higher quantifier, while a non specific expression stays in the scope 
and therefore has its meaning affected by the meaning of the operator. In this sense, definite 
expressions can also be non-specific, because as we saw under certain conditions they can be 
manipulated as variables by operators. 
In (160), there are two possible interpretations: that there is one book that each student has 
to read –for instance Don Quijote– and that each student has to read a book that might be 
different from the other students, so that there could be multiple books involved. The first 
reading would be called specific in this context –note that there is still one sense in which the 
speaker intends to refer to a particular book in this interpretation–, while the second would not 
be –the speaker might even lack any knowledge about the books that the students could read, 
and the sentence simply says that as part of the course assignment they have to find a book 
and read it–.  
 
(160) Todos los estudiantes deben leer un libro. 
 all       the students     must   read a book 
 
The third notion of specificity that Leonetti (1999a) singles out is the one that is related to 
partitivity. In this notion, an expression is specific if its intended referent comes from a set of 
entities that, at that moment of the communication, has been provided contextually. This 
interpretation could be traced back to Milsark (1974). In this sense, (161) is necessarily 
specific because it is overtly partitive: it picks one of the members of a set that, in the 
discourse, had been already identified –a particular set of books that we assume the addressee 
is able to identify at that point–. 
 
(161) Uno de los libros del curso ha sido sustituido por otro. 
 one of the books of.the course has been substituted by another 
  
The speaker might ignore at that point the referent of the book that has been substituted. In 
this sense, (162) is ambiguous between the specific and the non-specific reading in the 
following sense: in the specific reading, we talk about many of the students of a given set that 
is already introduced in the discourse –for instance, the students of a particular course–, while 
in the non-specific reading we just state that many students have that property without 
restricting our claim to a given set of students. 
 
(162) Muchos estudiantes toman asignaturas de economía. 
 many     students      take    subjects      of economy 
 'Many students take economy courses' 
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 a. 'Many of the students take economy courses' (specific) 
 b. 'Economy courses are popular among students' (non-specific) 
 
In this sense it is also possible to have definite expressions that are non-specific: in the 
generic reading of the definite article, we do not pick elements from a particular set that has 
already been introduced in the discourse. 
 
(163) Los españoles son bajitos. 
 the  Spaniards are short 
 'Spaniard are short' 
 
Von Heusinger (2011) provides an even more detailed classification of the senses in which 
something is specific or not. What he calls referential specificity makes the distinction on the 
base of whether the indefinite expression entails that there exists an entity that fits the 
description given or not. This notion is relevant in the context of attitude predicates, such as 
(164). 
 
(164) Pedro cree que María le es infiel con un actor. 
 Pedro believes that María him is unfaithful with an actor 
 
The two interpretations depend on whether the speaker thinks that there exists an actor 
such that María has been unfaithful to Pedro with him. If the speaker believes that, the 
indefinite expression is specific, but if the speaker believes that Pedro is wrong and there 
exists no actor with which María has had an affair, then the indefinite is non-specific. In this 
sense, a definite expression could also be non-specific: if Pedro believes that someone is the 
king of France but the speaker knows that such expression does not have a referent in the real 
world because there exists, in actuality, no king of France, then (165) illustrates an instance of 
a non-specific definite expression. 
 
(165) Pedro cree que ha conocido al rey de Francia. 
 Pedro believes that has met the king of France 
 
Note that in this sense, the distinction is very close –and virtually undistinguishable from– 
the de dicto / de re distinction that we presented above. 
The second interpretation of specificity is the one that relates to the scope of quantifiers, 
and coincides with Leonetti's second interpretation.  
The third sense of 'specificity' is what von Heusinger (2011) calls 'epistemic specificity', 
which is similar but not identical to Leonetti's first sense. In the epistemic notion of 
specificity, an expression is non-specific if the speaker ignores or is indifferent to the referent 
of the indefinite. In a sentence like (161), the specific interpretation would be one where the 
speaker knows which book in particular has been substituted, and the non-specific reading is 
the one where the speaker ignores at that point the particular book that has been replaced. 
Expressions where the speaker conveys directly his or her indifference about the particular 
referent, such as the ones with cualquier 'no matter which' (166) are also non-specific in this 
sense. 
 
(166) a. Cualquier estudiante puede aprobar el curso. 
     any           student     can     pass       the course 
 b. Léete cualquier libro. 
     read-you any book 
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 c. Podemos ir a cualquier sitio. 
     can.1pl   go to any place 
  
In the epistemic sense, definites can also be non-specific: notice that in (167) the speaker 
probably ignores who the winner of the election would be. 
 
(167) El candidato elegido tendrá que resolver este problema. 
 the candidate chosen will.have to solve this problem 
 
Von Heusinger's fourth notion of specificity is the partitive one, that he characterised as 
presuppositional (Milsark 1974) or discourse-linked (d-linked, Pesetsky 1987).  
In the fifth sense, specificity is related to topicality: an expression is specific if it performs, 
syntactically and pragmatically, the role of topic in the sentence, as a referent that is under 
discussion in the proposition. In this sense (168a) is specific, and the same expression is non-
specific in (168b). Notice that, to the extent that many definite expressions are not topics, this 
also implies that definites can be non-specific. 
 
(168) a. Algunos problemas no pueden resolverse. 
  some problems not can solve-SE 
 'Some problems cannot be solved' 
 b. No pueden resolverse algunos problemas. 
     not can      solve-SE   some problems 
 'There are some problems that cannot be solved' 
 
The sixth sense of specificity is 'specificity as noteworthiness', where the nominal 
expression is used to introduce some property that, within the context of discourse, is 
significant or deserves a particular mention. This notion is clearly pragmatic and depends on 
the role that the expression plays for the argumentation that the discourse is following. For 
instance, in (169) the indefinite expression would be specific if the property of having long 
hair turns to be noteworthy for that person, but non-specific if it is not. 
 
(169) La chica tenía un pelo largo y sedoso. 
 the girl had     a   hair long and silky 
 'The girl had long and silky hair' 
 
Similarly, the seventh notion, 'specificity as discourse prominence', also depends on the 
flow of the narration or argumentation in the text: something is specific if it introduces a 
discourse referent that will continue to be referred to in the following discourse. In this sense, 
any indefinite expression that appears in a text with definite expressions in an anaphoric 
relation would be specific. 
As we see, all these notions of specificity cut the cake in different ways, some of them 
allowing definites to be non-specific and others restricting the distinction to the realm of 
indefinites, on the assumption that any definite will be specific. It is of course desirable to 
either find a common denominator to all these notions of specificity, or to determine which 
ones are the senses that grammars are sensitive to, and which ones are rather interpretations 
that depend on extralinguistic factors. This task is complicated by some of the same factors 
that we saw appeared when trying to define definiteness: first of all, reference is a semantic 
notion that can be grammaticalised but whose proper characterisation almost unavoidably 
must invoke discourse properties, that are properly pragmatic in nature.  
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The more traditional characterisation of specificity is the one that tries to unify all uses 
under the common umbrella of the speaker's intended reference, that is, that when the speaker 
uses the nominal expression he or she has in mind a particular referent that is introduced in 
the discourse. However, as both Leonetti (1999a) and von Heusinger (2002) point out, this is 
a definition that is too restrictive, because it does not cover for instance the cases where the 
speaker is unaware of the identity of the referent even if it is specific. Von Heusinger (2002: 
45) defines specificity in terms of the notion of referential anchoring: the reference of a 
specific expression is anchored to a discourse participant, typically the speaker, or to another 
discourse referent. The addressee interprets something as specific when he or she can identify 
the anchor –speaker or another entity mentioned in the discourse– in whose mental 
representation there is a referent for that expression, and also identify that the anchor has the 
intention to refer through the expression. In more prosaic terms, the addressee must be able to 
interpret that the mental representation of the anchor includes a particular referent that 
corresponds to the nominal expression. 
 
4.2. Contexts that trigger non-specificity in the strong sense 
There are several linguistic contexts that favour or license non-specific interpretations 
(Fodor 1970, Jackendoff 1972, Givón 1978, Leonetti 1990, 1999a). Interrogative operators 
are able to do this: 
 
(170) ¿Tienes un libro de matemáticas? 
  have.2sg a book of mathematics? 
 'Do you have a book of mathematics?' 
 
Imperative contexts also trigger the non-specific reading of indefinites. 
 
(171) Lee muchos libros. 
 read many books 
     
Modal operators, such as modal auxiliaries and the future and the conditional forms, also 
produce non-specific contexts. 
 
(172) a. Puedes comprarte un libro. 
     can.2sg buy a book 
 'You can buy a book' 
 b. Algún día tendré una casa. 
     some day will.have.1sg a house 
 'Some day I will have a house' 
 c. Me comería un plato de sopa. 
    me would.eat a dish of soup 
 'I would eat a dish of soup' 
 
Conditional sentences are another context of non-specificity: 
 
(173) Si ves a un niño perdido, avisa a las autoridades. 
 if see.2sg a boy lost, call the authorities 
 'If you see a lost child, call the authorities' 
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Individual level predicates, that as we saw license the generic interpretation of indefinites, 
can produce non-specific contexts in which the particular referent of the nominal expression 
is not relevant. 
 
(174) Es genial encontrar un amigo. 
 is  great   find          a   friend 
 'It is great to find a friend'  
 
Negation can also trigger non-specific contexts, because it can suspend the entailment that 
there exists a particular referent for the indefinite expression. 
 
(175) No tengo muchos amigos. 
 not have  many    friends 
 'I don't have many friends' 
 
Finally, a class of predicates –so-called intensional predicates, that tend to express wishes, 
necessities, preferences, intentions or plans– through their meaning can also create contexts 
where the reference of the expression is suspended, as they involve situations that have no 
actual reality. Among these predicates we have the verbs querer 'want', preferir 'prefer', 
desear 'desire', intentar 'try', buscar 'search', pedir 'ask for', esperar 'hope', permitir 'allow' 
and planear 'plan', adjectives like necesario 'necessary', preferible 'preferable', obligatorio 
'compulsory' or deseable 'desirable', and the preposition para 'for', used to introduce finality 
and intention. All of them allow the non-specific reading. 
 
(176) a. Busco un libro. 
     search a book 
 'I am looking for a book' 
 b. Prefiero un libro que hable de otra cosa. 
     prefer.1sg a book that speaks of other thing 
 'I prefer a book that talks about something else'  
 c. Es necesario traer un libro. 
     is necessary bring a book 
 'It is necessary to come with a book' 
 d. Lo hice para encontrar un trabajo. 
     it   did   to     find         a    job 
 'I did it in order to find a job' 
 
In all these contexts, there is entailment of existence associated to the indefinite, that is, it 
is not entailed that there is a referent for the indefinite expression. As Leonetti (1999a: 863) 
points out, outside these contexts the notion of non-specificity is weaker: the speaker does not 
suspend the idea that there is a referent for the indefinite expression. The non-specific reading 
in this weak sense implies that pragmatically the speaker is not interested in communicating 
the reference of the expression, which anyways is there. This is, for instance, the case of the 
epistemic specificity. 
 
(177) Un político ha sido detenido por corrupción. 
 a    politician has been detained for corruption 
   
In any interpretation in (177) there is a referent for un político, but the difference is that in 
one interpretation the speaker is not interested in communicating that a concrete politician has 
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been detained –maybe the speaker ignores who the politician is–, and in the other 
interpretation this is part of the information that the speaker intends to communicate. 
 
4.3. Grammatical phenomena related to specificity 
There are a number of phenomena that in Spanish allow to differentiate between the 
specific and the non-specific interpretation of nominal expressions. The strongest predictor of 
strong non-specificity –suspending the existential entailments of the nominal expression– is 
the mood of the verb in subordinate relative clauses (Rivero 1977). The sentence in (178) 
allows both readings, with and without a referent for the indefinite. 
 
(178) Quiero comprarme un libro. 
 want.1sg buy          a   book 
 'I want to buy a book' 
 
Each reading corresponds to one of the two sentences in (179): the one where the 
subordinate sentence is in indicative is interpreted as a situation where the speaker thinks of a 
particular book that he or she wants to buy; the one in subjunctive (179b) corresponds to the 
non-specific interpretation where any book would do, and in fact no book might be found by 
the speaker when he or she tries to buy one. 
 
(179) a. Quiero comprarme un libro que habla de Italia. 
     want.1sg buy          a   book that speaks.ind of Italy 
 b. Quiero comprarme un libro que hable de Italia. 
     want.1sg buy          a   book that speaks.sbj of Italy 
 
A second phenomenon is the possibility of having prenominal qualitative adjectives 
combined with the nominal expression (Bosque 2001). The presence of a prenominal 
qualitative adjective in Spanish triggers the specific interpretation; this means that in (180) the 
speaker must have a particular book in mind that he or she wants to buy. 
 
(180) Quiero comprarme un estupendo libro. 
 want.1sg buy          a   wonderful book 
 
Both readings, specific and non-specific, are possible with a postnominal adjective, as in 
(181).  
 
(181) Quiero comprarme un libro estupendo. 
 want.1sg buy          a   book wonderful 
  
Because imperatives and interrogatives create contexts for non-specifics, nominal 
expressions containing prenominal qualitative adjectives tend to be avoided in such sentences 
(Bosque 2001). 
 
(182) a. *Regálame un estupendo libro. 
       give.me    a   wonderful book 
 'Give me a wonderful book as a present' 
 b. *¿Me regalas un estupendo libro? 
        me  give.2sg a wonderful book? 
 'Will you give me as a present a wonderful book?' 
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Another property that is generally related to specificity is differential object marking 
(DOM) in direct objects, that is, the accusative a 'at' marking. When a nominal expression is 
specific, DOM is compulsory if another set of properties is met –for instance, the human 
nature of the referent; see Fábregas (2013) for a detailed overview–. However, as López 
(2012) discusses in detail, while absence of DOM in human direct objects is a clear test for 
non-specificity, some non-specifics (184) can combine with DOM, which makes this test less 
reliable to diagnose the specific nature of an expression. 
 
(183) a. Busco a mi hermana. 
     search DOM my sister 
 'I look for my sister' 
 b. Busco un amigo. 
     search a friend 
 'I am looking for a friend' (non-specific) 
(184) a. No busco a nadie. 
     not search DOM nobody 
 'I am not looking for anyone' 
 b. Busco a un amigo que sepa de estas cosas. 
     search DOM a friend that knows.sbj of these things 
 'I am looking for a friend that knows of these things' 
 
In the weaker sense of specificity, there are also other constructions that are influenced by 
the non-specific nature of an indefinite expression. As we saw, topichood triggers specificity 
in this weaker sense: the preverbal position of an indefinite, therefore, favours the specific 
reading –although it does not exclude a non-specific interpretation in terms of epistemic non-
specificity, for instance–, while the postverbal position is easier to associate to non-specific 
readings where the referent introduced by the indefinite is not relevant for the following 
discourse. 
 
(185) a. Un espía me sigue a todas partes. 
     a   spy me follows to every place 
 b. Tengo un espía que me sigue a todas partes. 
     have.1sg a spy that me follows to every place 
 
Partitive structures also tend to be specific –definitionally, they are specific in one of the 
common uses of the term–, but again both readings are allowed if we take into account 
whether the paticular referent of the indefinite is part of what the speaker tries to 
communicate (Leonetti 1999a: 869). In (186) it is natural to have a specific reading where we 
talk about a particular member of the group, but (187) is more naturally interpreted in a way 
where the particular reference of the doctors that recommend that toothpaste is not important. 
 
(186) Uno de los médicos ha venido a buscarte. 
 one of the doctors has come to search.you 
 'One of the doctors has come here looking for you' 
(187) Seis de cada siete médicos recomiendan esta pasta de dientes. 
 six of each seven doctors recommend this paste of teeth 
 'Six out of each seven doctors recommend this toothpaste' 
 




5. Types of quantifiers: tests and properties 
The difference between definite and indefinite expressions, which is relevant for the 
determiners, finds a parallelism in the domain of quantifiers in the form of the basic 
distinction between universal and existential quantifiers; in fact, as we will see, the notions of 
definiteness and specificity are sometimes relevant to differentiate between individual 
quantifiers.  
 
5.1. Universal and non-universal quantifiers 
The main division within the quantifier domain is the one between universal quantifiers 
and those that are non-universal, or existential. The universal quantifiers are those that take all 
the entities that belong to a given set –that set can be contextually restricted, as we will see–. 
In Spanish (Sánchez López 1999: 1037, López Palma 1999: 49-51) the universal quantifiers 
are listed in (188).  
 
(188) a. todo 
 b. cada 
 c. ambos 
 d. cualquiera 
  
(188a) can be combined with the definite article or not; when it does not combine with the 
definite article it is restricted to the singular –like cada–, but is restricted to contexts that 
trigger non-specificity –particularly, the interpretations of epistemic non-specificity–. 
 
(189) a. Todos los chicos pueden aprender inglés. 
     all       the boys   can       learn       English 
 b. Todo chico puede aprender inglés. 
     every boy    can    learn       English   
 
Thus, (189a) allows two interpretations: a specific one where we talk about every boy in a 
given set known by the addressee, and a non-specific one where we talk, generically, about 
any boy in the universe. In the first case, the universal quantification is restricted to every 
member in a given set. In (189b) only the second reading is allowed, and we cannot be talking 
about all the boys from a given set. 
Similarly, cualquiera 'any' is restricted to non-specific interpretations when interpreted as a 
universal quantifier (see below for non-universal uses). 
 
(190) Cualquier chico puede aprender inglés. 
 any           boy    can     learn       English 
 
As for cada 'each', it contrasts with todo in the singular in that it requires specific contexts. 
 
(191) Cada chico aprendió una lengua. 
 each  boy    learnt      a    language 
 
Judging from the definiteness effect (§3.1), all the universal quantifiers are definite: 
 
(192) a. *Hay todos los chicos. 
       there.is all the boys 
 b. *Hay todo chico. 
       there.is every boy 
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 c. *Hay cada chico en un jardín. 
       there.is each boy in a garden 
 d. *Hay ambos chicos. 
       there.are both boys 
 e. *Hay cualquier chico. 
       there.is any boy 
 
The quantifier cualquiera 'any' is an indifference quantifier or free choice item (like other 
expressions such as quienquiera 'whoever', sea quien sea 'whoever may be', etc.): a quantifier 
whereby the speaker wants to convey the information that it is not relevant for the utterance 
which one inside the set of entities is chosen (Sánchez López 1999: 1041; Menéndez Benito 
2004; Aloni & Van Rooij 2007; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010). The different 
consequences of this indifference trigger the different readings: the universal reading is 
triggered in cases where the speaker is indifferent about which item is chosen because the 
properties apply equally to every member of the class. Non-universal readings are also 
possible, as in (193): in such cases, the indifference means that the speaker ignores the 
identity of the set member that performs the action, or that this identity is not relevant in the 
utterance. 
 
(193) Cualquier postre me sirve. 
 any           dessert me serves 
 'Any dessert would be fine for me' 
 
With respect to cada 'each' it is differentiated from the other universal quantifiers in that it 
triggers distributive readings. A distributive reading is one which states, as part of its truth 
conditions, that the property described by the predicate applies to every member of the set 
individually. In (194a), there are two possible readings: in the distributive reading, for each 
boy it is true that that boy lifted a piano; in the second reading, called collective, no boy lifted 
a piano on his own, but rather all the boys together lifted one single piano. (194b), on the 
contrary, only has the distributive reading. 
 
(194) a. Todos los chicos levantaron un piano. 
     all       the boys   lifted          a   piano 
 b. Cada chico levantó un piano. 
     each  boy    lifted    a   piano 
 
The rest of the quantifiers in Spanish are non-universal –also known as existental–: what 
they have in common is that they do not state that the predicate applies to every member of 
the set. Inside them, there are several classes depending on the type of quantification they 
perform (following Fernández Ramírez 1951, Seco 1989, Martínez 1989, López Palma 1999, 
Sánchez López 1999): 
 
a) Negative quantifiers (where N = 0): ninguno 'none' 
b) Particularisers or existence quantifiers (where N = at least 1): algún 'some' and the 
indefinite article 
c) Numerals: dos 'two', veinte 'twenty'... 
d) Evaluative: muchos 'many', pocos 'few'...2 
 
                                               
2 Interrogative and exclamative determiners (and pronouns) such as qué 'which' or qué de 'what of' are also 
existential quantifiers; we leave them outside of this overview given their connection to specific modalities. 
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These non-universal quantifiers act all like indefinite determiners with respect to the 
definiteness effect test (195) and trigger specific / non-specific readings at least in one of the 
notions discussed in §4 –the partitive interpretation of specificity–, sometimes several of 
them. 
 
(195) (No) hay {ningún / un / muchos / tres} {libro / libros}. 
 not there.is no         a     many      three book     books 
  
The capacity to support partitive constructions is in fact the main test to differentiate 
grammatically between universal and non-universal quantifiers. A partitive structure is one 
that explicitly conveys the information that the property expressed by the predicate applies to 
a proper subset of the members of a group, that is, never to the whole set. In Spanish the set 
from which some members are selected is grammaticalised as a prepositional structure with 
de 'of'. 
 
(196) a. ninguno de los estudiantes 
     none      of the students 
 b. alguno de los estudiantes 
     one      of the students 
 c. siete de los estudiantes 
     seven of the students 
 d. varios de los estudiantes  
     several of the students 
 e. muchos de los estudiantes 
     many of the students 
 
As Brucart (1994) notes, non-universal quantifiers are not the only elements that can be the 
head of partitive structures (nouns like mayoría 'majority' or mitad 'half' can also do it), but if 
we restrict ourselves to the determiners as diagnosed by the property of licensing a preverbal 
subject (cf. §1), only the non-universal quantifiers can support partitive structures. As (197) 
shows, this option is not available in the case of universal quantifiers. 
 
(197) a. *todos de los chicos 
      all      of the boys 
 b. *todo de los chicos 
       every of the boys 
 c. *cada de los chicos 
       each of the boys 
 d. *ambos de los chicos 
       both of the boys 
 
The partitive test allows us to test whether cualquiera 'whichever' is interpreted as 
universal or not; in (198) it is interpreted as a non-universal quantifier.  
 
(198) cualquiera de los chicos 
 any            of the boys 
 
Notice further that (197c) contrasts with (199), where there is a non-universal pronoun uno 
'one' that supports the partitive structure. Here the meaning is universal because cada 'each' 
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generalises over each single member of the set, but formally the structure contains a non-
universal form whose presence is compulsory. 
 
(199) cada uno de los chicos 
 each one of the boys 
 
5.2. Evaluative and non-evaluative non-universal quantifiers 
Within the non-universal quantifiers, the next big division is the one that involves the 
distinction between quantifiers that evaluate the quantity with respect to some standard value 
and those that do not do it. (200a) provides several non-evaluative quantifiers, and (200b) 
provides some that are evaluative. 
 
(200) a. algún 'some', dos 'two', ningún 'none', varios 'several'... 
 b. muchos 'many', bastantes 'quite', suficientes 'enough'...  
  
One test to identify the evaluative quantifiers is that they semantically support the presence 
of an over comparison (Sánchez López 1999: 1047): 
 
(201) *Había {varios / dos / algunos} estudiantes, comparados con lo que es normal. 
   there.were several two some    students, compared with what is normal 
(202) Había {muchos / pocos / suficientes} estudiantes, comparados con lo que es normal. 
 there.were many / few / enough students, compared with what is normal 
 
Among the non-evaluative quantifiers, Fernández Ramírez (1951: §187) singles out the 
class of existence quantifiers. The existence quantifiers are specialised in expressing in claims 
about the existence of at least one member of the class. The negative quantifiers belong to this 
class, making the statement that there exists no member of the class in the relevant context 
(203). 
 
(203) No hay ningún perro aquí. 
 not there.is no dog here 
 'There is no dog here'. 
 
In comparison to them, algún 'some' acts like a positive polarity item that states that there 
is at least one member of the set in the relevant context. (204) can be roughly paraphrased as 
'there is at least one entity that is a dog here' (Martí 2009). 
 
(204) Hay algún perro aquí. 
 there.is some dog here 
 
Note that the quantifier in (204) rejects negative sentences. 
 
(205) *No hay algún perro aquí. 
  not there.is some dog here 
 
In plural, unos and algunos 'some' imply that there are at least two members. This follows 
naturally from the combination of the existential meaning and the semantics of the plural 





(206) a. *No hay unos chicos. 
      not there.are some boys 
 b. *No hay algunos chicos. 
       not there.are some boys 
 
5.3. Monotonic and non-monotonic quantifiers 
Within the non-universal quantifiers there is a second distinction that is useful to 
differentiate between the two classes of existence quantifiers, but can also be extended to the 
other classes: one based on monotonicity (Barwise & Cooper 1981).  
A quantifier is monotonic if it licenses an entailment relation between two predicates P and 
Q, such that one of the two expresses a subset of the situations expressed by the other. 
Imagine that P is the predicate 'walk fast', and Q is the predicate 'walk'. P applies to a subset 
of the relations that Q applies to: every situation that can be described as 'walk fast' is a 
situation that can be also described as 'walk', but not every situation where one walks is a 
situation where one walks fast.  
A quantifier is monotonic if it licenses an entailment relation between P and Q when they 
are in a subset relation as we just described. It is non-monotonic if that is not the case. 
Consider first a non-monotonic quantifier. 
 
(207) a. Exactamente seis estudiantes caminaban rápido. 
     exactly   six students walked fast 
 b. Exactamente seis estudiantes caminaban. 
     exactly          six students        walked 
 
In (207) none of the two sentences entails the other. If exactly six students walked, we 
cannot deduce from it that there were six students walking fast (maybe only 3 out of the 6 
students walked fast). If exactly six students walked fast, we cannot deduce from it that the 
total number of students walking was six: other students might be walking in that context, 
only that not fast. Exactamente seis 'exactly six' is, therefore, a non-monotonic quantifier. 
Consider in contrast the quantifier algún 'some'. 
 
(208) a. Algún estudiante caminaba rápido. 
     some student       walked     fast  
 b. Algún estudiante caminaba. 
     some student walked 
 
Here the first proposition entails the second: if there was at least one student that walked 
fast, it follows that there was at least one student that walked. Here, the situation that applies 
to a smaller subset of cases ('walk fast') entails the situation that applies to a wider subset of 
cases ('walk'). The opposite does not hold: if there is one student that walks, we cannot 
conclude that there is one student that walks fast –he or she might be walking slowly–. 
There are two types of monotonicity, depending on the direction of the entailment. The 
entailment from the subset of situations to the superset of situations characterises so-called 
upward entailing monotone quantifiers or (in short) monotone increasing quantifiers. 
Universal quantifiers are also upward entailing: 
 
(209) a. Todos los estudiantes caminaban rápido. 
     all       the students     walked       fast 
 b. Todos los estudiantes caminaban. 
     all       the students      walked 




In contrast, the entailment from the more general situation to the less specific situation is 
known as downward entailment, and the quantifiers that license this relation are called 
monotone decreasing quantifiers. The negative quantifiers are the prototypical representatives 
of this group. Consider (210). 
 
(210) a. Ningún estudiante caminaba rápido. 
     no         student      walked fast 
 b. Ningún estudiante caminaba. 
     no         student      walked         
 
If it is true that there is no student walking, it is necessarily true that there is no student 
walking fast either. The opposite does not hold: maybe there is no student walking fast in the 
relevant context, but five of them that are walking.  
We have now finished with the general description of quantifiers and determiners in 
Spanish: we have seen that, despite some similarities that show that both types of elements 
belong to a superclass with common properties –syntactic and semantic–, it is possible to find 
properties that differentiate quantifiers in the strict sense from determiners in the strict sense. 
The superclass is characterised by a number of notions: definiteness, which has been studied 
prototypically in the determiner domain but is also relevant to differentiate between universal 
and non-universal quantifiers, and specificity, that cross-cuts determiners and quantifiers. 
Within quantifiers in the strict sense, we have seen that scope ambiguities are characteristic of 
this group, and that there is a number of subclasses within them, depending on the nature of 
the quantification that they perform. 
In the rest of the article, we will discuss a number of analytical problems that are caused by 
these empirical facts. Let us start with the problem of whether the determiners and quantifiers 
should be viewed as the syntactic head of the nominal constituents that carry them or not. 
 
6. Theories about determiners and quantifiers (I): the head of nominal constituents 
In the description above, there have been a few recurrent questions that we have already 
discussed a bit, such as for instance why it is the case that a class of items –determiners in the 
broad sense– has the capacity to license arguments in the preverbal subject position, or what 
is the property that both quantifiers and determiners (in the strict sense) have that explains 
their parallelisms: the definite / indefinite and specific / non-specific distinctions are relevant 
for both, as we saw. These problems and questions are directly relevant for the issue of 
whether quantifiers and determiners are the head of nominal constituents or not. 
 
6.1. Determiners as the head of nominal constituents: the DP-hypothesis 
It is probably fair to say that for many years, the so-called DP-hypothesis (Abney 1987) 
was standardly assumed in generative grammar (but not only; see Sag et al. 2003 within the 
HPSG framework). Its core idea is that there is a parallelism between the sentential and the 
nominal domain such as that the determiner performs roughly the same role in nouns as tense 
or complementisers perform on verbs: formally, D is a functional head that selects a predicate 
(NP) in the same way that C and T are functional heads that contain in their complement 
another predicate (VP).  
Two observations –or rather, two interpretations of these observations– are generally cited 
as the main arguments in favour of the DP hypothesis. The first one comes from Abney 
(1987: 37-52). In the same way that within the sentential domain the subject of a predicate 
agrees, it is possible to find possessor agreement cross-linguistically. (211) reproduces one 
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instance of agreement in Yupik Eskimo (1987: 39-42) where the parallelism with sentential 
agreement can be seen. 
 
(211) a. angute-t kiputa-a-t 
     man-erg.pl buy-om-s.pl 
 'The men bought it'  
 b. angute-t kuig-a-t 
     man-erg.pl river-sg-agr.pl 
 'the men's river' 
 
Similarly, this type of agreement between the possessor and the noun is found in 
Hungarian. Abney's (1987) proposal is that the nominal constituent contains a functional layer 
headed by D in whose specifier the possessor is located. 
 
(212)  DP 
 
 possessor D 
 
  D  NP 
 
On the assumption –general at the time when Abney wrote his work– that each head can 
only host one specifier, a structure like (213; Abney 1987: 270) is an argument that next to 
NP there should be a second head able to host the specifier. That is, theory-internal reasons in 
the 80s forced the structure to be (214a) and not (214b). The restriction that there should be 
only one specifier per head, however, is no longer assumed in modern times, which makes 
this argument vacuous within the current theoretical universe. 
 
(213) John's every secret wish  
 
(214) a. DP     b. NP 
 
 John's  D    John's  N 
 
  D  NP    every  N 
  every 
   AP  NP    A  N 
   secret   wish    secret  wish 
   
A related reasoning is due to Longobardi (1994). Abney (1987) emphasised the parallelism 
between sentences and nominal constituents in terms of agreement with a potential subject, 
proposing that homogeneously the 'subject' (possessor in the case of the nominal) is located in 
the specifier of a functional projection. Longobardi (1994) emphasises the semantic side of 
the story: on the assumption that NP is a predicate (type <e,t> in Montague's terms), the 
question is what causes the predicate to become an argument of a verb or another predicate 
that selects it. Longobardi's (1994) proposal is that the role of the determiner is precisely this 
one: to turn the predicate into an argument. Once the determiner is introduced in the nominal 
constituent, the expression can be interpreted as a constant that can satisfy the open variable 
position of the predicate. Assume (parting ways somehow with the generalised quantifier 
theory) that the determiner in the proper sense is an object of type <<e,t>,e> that, when 
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combined with the <e,t> denoted by the NP, produces an object of type <e> that denotes an 
individual and not a predicate.  
This property, then, would explain why in Romance languages the presence of a 
determiner (in the wide sense, that is, including quantifiers) licenses nominal expressions in 
the prototypical argument position, preverbal subject. 
 
(215) *(un) chico vino. 
    a     boy    came 
 
Beyond this core reasoning, there were a number of additional arguments that supported 
the DP-hypothesis in the beginning.  
 
a) Verbs select as arguments both pronouns and nominal expressions. If one assumes that 
pronouns belong to the determiner category –as in the Spanish tradition has been argued since 
Bello (1847), based on similarities between articles and pronouns (216)–, then treating 
nominal expressions as projections of D allows for a consistent characterisation of the types 
of elements that verbs take as arguments, always DPs.  
 
(216) la / la, los / los, las / las 
 the / her, the /them, the / them 
 
b) Ellipsis shows that the NP, with all the material it contains –including modifiers– acts as 
a constituent to the exclusion of the determiner. It is well-known that only syntactic 
constituents can undergo ellipsis, and (217) shows that the adjective and the noun can 
undergo this process to the exclusion of the determiner. 
 
(217) a. Me gustan estos libros científicos, y a ti te gustan esos libros científicos. 
     me like.3pl these books scientific and to you you like.3pl those 
 'I like these scientific books and you like those' 
 b. *Me gustan estos libros científicos, y a ti te gustan estos libros históricos. 
       me like.3pl these books scientific, and to you you like.3pl those books historical 
 
c) In some languages, like Hebrew and Italian, some evidence has been gathered that under 
certain conditions the N moves to a higher position related to referentiality. On the 
assumption that this position is D, the movement operation involves two heads, N and D. 
Following the constraint of head movement in Travis (1984), N and D must be in a head-
complement relation, which means that the structure should be, minimally [DP D [NP N]], 
not [NP D N]. See §9 below, where the case of proper names is discussed. (218) shows that, 
on the surface, the proper noun in Italian can appear before and after the possessive; when it is 
before the possessive, it occupies the position of the determiner, that is compulsory if the 
proper name is after the possessive. 
 
(218) a. il mio Gianni 
     the my Gianni 
 'the Gianni that is related to me' 
 b. Gianni mio 
     Gianni mine 




d) It is also noticed that some determiners cannot appear without an NP; this is for instance 
the case in Spanish of the prenominal possessives (219). Given that any noun –in plural or in 
singular, cf. §10– can appear without an overt determiner at least in some position, this 
suggests that when the determiner and the noun combine, the determiner selects the noun and 
not vice versa. This is directly amenable to an analysis where the determiner is a head that 
takes the noun as a complement. 
 
(219) *Ha venido mi. 
   has come my 
  
Given these arguments, determiners should be reanalysed as the heads of nominal 
constituents, and as we say this is what most researchers have assumed until recently.  
 
6.2. Against the DP-hypothesis: N is the head of the nominal constituent 
In recent times, however, the previous arguments have been contested, and some have 
been proposed that in fact suggest that the noun is still the head of the nominal constituent, 
with the determiner acting as a modifier. Let us review these arguments, that come mainly 
from Müller (2007), Bruening (2009), but also from Baker's (1988) analysis of incorporation.   
For historical reasons, let us start with Baker's argument. Incorporation in his theory 
involves head movement: the N that is contained inside an argument incorporates to the 
predicate head, in the general case V, but potentially also A. (220), from Mohawk, shows that 
under incorporation, the determiner of the argument from where the noun comes can be 
stranded behing. 
 
(220) ka-nuhs-rakv  thikv 
 3n-house-white that 
 'That house is white' (litterally, 'That is a house-white') 
 
Now, on Travis' (1984) head-movement assumptions, that are standardly accepted, it is 
impossible to incorporate a head to a higher head skipping intermediate heads. That is, if the 
structure was (221), the noun would never be able to incorporate to the adjective skipping the 
head D. In contrast, if the structure is rather (222), then the data are compatible with head-
movement because D does not intervene as a head between A and N. 
 
(221)  X    (22)  X  
 
 A  DP    A  NP 
 
  D  NP    D  N  
 
Then, we have Bruening's (2009) arguments, which are basically two. The first one has to 
do with selection: judging from the clausal domain –as the reader remembers, establishing a 
parallelism between nominal expressions and clauses was part of the motivation to propose a 
DP structure–, one property that is directly associated to the fact that C (the complementiser) 
is a head is that different classes of verbs select different classes of complementisers, such as 
interrogatives vs. declaratives (222) or indicative vs. subjunctive (223) (Bruening 2009: 27-
28). 
 
(222) a. Me pregunto {si / *que} María viene. 
     me wonder   whether that María comes 
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 b. Lamento {que / *si} María venga. 
     regret.1sg that / whether María comes 
(223) a. Pienso que María {viene / *venga}. 
    think.1sg that María comes.ind / comes.sbj 
 b. Quiero que María {venga / *viene}. 
     want.1sg that María comes.sbj / comes.ind 
 
However, with respect to nominal constituents, there are no clear instances of a parallel 
situation where for instance a class of verbs selects just possessive determiners, or just 
definite determiners, etc. We mentioned in §1 that psychological verbs take subjects that must 
carry a determiner, but this can be explained by semantic or syntactic reasons other than 
selection: it could be that the predicates force particular readings on their arguments (see 
Seres & Espinal 2018) or that the syntactic position where the argument is introduced requires 
a determiner introduced as a modifier of the noun. Even these verbs do not impose a 
particular type of determiner on their arguments. 
 
(224) a. Me gustan las manzanas. 
     me like.3pl the apples 
 b. Me gustan algunas manzanas.  
     me like.3pl some apples 
 c. Me gustan estas manzanas. 
     me like.3pl these apples 
 d. Me gustan siete manzanas.  
     me like.3pl seven apples 
 e. Me gustan tus manzanas. 
     me like.3pl your apples 
 'I like {ø / some / these / seven / your} apples' 
 
This asymmetry suggests that D is not the head of the construction.  
Similarly, a second sign that C is the head in the clausal domain is that C has the ability to 
determine the form of the head that it introduces. This is behind the distinction between finite 
and non-finite complementisers (Bruening 2009: 29-30). 
 
(225) a. I would like for the Jamaicans to win. 
 b. I expect that the Jamaicans will win. 
 
Then, if D was the head of the nominal constituent, it would determine the shape of the 
material that is introduced, but this is not clearly true –although it has been proposed in the 
case of adjectives in German, that take weak inflection if the determiner is definite and strong 
inflection if it is indefinite; see Leu (2015) for an analysis that does not involve treating D as 
the head of the construction–. As the contrast in (226) shows, it is the head noun that 
determines the shape –in terms of agreement– of both adjectives and determiners / quantifiers. 
 
(226) a. todos esos lobos blancos 
    all.m.pl these.m.pl wolves white.m.pl 
 'all these white wolves' 
 b. todas esas jirafas blancas 
     all.f.pl these.f.pl giraffes white.f.pl 




6.3. Reinterpreting the DP-hypothesis arguments inside the NP-hypothesis 
Given these two asymmetries, the DP-hypothesis is not as solid as one would assume 
otherwise. In fact, the arguments that were initially established to support the DP-hypothesis 
can be easily accommodated in an NP structure where the DP is a modifier.  
We have seen that some of the arguments given there were strictly theory internal: the need 
for a specifier position and to some extent the incorporation of N to D are two examples of 
this, because with a distinct set of theoretical assumptions these phenomena would not count 
as evidence that there is an additional head above N –let alone that such head is specifically 
D–. The parallelisms between clauses and nominal constituents, to the extent they are 
empirically correct, might make the model more elegant or more parsimonious, but they can 
hardly count as arguments that the correct structure of a nominal expression should be parallel 
to a clause.  
As Salzmann (2018) notices, the agreement pattern that Abney (1987) used as an argument 
to support the existence of a DP structure does not in itself imply that there should be a DP 
layer: one could equally argue that the possessor triggers agreement on the head noun from a 
derived specifier position (apud Salzmann 2018: 6): 
 
(227)  NP 
 
 possessor N 
 
  D  N 
 
   N  possessor 
 
Bruening (2009: 31) casts doubt on the claim that determiners are there to turn NP 
predicates into arguments, contra Longobardi (1994), noting that overwhelmingly their cross-
linguistic role is more obviously related to definiteness and other reference-related notions. 
However, he shows that even if Longobardi (1994) was right it would not imply that D should 
be a head: a specifier of the appropriate type will also, by compositionality, produce the 
desired type-change from <e,t> to <e>. 
 
(228)  NP <e> 
 
 D  N 
 <<e,t>,e> <e,t>  
 
This would be entirely parallel to an NP introducing an argument of a predicate, where 
even though the combination changes the type of the verb we do not assume that the argument 
should be the head that selects VP. 
 
(228)  VP <t> 
 
 NP  V 
 <<e,t>,t> <e,t>  
 
With respect to the argument that nominal expressions should be DP because pronouns are 
DPs and verbs select both, Salzmann (2018) makes two observations. One of them is that it is 
unclear that any argument of a verb should belong to the same type: if we treat a bare noun 
phrase as an argument in (229) –see §10 for more about this–, we have to either conclude that 
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predicates can take nominals without D as arguments or, alternatively, that the bare noun in 
fact contains a phonologically null D. However, once we allow for phonologically null 
structure, nothing excludes that the pronoun could actually be a projection of a null NP 
structure where the determiner part is its specifier. Thus, the same arguments that apply to 
nominal expressions if we treat them as NPs with Ds as specifiers can extend also to the 
pronouns, saving the consistency of selection. 
 
(229) comer manzanas 
 eat      apples 
 
Another argument for the DP-hypothesis was the idea that nouns and modifiers can 
undergo ellipsis without the determiner. Salzmann (2018) notes that this just shows that at 
some point in the derivation the noun and the adjective form a constituent to the exclusion of 
the determiner, but this is satisfied already in (230). Without additional assumptions –for 
instance that only maximal projections can undergo ellipsis– this does not guarantee that DP 
is the head. 
 
(230)  NP 
 
 D  N 
 
  A  N 
 
Then we have the N-to-D movement proposal made for some nouns in some languages, 
where the alternation between the article and the proper name in first position suggested that 
the noun has head-moved to the determiner, an operation that as we saw is possible only if 
both N and D are heads in a head-complement relation. Bruening (2009: 33) discusses that in 
this context Cinque (2005) has argued that any movement involving the noun within the 
nominal expression is phrasal (NP, not N); Hankamer & Mikkelsen (2005) have also argued 
against N-to-D movement in Scandinavian. In addition to phrasal movement, it could also be 
the case that the different position of nouns within the nominal expression is due to some 
other operations, such as reprojection of the N head (cf. Georgi & Müller 2010).  
However, even if it turned out to be right that N head-moves to a higher position under 
some circumstances, it would still need to be shown that that specific head is indeed D and 
not another functional projection related to NP. 
Finally, the argument that D must be the head because D seems to select N and not vice 
versa is also flawed: if the requisite that makes determiners combine with NPs is semantic in 
nature (for instance, because the determiner needs to combine with a predicate expressed at 
the NP level to satisfy its denotation), then a structure like (228) above would be able to 
account for the property without implying that D projects as a head. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
All in all, it is fair to say that currently there are no strong empirical arguments in favour of 
treating D as the head of the nominal constituents in which they appear. If D was really the 
head, it would be necessary to dissociate selection from headedness in order to account for the 
asymmetries between CP selection and DP selection, and also something should be said about 
the agreement patterns found within nominal constituents, where the NP seems to be 
responsible for the form of determiners and not vice versa. We have seen, also, that the 
position that D is necessary to turn the NP into an argument is controversial, and even if it 
was correct it would not force a syntactic analysis where D is the head. 
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The relation between determiners (in the strict sense) and quantifiers, both being able to 
license nominal constituents in prototypical argument positions, could be therefore reduced to 
a semantic principle: what these items do, as generalised quantifiers, is making it possible that 
the predicate expressed by an NP is related to the predicate expressed by a VP. The relation 
would not be expressed in syntactic terms (for instance saying that both determiners and 
quantifiers are selected by predicates), but would reduce to a semantic condition. 
The theories that currently adopt the DP-hypothesis, in fact, emphasise the conceptual 
elegance of the idea that the nominal constituent reproduces the same basic structure that we 
find in clauses; that is, the appeal of the DP-hypothesis in the contemporary literature is that it 
allows a formalisation of the idea that language builds structures with a very small set of units 
that are manifested in slightly different terms across domains. But this takes us to the next 
section, where the potential areas defined by determiners and quantifiers will be discussed. 
 
7. Theories about determiners and quantifiers (II): the internal organisation of the area 
and the emergence of the relevant readings 
There are two families of theories that discuss the internal organisation of the quantifier 
and determiner area: those that focus on the parallelism between clauses and nominal 
expressions, finding equivalents inside the nominal domain for the best established clausal 
functional projections, and those that leave that conceptual issue on the background and rather 
try to account through syntax for the distinctions based on definitiness and specificity. While 
all the approaches we will present in this section assume the DP-hypothesis, note that nothing 
prevents, in principle, that the same areas would be defined as different layers of specifiers 
within one single NP constituent –that is, that given their meaning and function, a subset of 
the determiners would necessarily be introduced below another subset of them–.  
 
7.1. Parallelisms between clauses and nominal expressions 
The DP-hypothesis had been proposed in a context that emphasised the parallelisms 
between CP and nominal expressions, and we have seen in §6.1. above that part of the 
argumentation involved treating possessors as nominal subjects that in some languages 
actually triggered overt agreement.  
Inside this general context, there have been two different proposals about what should be 
the parallel between D and the projections at the clausal level. One first line of research has 
treated D as the parallel of Tense (see, for instance, Wiltschko 2014: 78). Part of the 
arguments have to do with the idea of deictic anchoring. The prototypical function of D is to 
express referentiality, which is defined through the utterance context –we have seen in §3 that 
the notion of definiteness has a clear pragmatic side, conveying information about 
identificability that might require deictic anchoring, or at least considering a salient or 
accessible referent in the discourse context–. Similarly, tense is also a deictic category that 
anchors the proposition to a particular time period using the time of utterance as the 
landmark: before now, now and after now, to put it bluntly. In this sense, D and T would be 
parallel in that their role is to take a set of properties expressed by a lexical layer (NP and VP) 
and anchor that set to the context of utterance.  
In the previous family of theories, C should be considered as parallel to case marking or P 
(see for instance Emonds 1985, Dubinsky & Williams 1995, Kayne 2000), among other 
reasons because cross-linguistically it is common that prepositions grammaticalise as 
complementisers and because both case/P and complementisers are used to link the 
constituents they introduce to external heads that select them (respectively, the predicate that 
takes the nominal expression and the predicate that introduces a subordinate clause).  
A second line of reasoning, however, has been to propose that D is in fact parallel to C, not 
to T. This approach (see for instance Hinzen & Sheehan 2015) proposes that the typology of 
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clause types should be treated as differences in referentiality; as C codifies, by assumption, 
the clause type, C contains some form of referentiality, and therefore should be seen as a 
parallel to D. Clauses where the speaker takes no stance with respect to the truth value of the 
proposition –not presupposing they are true– are weakly referential clauses (231), while 
factive clauses (232) whose truth is presupposed by the speaker are parallel to definite noun 
phrases, which also presuppose the existence of a referent. 
 
(231) Es posible [que María venga]. 
 is  possible that María comes 
 'It is possible that María comes'. 
(232) Es lamentable [que María venga]. 
 is  regrettable that María comes 
 'It is regrettable that María will come'. 
 
Hinzen & Sheehan (2015) emphasise a second parallelism that is important in their 
analysis: assuming phase theory (Chomsky 2000), D and C are two of the heads that are able 
to define their complements as a closed domain that is dispatched to the interfaces to be 
interpreted.  
This parallelism between C and D as phase-defining heads is the cornerstone of Ticio's 
(2003) proposal on the equivalence between clauses and nominal expressions. Following 
Grohmann's (2000) proposal that the clause has three domains, she extends it to three areas in 
the nominal structure. The lowest domain both in clauses and nominal expressions is 
responsible for theta-assignment. In the nominal domain, this is NP, which introduces the 
possible arguments of the noun; in the verbal domain, this is VP. The intermediate domain is 
responsible for the definition of the formal relations of agreement and case marking, which in 
the case of nouns would be for instance genitive case marking. The highest domain codifies 
the information relevant to discourse, which in the case of DP has to do with the identification 
of reference, and in the case of CP has to do with information structure. Ticio's proposal is 
that a definite DP defines a strong domain which does not allow extraction of an argument 
(*¿De quiéni leíste [este libro ti]? 'Of who did you read that book?') in the same way that 
some CPs reject extraction from their complement, pursuing the equivalence even further. 
However, within the research of the internal structure of nominal expressions, D is not the 
only head that has been proposed in the functional domain. Ritter (1991), using facts from N-
head movement in Hebrew, argued that number features also project as a head within the 
nominal expression. The specific fact she used to argue for NumberP is (233).   
 
(233) ha-axila ha-menumeset shel dan et ha-uga 
 the-eating the-polite      of    Dan ACC the-cake 
 'Dan's polite eating of the cake' 
 
Given that the noun axila 'eating' is a nominalisation, it has to be base generated in a lower 
position where it can introduce the arguments referring to the person that eats and the thing 
that is eaten, but it surfaces in a high position, leaving all arguments and the adjective behind. 
Because all the modifiers and arguments are left behind, Ritter argues that N moves head-to-
head. The landing head cannot be D, because this head is occupied by ha 'the'. Thus, an 







(234)  DP 
  
 D  NumP 
 ha- 
  N+Num NP 
  axila  
   AP  NP 
  (ha)-menumeset 
    shel Dan N 
 
     N  ha-uga 
 
With respect to the parallelism between NumP and a projection within the clausal domain, 
Travis (1992) argued that NumP –which she treats as essentially a projection related to 
quantification– is an instantiation of Aspect Phrase, the head responsible for grammatical 
aspect. Among the evidence that she cites, there is the fact that Tagalog uses the same 
morphology to mark plural and progressive aspect, but also that progressive aspect in a telic 
verb has the same basic effect as plural number on a count noun: in both cases, one turns 
something that was bounded and delimited into something that is unbounded and non-
delimited (see also Megerdoomian 2008). 
 
(235) a. Juan comió una tarta.  
    Juan ate       a     cake 
 'Juan ate a cake' (bounded: the cake is eaten) 
 b. Juan estuvo comiendo una tarta. 
     Juan was     eating       a     cake 
 'Juan was eating a cake' (unbounded: the cake is not eaten completely) 
(236) a. Juan comió una tarta. 
     Juan ate      a     cake 
 'Juan ate a cake' (bounded: the cake is eaten) 
 b. Juan comió tartas. 
    Juan  ate      cakes' (unbounded: there is no specific cake such as it is completely 
eaten) 
  
On the relation between grammatical aspect and quantification, see for instance Krifka 
(1989), Tenny (1987), Parsons (1990) and Arche (2014): the general observation is that 
grammatical aspect involves quantifying over distinct subphases of the eventuality time, in a 
way parallel to how number and other types of quantification act over the description of the 
NP. 
Wiltschko (2014) generalises the NumP to a position responsible for the phi features of the 
noun (number, gender, person), and also argues for a parallelism between grammatical aspect 
and the phi feature head within the nominal domain. In her view –where she wants to 
dissociate the function played by these heads from the conceptual notion of time–, aspect is a 
category whose function is to provide a point-of-view about the eventuality defined by the 
VP. Obvious values for this point-of-view in a language like Spanish are imperfective –
focusing on the internal duration of the event, excluding the initial and final moments–, 
perfective –focusing on the final moment, or taking the whole running time of the eventuality 
including both beginning and end–, perfect –focusing on the state after termination of the 
event– or prospective –focusing on the state immediately preceding the initial point of the 
event–. The phi feature head would perform a similar function, giving a particular point of 
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view over the class of predicates defined by the NP, including notions such as plural, singular, 
dual, paucal, etc.  
(237) reproduces the complete parallelism that Wiltschko (2014: 78) proposes between the 
clause and the nominal domain. NP and VP are used to classify, that is, to define predicates 
that select different types of objects. AspP and PhiP (≈NumP) have the function to express a 
point of view with respect to the predicate. TP and DP are used to anchor to the utterance, and 
CP and KP (≈PP) are used to link the whole structure to external linguistic material.  
 
(237)  CP     KP 
 
  C  TP   K  DP 
      
  T  AspP   D  PhiP 
 
   Asp  VP   Phi  NP  
 
7.2. Deriving the referential readings from the internal organisation of the D area 
Note that in the previous theories any difference that has to do with definiteness or 
specificity should come from one of two sources: either the feature endowment of heads like 
D –for instance, through a distinction between two Ds, one [definite] and one [indefinite]– or 
the syntactic position of the nominal expression within the clase –remember in §4 that some 
definitions of specificity took into account whether the expression was preverbal or 
postverbal–. Diesing (1992) is one instance of this second type of theory: she proposed that 
the difference between specific and non-specific readings of an indefinite nominal expression 
depended on whether the whole nominal is mapped inside VP or outside it at the moment 
when the meaning of the structure is processed. The notion of specificity that is central in 
Diesing (1992) is the strong notion of specificity whereby a non-specific expression suspends 
the presupposition that there exists a referent that corresponds to it (remember §4). 
 
(238) a. ...[TP  ...[VP V a book ]] (non specific) 
 b. ...[TP a book ...[VP V  ]] (specific)   
 
 However, there is a third option to account for the readings that we will discuss in this 
section: an account where specificity and definiteness are properties defined by the internal 
syntax of the nominal expression. The prime exponent of this type of theory is Zamparelli 
(1995, 2000), who proposes a division in three layers: strong determiner phrase (SDP), weak 
determiner phrase (WDP) and kind phrase. 
 
(239)  SDP 
 
 SD  WDP 
 
  WD  KindP 
 
   Kind  NP 
 
The least relevant of these projections for our purposes is KindP; Zamparelli (1995: 118) 
proposes that it can be materialised as the preposition de 'of' in structures that explicitly 
grammaticalise the expression of different types or kinds of an NP, such as (240), and that 
otherwise it is a projection that contains any material used to define the predicate part of the 
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nominal expression, including the NP itself and all restrictive modifiers that are used to select 
a (sub)kind of the entities denoted by them.  
 
(240) [KindP [clase] Kind    de [NP  tigre]] 
  type  of  tiger 
 'type of tiger'  
 
The strong determiner phrase is the one that introduces referentiality. All determiners that 
directly codify definiteness are base-merged there, including the universal quantifiers –which 
as we saw in §5.1 act as definites with respect to the combination with hay 'there.is'–. The 
weak determiner phrase –also called Predicative Determiner Phrase– hosts non-universal 
quantifiers, where Zamparelli (1995, 2000) also includes the Italian and the Spanish indefinite 
article un 'a'. Importantly, alone, the WDP does not contain reference: it still denotes a 
predicate, just like KindP and NP, and by assumption is not enough in itself to license a 
nominal expression in argument position. A case of nominal expression projecting WDP but 
no SDP is for instance the predicate that combines with the copulative verb in (241) –
remember we have called this the descriptive use of the indefinite article in §3.2–: 
 
(241) Juan es un médico estupendo. 
 Juan is a   doctor wonderful 
 'Juan is a wonderful doctor' 
 
As a side note, we should point out that Zamparelli (1995) can treat a sequence like (242) 
as (243), that is, with the universal quantifier in the specifier of the head responsible for 
referentiality and the article in the head position. 
 
(242) todos los chicos 
 all      the boys 
 'all the boys' 
 
(243)  SDP 
 
 todos  SD 
 
  SD  ...NP 
  los  chicos 
 
However, given that todos estos chicos 'all these boys' is also possible, it might become 
necessary to split the universal quantifier projection from the strong determiner projection. 
The reason is that in several languages, such as Modern Greek, demonstratives co-occur with 
the definite article (244). This suggests that the demonstrative itself should be projected as a 
specifier of SDP, which in turn could make it necessary to find an additional head for the 
universal quantifier todos 'all' –on the usual assumptions of the DP-hypothesis, which does 
not allow multiple specifiers inside the same projection–.   
 
(244) autos o kyrios 
 this the gentleman 
 'this gentleman' 
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(245) a.   SDP 
 
  this  SD 
 
   SD  ... 
   the 
 
 b.   UQP 
 
  UQ  SDP 
  all  
   these  SD 
 
    SD  ... 
    the  
 
Going now back to the letter, not the spirit, of Zamparelli (1995, 2000), let us consider 
how he derives the definite / indefinite distinction, and the specific / non-specific distinction. 
Importantly, the notion of specificity that he considers is two-fold: whether the nominal 
expression presupposes the existence of a referent or not, and whether the nominal expression 
is a variable under the scope of an operator or not. We will restrict the discussion to nominal 
expressions in argumental positions –excluding uses as predicates such as (241) above.  
Zamparelli (1995: 119-121) states two principles that govern the interpretability of SDP: 
 
(246) a. A filled SDP layer triggers presupposition of existence. 
 b. An SDP without lexical material is interpreted as a variable. 
 
This rule is able to derive the distinction between specificity and non-specificity, in the 
strong sense. Remember the two interpretations that an intensional predicate like querer 'want' 
triggers in an indefinite nominal expression. 
 
(247) Quiero comprar un libro. 
 want.1sg buy     a   book 
 'I want to buy a book' 
 Specific: 'There is a book that exists, and I want to buy it.' 
 Non-specific: 'I want to buy any book, and maybe I don't find one.' 
 
In both cases the indefinite article is base generated in the WDP; SDP must be present, 
because otherwise the nominal expression cannot act as an argument. 
 
(248)  SDP 
 
 SD  WDP 
 
  WD  ...NP 
  a  book 
 
Without further operations, (248) is the non-specific reading. The SDP is empty, so there is 
no presupposition of existence and the nominal expression is a variable under the scope of the 
modal operator querer 'want'. In order to trigger the specific reading, presupposing that a 
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particular book exists, SDP must be filled: the indefinite article rises to SDP –we can assume 
head movement in this case–. 
 
(248)  SDP 
 
 WD+SD WDP 
       a 
  WD  ...NP 
    book 
 
Is definiteness also codified in the syntax? No, this does not seem to be the case. The main 
reason is that definite determiners, as we saw, next to the strong referential readings, can also 
have weak referential or expletive readings where the definite article is taken as a variable 
(249). 
 
(249) Los chicos se rompieron el brazo. 
 the  boys    SE broke.3pl the arm 
 'The boys broke their arms'  
 
For a definite expression like (249) it has to be the case that SDP is empty of lexical 
material, which means that the article must be introduced in WDP in this case at least.  
 
(250)  SDP 
 
 SD  WDP 
 
  WD  ...NP 
  the  book 
 
Thus, it cannot be said that WDP is the position occupied by any indefinite determiner. We 
have seen that it cannot be said either that SDP is restricted to definite determiners, because in 
specific readings the indefinites must fill SDP also. The conclusion is that the definiteness 
contrast needs to be lexically codified by the specific items that are introduced in the 
determiner domain: el 'the' will inherently convey definiteness, while un 'a' would not contain 
the semantic information that triggers definiteness. 
As additional support for this idea, consider (251), where the definite expression is used as 
a predicate –remember also the de dicto readings that were presented in §1, where the definite 
description is relevant as predicate–. 
 
(251) Juan es el ganador del concurso. 
 Juan is the winner of.the competition 
 
Why are universal quantifiers definite? In Zamparelli's (1995) theory, the explanation is 
simple: they are introduced as specifiers of the SDP, and once they fill the SDP they trigger a 










(252)  SDP 
 
 todos  SD 
 
  SD  ... 
  los 
 
However, in this domain we have an additional argument that universal quantifiers should 
be introduced in an even higher position. As we saw, todo 'every' is chosen in non-specific 
contexts where cada 'each' is not possible.  
 
(253) Todo estudiante puede leer esto. 
 every student     can     read this 
 'Any student can read this' 
 
The indifference reading associated to this quantifier in a sentence like (253) involves a 
non-referential reading where the modal verb takes the expression as a variable. This would 
mean that (254) should be the right structure, with SDP empty. 
 
(254) [UQP todo [SDP ø ...[NP estudiante]]] 
 
Non-universal quantifiers are treated as the indefinite un 'a': they are base generated in 
WDP, adding another property to the predicate part of the nominal expression –its cardinality, 
its quantity, etc.–, and the specific / non-specific contrast is explained in the same way as with 
the indefinites. 
 
(255) a. Non-specific   b. Specific 
 
  SDP     SDP  
  
 SD  WDP   WD+SD WDP  
 ø         dos 
  WD  ...NP   WD  ...NP  
  dos   
 
The indefinite quantifiers can combine with a definite, which precedes them. Then they are 
part of a definite expression, which presupposes existence. 
 
(256)  SDP 
 
 SD  WDP 
 los 
  WD  ...NP 
  dos  libros 
 
 'the two books' 
 
An interesting property of this proposal is that it makes a claim about what counts as 
specificity in grammatical structures: from all the notions of specificity discussed in §4, it 
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implies that the one that is grammaticalised is the one that has to do with the presupposition 
of existence and the scope relations between operators. The epistemic specificity, in contrast, 
which is triggered when we know that there is a referent but we ignore or we don't care about 
its identity, would not be properly specificity from the perspective of the DP structure: it 
would have to depend on other factors that are not directly codified in the determiner area. 
 
(257) El estudiante que se rompió un brazo, sea quien sea, está en el hospital. 
 the student that SE broke an arm, be whoever be, is in the hospital 
 'The student who broke his arm, whoever he is, is at the hospital' 
 
Another property of the proposal is that it is well-equipped to deal with the relation 
between determiners and quantifiers that is one of the underlying issues in any analysis of the 
determiner area. We saw that even though determiners are quantifiers, semantically, 
sometimes they cannot be used as variables. Zamparelli (1995) elegantly accounts for this 
apparent contradiction: the distinction between variables and constants is not directly codified 
in the syntactic structure, but depends on whether SDP is filled with lexical material or not. In 
themselves, the determiners are quantifiers homogeneously, and if they stay in WDP they 
have all prototypical properties of quantifiers. It is the SDP layer that introduces the notions 
that make them look different from quantifiers; when the items move to SDP (or are base-
generated there) they trigger a referential interpretation that can support other notions (deixis, 
for instance) that are not involved in operator-variable pairs.  
Similarly, it is not true that both determiners and quantifiers license nominal expressions in 
argument positions. What happens, rather, is that a syntactic head, SD, licenses them there, 
and the determiners and operators can move to SDP or not, depending on whether they are 
specific or not. The same expression without SDP will act as a predicate, independently of 
whether it contains the same determiner or quantifier as the one acting as an argument.   
Explicative as the proposal is, there are several aspects that it cannot derive from the 
perspective of Spanish. One of them is that, given that indefinite articles are introduced below 
SDP, it allows that indefinite articles can combine with definite articles and demonstratives. 
 
(258) *estos unos chicos 
 these some boys 
  
It cannot be the case that the indefinite article must compulsorily move to SDP, because 
then it would only have specific readings, and it cannot be the case that the definite 
determiners are base generated in WDP, because they can combine with most indefinite 
quantifiers (e.g., los muchos problemas 'the many problems'). Syntax, in this system, cannot 
explain the incompatibility, which might be due –for instance– to a clash between the 
contradictory information that the definite article and the indefinite article convey. Note that 
this can only be a partial explanation, because in principle the cardinal meaning of un 'a' as 
'one' should not trigger the incompatibility. 
 
(259) a. los dos chicos 
    the two boys 
 b. *el un chico 
       the one boy 
 c. el único chico 
     the only boy 
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One way of solving the problem would be to say that un 'a' is always an article and never a 
cardinal numeral. This takes us to the debate on the nature of un 'a' in Spanish, which we 
discuss in the following section. 
 
8. Theories about determiners and quantifiers (III): on the nature of un 
One of the most active traditional debates in the field of quantification and determination 
in Spanish is the nature of the form un 'a' (see Alonso 1933, Alarcos 1967, Lapesa 1975, 
Lázaro Carreter 1975, Renzi 1976, Álvarez Martínez 1986, Lorenzo 1995, Laca & 
Tasmowski 1996, Leonetti 1999a, 1999b, Rigau 1999, Sánchez López 1999, Brucart & Rigau 
2002, Gutiérrez 2008, as well as Heim 1982, whose analysis for English has influenced the 
proposals made for Spanish after her). The debate concentrates on whether un 'a' should be 
considered a quantifier or not. There are three positions in the debate. 
The first position is that the form is a quantifier, and as such should be assimilated to other 
indefinite quantifiers like algún 'some, any' (Alonso 1933, Alarcos 1967, Álvarez Martínez 
1986, Lorenzo 1995, Sánchez López 1999, Brucart & Rigau 2002). An additional argument in 
support of this idea is that the indefinite is used sometimes as a cardinal numeral meaning '1'. 
A second position is that the form is an indefinite article, not a quantifier, used to introduce 
a new discourse referent –in opposition to the definite article–; the similarity with the cardinal 
numeral is explained historically (Lapesa 1975). The hypothesis is also pursued in Lázaro 
Carreter (1975), Renzi (1976), Laca & Tasmowski (1996), Leonetti (1999a) and Rigau 
(1999).  
The third position is defended in Gutiérrez (2008): the form is an indefinite article, but 
there is a homophonous form un used as a cardinal quantifier meaning '1'. The plural forms 
unos and unas can only be articles, because the plural meaning is incompatible with the 
cardinality '1', while the singular un could be either 'a' or 'one', depending on other properties. 
 
8.1. Arguments that the indefinite article is a quantifier 
The position that the indefinite article is a quantifier is in principle supported by several 
facts that have been discussed in the literature.  
The first one is that, cross-linguistically, it is frequent that the so-called indefinite article 
comes from a numeral expression meaning '1'. This is the case in Romance languages, but for 
instance also in English, where the Old English form a:n produced both a(n) and one, 
depending on prosodic factors. 
Second (Alarcos 1968), the indefinite article is able to combine with the indifference 
quantifier cualquiera 'any', something impossible for undisputed determiners (260): 
 
(260) a. un libro cualquiera 
     a   book any 
 'any book' 
 b. *{el / este / tu} libro cualquiera 
        the this   your book any 
 
The same quantifier can combine with cardinal numerals, so in this respect the indefinite 
article patterns with quantifiers. 
 
(261) dos libros cualesquiera 
 two books any 




Third, the indefinite article can appear without a noun and head partitive structures, 
something impossible for the definite article (262). Undisputed quantifiers share these two 
properties (263). 
 
(262) a. uno de los tres chicos 
     one of the three boys 
 b. *el de los tres chicos 
       the of the three boys 
(263) muchos de los cuarenta chicos 
 many of the forty boys 
 
8.2. Arguments that the indefinite article is a determiner 
However, there are also other phenomena that suggest that the indefinite article patterns 
with the determiners.  
In the strict sense, if the form un is a quantifier it should be an operator that is able to 
define a scope. Heim (1982) shows that the form un 'a' introduces a variable in the discourse, 
and that variable can be bound by a quantifier at any point. Her main argument is sentences 
like (264), which are known in the literature as Donkey-sentences. 
 
(264) Every farmer that owns a donkey beats it. 
 
The natural way of interpreting the sentence is as follows: 'for every donkey that is owned 
by a farmer, it is the case that the farmer beats that donkey'. Importantly, then, the indefinite 
expression 'a donkey' must be interpreted as universally quantified, not existentially 
quantified. If the indefinite form un 'a' was itself an operator, judging from this example, it 
should be a universal quantifiers. However, we have seen plenty of evidence that this form 
does not map with universal quantifiers –for instance with respect to definiteness effects–, and 
in other cases it would have to be interpreted as an existential quantifiers, as in (265), which 
by no means implies that every boy came. 
 
(265) Ha venido un chico. 
 has come a boy 
 
Heim (1982) then argued that the role of the indefinite is to introduce a variable in the 
discourse, and as a variable it can be bound by different types of operators. Remember that we 
saw that the definite article is also able to act as a variable, and therefore that this property 
does not mean that an expression is not a determiner. 
Other properties argue directly that the expression is not a quantifier. First of all, remember 
that the use of the indefinite article extends to nominal expressions used as predicates, or 
where the descriptive content is salient. It is difficult to see how the quantification would be 
instantiated in these cases. 
 
(266) Pedro es un médico estupendo. 
 Pedro is a    doctor  wonderful 
 
Third, Gutiérrez (2008: 296) notes that the form unos cannot be used to answer quantity 
questions: 
 
(267) A: ¿Cuántos niños vinieron? 
    how.many boys came 
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 B. *Unos  
 B.   Algunos 
    'some' 
 
Note also that this plural form cannot license partitive constructions (Gutiérrez Rexach 
2003: 424). 
 
(268) {algunos / *unos} de los estudiantes 
  some          some  of the students 
 
Also (Gutiérrez 2008: 293), the adjective mismo 'self' used to manifest identity with a 
previous referent cannot combine with indefinite quantifiers (269), because they do not codify 
information related to the reference of the expression. It can combine with the definite article, 
and also with the indefinite one (270). 
 
(269) *{muchos / pocos / bastantes} mismos niños 
     many       few      quite.many same  children 
(270) {el / un} mismo niño 
   the / a same boy 
 'the same boy (as before) / one same boy' 
  
Another property that makes the indefinite article act like a determiner and not a quantifier 
is the combination with adjectives that express notions related to identity (Gutiérrez 2008: 
290), like cierto 'certain' –which Eguren & Sánchez (2007) treat as an adjective of 
imprecision– and determinado 'determined', which conveys the idea that there is a specific 
referent.  
 
(271) un {cierto / determinado} sufrimiento 
 a     certain / determined suffering 
 'something of a suffering / a particular suffering' 
 
Indefinite quantifiers cannot combine with them. 
 
(272) *{dos / muchos / algunos} {ciertos / determinados} casos 
    two    many      some         certain   determined       cases 
 
This combinatorial property can suggest that the meaning that un 'a' conveys has to do with 
reference, as the theory that proposes that it is a determiner expects. In contrast, proper 
quantifiers do not express notions related to identificability and expectedly they reject these 
adjectives. 
Gutiérrez (2008) goes back to some of the arguments that the indefinite article is a 
quantifier, provided in §8.1 above, and shows that they are not incompatible with a 
determiner analysis. The reason that un 'a' can combine with cualquiera 'any', but not the 
definite determiners, is that definiteness is of semantic nature: cualquiera expresses 
indifference about identity, which is not compatible with the identification associated to 
definiteness. With respect to why un 'a' can appear without a noun, but el 'the' cannot, 
Gutiérrez (2008: 292) proposes that the reason is phonological: the definite article always 
lacks stress and phonologically cliticises to the noun phrase, but the indefinite article still 
carries stress. On the assumption that a clitic cannot sustain itself in phonology, this explains 
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why the definite article cannot license ellipsis of the whole NP, but the indefinite article 
allows it.  
 
8.3. Two different un: a cardinal quantifier and a determiner 
However, there are still several properties of un 'a' that are not compatible with the view 
that this form is a determiner. Interestingly, they never extend to the plural form unos 'some'.  
First, one has to explain why it is the case that cross-linguistically there is this connection 
between the cardinal for '1' and the indefinite article, as we saw. Second, it is still true that the 
singular form can license partitive constructions, which as we saw is a property of non-
universal quantifiers: 
 
(273) uno de los estudiantes 
 one of the students 
 
Third, as we saw in §3, the indefinite article can be modified by expressions like solo 'only' 
or exactamente 'exactly' when it denotes the cardinality '1'. 
 
(274) exactamente un estudiante 
 exactly         one student 
 
This is not the case with the plural form, again. 
 
(275) *exactamente unos estudiantes 
   exactly         some students  
 
In some contexts, it contrasts with cardinal numerals of values different than '1', such as 
(276). Even without the modifiers noted above, it can denote a cardinality of '1' unequivocally 
in some sentences, like (277). 
 
(276) Puedes comprarte un juguete, no dos. 
 can.2sg buy-you   a   toy         not two 
 'You can buy one toy, not two' 
(277) Cada menú da derecho a una bebida. 
 each menu gives right to one drink 
 
Again, this is never the case with the plural unos. It cannot contrast with quantifiers 
(cardinal numerals or others) and it is never used to express a quantity. 
 
(278) *Vinieron unos estudiantes, no muchos. 
   came.3pl some students, not many 
 Intended: 'Only few students came, not many' 
 
The solution that Gutiérrez (2008) proposes for this puzzle is elegant and simple. The 
indefinite article un 'a', which allows a plural form unos, is a determiner used to introduce 
new referents in the discourse and more generally nominal expressions where the identity is 
not relevant, as in predicates. However, for historical reasons, there is also another un 'one', a 
cardinal numeral with a value of '1', which is of course a quantifier (like dos 'two' and the 
rest). This cardinal lacks a plural form, and that is why the form unos 'some' must necessarily 
correspond to the determiner un 'a'. 
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The cardinal un 'one' is the one that appears in partitive structures, in combination with 
expressions that express precise quantities, and in contrast with other cardinals.  
Going now to the structure, Gutiérrez (2008: 313) proposes that both the indefinite and 
definite articles should be merged in the same projection, for her DP, while the indefinite 
quantifiers –including the cardinal corresponding to '1'– are merged in a lower projection. 
 
(279)  DP 
 
 D  QP 
 el / un1 
  Q  ...NP 
  un2/ dos / muchos 
 
The form unos necessarily merges in DP. 
Two remarks are in order here; they might be interpreted as problems for the theory, or as 
open issues that imply that some additional mechanism besides the syntactic structure has to 
be invoked at this point. 
The first is possibly simpler to solve. The proposal that Gutiérrez (2008) makes does not 
clearly allow for a distinction between weakly referential and strongly referential definite 
phrases, and the specific vs. non-specific contrast. The structure, given the assumptions in 
(279), in principle places in the same position the definite article when it is weakly referential 
and when it is strongly referential, and the indefinite article is also there when it is specific or 
non-specific. The claim that the theory makes, then, is that these distinctions should derive 
from other properties not contained in the syntactic structure internal to the nominal 
constituent –for instance, the position that the whole nominal expression occupies inside the 
clause when it receives an interpretation (Diesing 1992)–.  
Note that the QP position in Gutiérrez (2008) is not equivalent to the WDP in Zamparelli 
(1995). Even if most indefinite quantifiers are merged in WDP in the second proposal, we 
saw that given their use as variables in expletive contexts, the definite determiner would also 
have to appear there. Gutiérrez (2008) is clear that her QP is only for proper quantifiers, and 
explicitly rejects the claim that indefinite expressions are always quantificational –as we saw 
for the indefinite article–. If both theories are combined, one would have to propose at least 
three layers, as in (280), letting the specific/non-specific contrast be accounted for in 
Zamparelli's terms and differentiating quantifiers from indefinite determiners. 
 
(280)  SDP  <--- strong referential readings  / specific) 
 
 SD  WDP <--- weakly referential readings  / predicate / non-specific  
  
  WD  QP <--- quantification  
 
   Q  ...NP 
 
Still, the difference between definites and indefinites would be a lexical matter –given that 
the indefinite article in this proposal is still able to move to SD and the definite article can be 
generated in WD–.  
The second comment about the structure is more difficult to solve, as far as we understand 
it. Basically, the problem is the following: we know that the definite determiner is always 
unable to combine with the form un. If the form un were just an indefinite determiner, the 
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incompatibility between el and un would reduce to a crash in the opposite instructions they 
convey about identificability. However, the crash extends to the cardinal un 'one': 
     
(281) *Vino el un chico, no los dos. 
   came the one boy, not the two 
 Intended: 'One boy that you know came, not the two you know'. 
 
Note that the incompatibility is difficult to explain syntactically. If the cardinal is merged 
in Q, there are only two ways of accounting for the crash in syntax: either el 'the' is 
compulsorily base merged also in Q, or the cardinal for '1' must compulsorily move to DP. 
The first option is untenable given that the definite article can combine with other quantifiers 
–so it cannot be generated in Q– (282). 
 
(282) los dos chicos 
 the two boys 
  
The second option is difficult to maintain. It would imply that '1', unlike the other 
quantifiers, is forced to move to the D domain even when it is interpreted as a cardinal. That 
movement operation would then be completely vacuous semantically, which also makes it 
difficult to find a trigger for it. 
In semantic terms, one alternative that does not involve the syntactic structure could be the 
uniqueness interpretation associated to the definite article in some theories. If the notion of 
definiteness involves a uniqueness interpretation, in a singular noun phrase the information 
that the cardinality is '1' would be presupposed by uniqueness. Thus the combination of the 
definite article and the cardinal '1' would be redundant.  
Importantly, this explanation assumes that redundancy is a cause for ungrammaticality; 
this might not be completely true, given that native speakers can produce combinations like 
subir arriba 'to ascend upwards'. Remember also that not all theories about definiteness 
accept that uniqueness is the right notion (cf. §3.1.1). 
Let us now leave this issue here, and move to the general question of what happens with 
nominal expressions that lack a determiner even though they are used as arguments. 
 
9. Theories about determiners and quantifiers (IV): on proper names  
There are two main types of determiner-less nominal expressions merged in argument 
position. The first type is proper names, as in (283), and the second type is common nouns 
with or without modifiers, as in (284).  
 
(283) Ha venido María. 
 has come  María 
(284) Han venido estudiantes. 
 have.3pl come students 
 'Students have come' 
 
Each one of the two cases is different. In the first case, no theory denies that the proper 
name is an argument and the discussion centers on what they mean and how they obtain their 
referential status in the absence of an overt determiner. In the second case, some theories deny 
that they are arguments in the strict sense. This section is devoted to the first class of 
determiner-less nominal expressions, while §10 deals with cases like (284). 
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9.1. The meaning of proper names 
There is agreement that proper names are nominal expressions that convey reference: they 
are referential by themselves, in the sense that they identify an entity without the help of overt 
definite determiners (see among many others Mill 1843, Donnellan 1966, Evans 1973, Kripke 
1980, Salmon 1981, Recanati 1997, Lewis 1986, Fernández-Leborans 1999). A few tests 
show this easily if we compare a proper name with a common noun.  
First, the proper name can be referred back by a pronoun, but not the determiner-less 
common noun: 
 
(285) a. Ha venido Juani, porque éli en persona quiere hablarte.  
     has come  Juan, because he in person wants talk-you 
 'Juan has come because he himself wants to talk to you' 
 b. *Han venido niñosi, porque ellosi en persona quieren hablarte. 
       have come  boys     because they in person want       talk-you 
 Intended: 'Some boys have come because they themselves want to talk to you' 
 
Second, because they directly convey reference, proper names reject modifiers, just like 
pronouns –and in contrast to common nouns–. 
 
(286) a. *María guapa 
       María pretty 
 b. *ella guapa 
       she pretty 
 c. niña guapa 
     girl pretty 
 
When the proper name is modified, it acts grammatically as a common noun in Spanish: it 
needs to combine with a determiner or quantifier in order to be licensed in argument position. 
 
(287) *(El) Madrid del siglo pasado era muy diferente. 
   the  Madrid of.the centiry past was very different 
 'The Madrid of the past century was very different' 
 
In logical terms, the proper name itself expresses an entity of type <e>, a constant, that 
satisfies the argument position of a predicate. Being of type <e> itself, it does not overtly 
combine with determiners –which, as we have seen, turn the <e,t> predicate in an <e>–, 
meaning that in sequences like (288) the determiner is expletive. 
 
(288) (La) Merkel ha estado en España. 
  the  Merkel has been in Spain 
 
An open issue, that we will discuss in §9.2, is how the noun comes to express an individual 
constant: most theories propose that in fact the proper name is part of a structure that contains 
a D element, so underlyingly their structure is the same of a common noun with a definite 
determiner.  
If there is agreement that proper names refer, there is disagreement with respect to whether 
they contain a predicate. In particular, the debate has revolved around the question of whether 





(289) a. Donald Trump 
 b. el presidente de EEUU 
     the president of USA 
     
It (289a) is at least covertly related to (289b), it means that the proper name, just like the 
definite description, contains a referential part and a predicative part. This proposal for proper 
names, known as the Descriptivist Theory or as the Frege-Russell theory (because Russell 
1905 argued for it based on previous work by Frege), proposes that the predicative part of 
(289a) would be the properties that are used to identify in this world the individual we know 
as Donald Trump, such as those in (290). 
 
(290) a. the 45th president of the USA 
 b. the guy that made a cameo appearance in Home Alone 2 
 c. the guy that appeared in The Apprentice 
 d. the guy that had a fight with Rosie O'Donnell 
 ... 
 
Every proper name would be associated to a cluster of properties, covertly. The only 
condition is that at least one of the properties in a given world picks only one individual, and 
therefore it is enough to identify it. In our example, (290a) is such property, at least for this 
world. 
One argument in favour of this approach comes from Russell (1905) himself: a person that 
does not know Donald Trump at all but only has the information that he is the current 
president of the USA can make the statement in (291) on the basis of what he knows is the 
role of the person that acts as a president. It is not even necessary that the speaker can identify 
Donald Trump if a picture of him is there. 
 
(291) Donald Trump is completely irresponsible. 
     
The alternative to this descriptivist theory is the proposal that proper names are rigid 
designators (Kripke 1980). In this theory, the proper name lacks any property-denoting 
aspect, and it is just a referential expression that identifies an individual in the universe of 
discourse. Kripke provides three arguments against the descriptive theory of meaning. 
Imagine that María makes the following statement: 
 
(292) This painting represents Aristotle.  
 
In the descriptive theory, Aristotle stands for a cluster of properties. Imagine the properties 
are things like 'the teacher of Alexander the Great' and 'the most important philosopher of 
Ancient Greece'. Now imagine that the world was different than we know it to be, and in that 
world Aristotle died at the age of 18, with the consequence that he would never teach 
Alexander the Great or become the greatest philosopher –assume that in that world Plato did 
both things–Alternatively, imagine it is discovered that old history is wrong and Plato wrote 
the works previously attributed to Aristotle, and taught Alexander. According to the 
descriptivist theory, in these cases, María meant to say Plato instead of Aristotle, but 
intuitively this is not right for (292): María still means that the individual called Aristotle is 
represented in the painting. Thus, the reference cannot be based on the properties that we 
attribute to the individuals referred to by the proper names. 
A second argument is that, if the meaning of Aristotle was 'the philosopher that taught 
Alexander', then the sentence in (293) should be a trivial statement, because it would equal 
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'The philosopher that taught Alexander was the philosopher that taught Alexander', which is 
not how the addressee feels about the proposition. 
 
(293) Aristóteles es el filósofo que enseñó a Alejandro Magno. 
 Aristotle is the philosopher that taught ACC Alexander Great 
 
The third argument is about false beliefs associated to the referent of a proper name. 
Imagine that María believes that Angela Merkel is the president of USA. If María says then 
something like I saw Angela Merkel because she saw the individual with that name, this 
would mean that María actually says that she saw Donald Trump (as for 2018), but this is not 
what María wanted to report. 
An effect of the theory that proper names are rigid designators is the treatment of pairs of 
sentences like (294).  
 
(294) a. He visto al presidente de EEUU.  
     have.1sg seen the president of USA 
 b. He visto a Donald Trump. 
     have.1sg seen Donald Trump 
 
Depending on the moment and world where this is uttered, the definite description in 
(294a) would refer to different individuals: Barack Obama if it is uttered in 2010, George W. 
Bush if it is uttered in 2003, etc. In other possible worlds it might even refer to Woody Allen, 
Mariano Rajoy or Benjamin Franklin. The direct object in (294b), in contrast, would refer to 
the same individual in 2003, 2010 and 2018 –Kripke says that even across possible worlds it 
would necessarily refer to the individual we know as Donald Trump, under any 
circumstances–. This is what being a rigid designator means.  
While the rigid designator theory has been adopted by many semanticists, it is not 
completely devoid of problems. We know that Alexander the Great was also called 
Ozymandias, and we can say a sentence like (295). 
 
(295) Alexander the Great was Ozymandias. 
  
If the proper name was only referring, (295) should be a tautology: we would say that 
some individual is identical to himself. This is against our intuition: we are informing 
someone with (295) that the two names are used for the same person.  
There are two ways out of this problem: Kripke (1980) argued that the proper name is 
assigned to a referent in what he calls an 'initial baptism' where the name becomes a rigid 
designator for that individual. This theory of reference us causal: the referent is associated to 
the proper name in that ceremony. From this perspective (295) is not vacuous, given that it 
means to say that the same individual that once was assigned the name Alexander got in a 
different baptism assigned the name Ozymandias.  
The second way out is in part going back to the descriptivist theory, but instead of 
proposing that there is a cluster of noteworthy properties that identify the referent it is claimed 
that the only property described is purely denominative (Kneale 1962, Kleiber 1981): the 
proper name Alexander means 'the x that is called Alexander'. (295) is then not trivial because 
it says that the x called Alexander is identical to the x called Ozymandias. 
What is undisputed, however, is that the proper name refers in a way that common nouns 
can only do through a determiner. In the next subsection we will present the most standard 




9.2. The internal syntactic structure of proper names 
The most influential analysis of proper names comes from Longobardi (1994). His main 
claim is that proper names are, syntactically, like common nouns, and underlyingly they 
participate in the same type of structure as common nouns. Specifically, they are NPs that 
become referential only when they combine with a determiner. 
 
(296)  DP 
 
 D  NP 
 
  N  ...  
  Juan 
 
In Logobardi's (1994) theory, there is no way to become an argument without D; a 
common noun and a proper name would equally have to be dominated by DP to become 
arguments (see also Stowell 1989).  
There are two alternatives to fill the DP position. The first one is to introduce a definite 
determiner there. These are the cases where the expletive article appears with the proper 
name, an option that is compulsory for instance in Contemporary Catalan, and which Spanish 
allows in some registers. 
 
(297)  DP 
 
 D  NP 
 el 
  N  ...  
  Juan 
 
The second option is that the N head-moves to D –Longobardi (1994) assumes the DP-
hypothesis, but as far as we understand it his claims can still be kept if the NP moved 
phrasally to a higher position–.  
 
(298)  DP 
 
 N+D  NP 
 Juan 
  N  ...  
  Juan 
 
This movement operation is visible in Italian. The consequence is that, inherently, the 
proper name is nothing but a common noun that has moved to D (see also Borer 2005). In 
Italian, there is evidence for this movement through possessives. The proper name can 
alternate between a structure where it follows the possessive and the D position is occupied 
by the article, and one where there is no article and the possessive follows it. Longobardi's 
proposal (1994: 623) is that in the first case the proper name stays in N, as a common noun, 
and in the second case it moves to D. 
 
(299) a. il mio Gianni 
     the my Gianni 
 b. Gianni mio 
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     Gianny my 
 
In Spanish the pattern does not replicate, possibly because the possessive already occupies 
the D position. 
 
(300) a. mi Juan 
     my Juan 
 b. *Juan mi(o) 
       Juan my(ne)  
 
In fact, assuming Longobardi's (1994) explanation, Italian and Spanish contrast in that the 
presence of modifiers blocks movement of N to D. In Italian (301) the adjective can follow 
the proper name when there is no article (Longobardi 1994: 624). 
 
(301) a. il vecchio Cameresi 
     the old      Cameresi 
 b. Cameresi vecchio 
     Cameresi old 
 
In Spanish, (301b) is impossible. Whenever the proper name is modified, it stays in the N 
layer and the D position has to be filled by a determiner. Syntactically, the proper name 
behaves as a common noun in this context. We can speculate, if head-movement is assumed, 
that the modifiers in Spanish introduce extra head positions that intervene between N and D. 
 
(302) a. el simpático Rajoy 
    the nice         Rajoy 
 b. *Rajoy simpático 
       Rajoy nice 
(303) *Simpático Rajoy fue presidente unos años. 
   nice           Rajoy was president some years 
 
With respect to English, modification seems to be compatible on the surface with a proper 
name without an article (304). However, Longobardi (1994) proposes that English in fact is 
like Spanish, only that the D position is occupied by an empty determiner. 
 
(304) I love old John. 
 
(305)  DP 
 
 D  XP 
 ø 
  AP  NP 
  old 
   N  ...   
   John 
 
Note that this proposal about proper names is in principle compatible with the descriptive 
semantic theory mentioned in §9.1: the proper name is underlyingly a common noun, only 
that when it acts as a proper name it has been combined with a DP, and in the standard case it 
has moved to the DP projection –by assumption, through head-movement–.  
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This nature as a common noun is related to two different uses of the proper name. In the 
first one, it appears in combination with some (pseudo-)copulative verbs to express some 
similarities between an entity and the referent of the proper name. Note that in this context 
there is no reference related to the noun. 
 
(306) a. Barcelona parecía Nueva York aquellos días. 
     Barcelona seemed New    Yourk those days 
 b. Pilar parece Chomsky. 
     Pilar seems  Chomsky 
 c. Pedro se volvió Sherlock Holmes. 
     Pedro SE became Sherlock Holmes 
 
Second (Jonasson 1991), the proper name can be used metaphorically to express a set of 
properties that are prototypically instantiated in the referent they normally associate to them. 
In such cases the use of an overt determiner is compulsory with or without modifiers, 
typically (but not exclusively) the indefinite article in the ponderative and evaluative 
descriptive use. 
 
(307) a. Este político es un Churchill. 
     this  politician is a Churchill 
 'This politician has the salient properties of Churchill' 
 b. Este cantante es un Gardel. 
     this  singer     is  a  Gardel 
 'This singer has the salient properties of Gardel' 
 
This alternation suggests –combining now Longobardi (1994) with Zamparelli's (1995, 
2000) proposal– that it should be possible to build a proper name without a SDP constituent 
that forces it to act as an argument, as in (308b). 
 
(308) a. SDP    b.  WDP 
 
 SD  WDP    WD  (QP) 
 
  WD  (QP)    Q  NP 
 
   Q  NP 
 
In the cases where the SDP projection is lexically filled by the noun, SD is interpreted as 
referential (not as a variable) and as such it can satisfy an argument position.  
With these lasts examples in hand, we would expect the proper name to denote at least 
some property –perhaps just the denominative property 'to be called X'–. An analysis as a 
rigid designator could claim that the property-denotation of the common noun becomes 
overwritten when the N is interpreted at D, but this is an extra assumption that the other 
theory would not have to make. 
What we have seen in Longobardi's (1994) analysis and its combination with Zamparelli's 
is that only nouns combined with a determiner can act as proper arguments. We have to insist 
at this point that even if Longobardi assumes the DP hypothesis, as Zamparelli does (2000), 
Bruening (2009) has shown that it is not necessary that the determiner projects as a head in 
the structure to turn the predicate into a referential expression. Therefore, the question of 
whether D is a head or not is independent of the question of whether D is necessary to license 
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something as an argument. Longobardi's (1994) arguments support the DP-hypothesis only to 
the extent that the data force a head-movement analysis of N –not a phrasal one–, and only to 
the extent that the landing position is unequivocally D. 
In the next section, we will revisit the claim that D is necessary for an NP to act as an 
argument through the discussion of common nouns that are apparently in argument positions 
even though on the surface they do not combine with a deteminer or quantifier. 
  
10. Theories about determiners and quantifiers (V): on bare nouns used as arguments  
Bare nouns such as those in (309), which in appearance at least occupy an argument 
position, have been controversial in the literature. Two main positions have been argued for in 
terms of whether they contain a determiner: Fiengo (1974), Otero (1976), Carlson (1977) and 
Contreras (1986, 1996) have argued that these nominal expressions contain empty 
determiners in English or Spanish, while Lois (1989), Wonder (1990) and Masullo (1992) 
have argued that there is no determiner and the nominal expression is part of the predicate, or 
is licensed as an argument by other means, such as partitive case. In this section we will first 
revise the facts about the restrictions that Spanish imposses on bare nouns in argument 
positions, and we will then present the arguments for and against the presence of empty 
determiners in these nominal expressions. 
 
10.1. The data: the restricted syntactic distribution of bare nouns in argument positions 
There are two main sets of restrictions for bare nouns in these contexts: a first set depends 
on the count or mass nature of the lexical noun, and a second set depends on the positions 
where these elements can occupy, in terms of the grammatical functions that they would 
correspond to. 
 
10.1.1. Plurals, countability and mass nouns 
Contrast the two sentences in (310): 
 
(310) a. He comido arroz. 
     have.1sg eaten rice 
 b. *He comido uva.  
       have.1sg eaten grape 
 
The difference between the two common nouns has to do with the count / mass distinction 
(Pelletier 1975, Ter Meulen 1980, Bosque 1983). While the noun arroz 'rice' is mass, the noun 
uva 'grape' is count, as shown among other things by the fact that the second, but not the first, 
can combine naturally with cardinal numerals without a taxonomic interpretation (types of the 
noun); the first, but not the second, can combine naturally with quantifiers such as mucho 
'much' in the singular.  
 
(311) a. mucho arroz 
     much rice 
 b. #mucha uva 
       much grape 
 c. #dos arroces 
       two rices 
 (possible as 'two types of rice') 
 d. dos uvas 




The generalisation is, then, that a mass noun can be a bare noun in argument position in the 
singular, while a count noun cannot; (310b) becomes grammatical if the count noun appears 
as a bare plural. 
 
(311) He comido uvas. 
 have.1sg eaten grapes 
 'I have eaten grapes' 
 
The singular of mass nouns behaves grammatically like the bare plural of count nouns in a 
number of respects (see Bosque 1996: 20 and folls.). Besides being able to appear without 
overt determiners in the object position of many verbs, we have the fact that they both admit 
the same comparative quantifiers (312), they both combine with cantidad 'quantity' (313) –
thus, they do not express numbers of items, but quantities of a substance or group– and they 
both can act as predicates in combination with copulative verbs (314). 
 
(312) a. menos madera  
     less     wood 
 b. menos niños 
     fewer boys 
 c. #menos niño 
      less      boy 
(313) a. una pequeña cantidad de sal 
     a     small     quantity of salt 
 b. una pequeña cantidad de libros 
     a     small      quantity of books 
 c. #una pequeña cantidad de libro 
       a     small     quantity of book 
(314) a. Esto es agua. 
     this is water 
 b. Esto son cajas. 
     this are boxes 
 c. *Esto es caja. 
       this is box 
 
This being the main restriction, there are also some more restricted cases of singular count 
nouns that appear without overt determiners (Alonso 1933, Sánchez de Zavala 1976, Masullo 
1992, Espinal 2010), such as the ones in (315). 
 
(315) a. Busco piso. 
     search.1sg house 
 b. No tengo novia. 
     not have.1sg girlfriend 
 c. Lo hizo a mano. 
     it did.3sg at hand 
 'He did it by hand' 
 
Leaving the contexts where these nouns can appear as predicates for the moment (see the 
next subsection), the distribution of these bare count nouns in the singular is facilitated by a 
number of factors. One of them is the presence of intensional verbs –remember in §4 that 
these verbs, like preferir 'prefer', buscar 'search' or desear 'desire' trigger strong non-
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specificity contexts where the existence of a referent for the nominal expression is 
suspended–.  
 
(316) a. Necesito coche. 
     need.1sg car 
 b. *Rompí coche. 
       broke.1sg car 
(317) a. He solicitado secretaria. 
     have asked.for secretary 
 b. *He conocido secretaria. 
       have met      secretary 
(318) a. Busco puesto. 
     search.1sg position 
 b. *He dejado puesto. 
       have.1sg left position 
 
Note that the fact that intensional verbs suspend the reference of the nominal expression 
under their scope might license these nominals in the singular because, anyways, there is no 
specific referent associated to them, and a kind interpretation of the nouns is easy to obtain –
what one has asked for in (317a) is not that a particular person becomes your secretary, but 
that an entity that belongs to the type 'secretary' is assigned to her–.  
Remember in §4 that, next to intensional verbs, negation could also produce non-specific 
readings of indefinite expressions. Negation is also able to license count singular bare nouns 
(Fernández Ramírez 1951: §3.2., Benincà 1980, Bosque 1996). 
 
(319) a. No he visto persona que haga estas cosas. 
     not have.1sg seen person that does these things 
 b. *He visto persona que hace estas cosas. 
       have seen person that does these things 
(320) a. No encuentro libro de mi gusto. 
    not find.1sg book of my taste 
 b. *Encuentro libro de mi gusto. 
       find.1sg book of my taste 
 
As coordination is one operation that licenses preverbal subjects without determiner (§1), it 
can also facilitate the presence of singular count bare nouns: 
 
(321) Madre e hija vinieron. 
 mother and daughter came.3pl 
  
Outside from these grammatical contexts, semantic and lexical factors seem to be at play 
(Bosque 1996, Dobrovie-Sorin & Laca 1996, 2003). One first group of cases involves pairs of 
direct objects and lexical verbs where the meaning connection is so tight that in a sense one 
can think that the meaning of the verb already presupposes the class of objects denoted by the 
direct object (Bosque 1996: 46, his example 38). 
 
(322) a. Hice fotocopia. 
     made photocopy 
 b. *Rompí fotocopia. 
       broke   photocopy 
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(323) a. Adjunto informe. 
     attach    report 
 b. *Leo informe. 
       read report 
(324) a. Se formuló resolución. 
     SE stated    resolution 
 b. *Se ocultó resolución 
        SE hid     resolution 
 
In many of these cases one can think of a single lexical verb that expresses both the 
meaning of the verb and the direct object: (322a) could be fotocopiar 'to photocopy', or (324a) 
could be resolver 'to determine in court'. The impression that the direct object and the verb 
form one complex predicate is reinforced by examples where the verb is light in its meaning, 
such as tener hambre 'have hunger, be hungry', tener frío 'have cold, be cold' –with mass 
nouns– and tener casa 'have house', tener perro 'have dog' –with count nouns–. It is true, as 
we see from the last cases, that not all the conceivable examples have an equivalent lexical 
verb. Anscombre (1986) for French has proposed that these cases without an intensional 
predicate or negation are possible because in them the predicate expresses a prototypical 
situation that can easily be used to classify events and entities that participate in those events. 
The examples in (325) can be related to this notion of prototypicality (see in particular 
Espinal 2010 for examples like those). 
 
(325) a. Juan tiene novia. 
    Juan has girlfriend 
 b. Supermán lleva capa. 
     Superman wears cape 
 c. Hay examen. 
     there.is exam 
   
(325a) can be used to classify the subject in one of the several socially-relevant groups that 
are defined by the civil status of an individual –single, married, etc.–. The predicate expresses 
a typical set of properties that can be judged as similar to 'not to be single', and in this sense it 
is naturally understood that the bare noun, rather than acting as a proper argument of the verb, 
is used to restrict the type of situation that it expresses.  
As for (325b), note that the prototypicality that the predicate conveys implies that we have 
a stereotypical image of the subject and we are describing it (rather than informing about what 
he has among his items of clothing). In fact (Bosque 1996), note that if we use adjectives to 
modify the bare noun, we are forced to use those that express the prototype –in the case of 
Superman, the cape is red, but the prototype does not say anything about whether one should 
like the cape or not–. 
 
(326) a. Supermán lleva capa roja. 
     Superman wears cape red 
 b. *Supermán lleva capa bonita. 
             Superman wears cape nice 
 
As for (325c), the notion that licenses it is the idea that we are talking about an 
(instantiation of an) event that is either periodic or planned in a calendar (Bosque 1996: 45). 
The idea is that the exam is an event that one expects in a certain context, and also that is 
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generally announced in a specific time frame. The following examples are also instances of 
the same type of condition. 
 
(327) a. Hay reunión de departamento. 
     there.is meeting of department 
 b. Tendremos boda el mes que viene. 
     will.have.1pl wedding the month that comes 
 'We will have a wedding next month' 
 c. Hemos organizado fiesta. 
     have.1pl organised party 
 
In contrast (Giry-Schneider 1991), any happening that is unexpected given the normal 
course of events would not be naturally expressed with a determinerless bare count noun 
(example from Bosque 1996: 45). 
 
(328) Hubo atropello de peatón. 
 there.was running of pedestrian 
 Intended: 'There was a running over of a pedestrian' 
 
Thus, to summarise: the condition in general is that count nouns cannot appear without 
determiners unless they are in the plural. In the singular, their distribution is restricted to well-
defined syntactic contexts also known to trigger non-specificity or license determinerless 
readings in unexpected positions –such as the preverbal subject one–; additionally, there are 
semantic conditions on prototypicality and lexical constraints which suggest that the noun is 
co-defining the predicate more than acting as one of its arguments. 
 
10.1.2. Syntactic positions 
With respect to the positions that bare common nouns can occupy, the examples that we 
have seen up to now show that they can appear as direct objects of the transitive predicates, 
provided the conditions on number and countability are satisfied. 
 
(329) a. Traigo sal. 
      bring.1sg salt 
 b. Traigo botellas. 
      bring.1sg bottles 
 
In the subject position, unless focalisation is present –see below–, the bare nouns can 
appear postverbally with the class of verbs known as unaccusative, where by hypothesis 
(Burzio 1986) the subject is non-agentive and occupies a base position that is equivalent to 
the direct object of transitive verbs (Suñer 1982, Torrego 1989, Masullo 1992, Lapesa 1975). 
 
(330) a. Llegan trenes. 
     arrive.3pl trains 
 b. Sale aire. 
     comes.3sg air 
 c. Mueren niños. 
    die.3pl children 
 
Contrast this with the postverbal subject of verbs where the subject is interpreted as an 




(331) a. *Estornudan niños. 
       sneeze.3pl boys 
 b. *Comen niños la sopa. 
       eat.3pl boys the soup 
 c. *Nadan bañistas. 
       swim.3pl swimmers 
 d. *Leen profesores las tesis. 
       read.3pl teachers the theses 
 
The possibility extends also to the postverbal position of subjects in passive sentences, 
where the subject is also non-agentive and comes from an underlying object position (Lapesa 
1975). 
 
(332) a. Fue encontrado oro. 
     was found       gold 
 b. Fueron establecidas leyes severas. 
     were    established   laws  strict 
 
See Laca (1996) for the effects that bare nominals have in the aspectual interpretation of 
the predicates, be it as postverbal subjects or as direct objects.  
After prepositions, the restrictions are even stronger. Common nouns without a determiner 
do not accept the prepositional a 'at' that marks some animate and inanimate direct objects, 
possibly because bare noun phrases have a non-specific reading and the prepositional marking 
in the object is related to specific readings of the subject (see Fábregas 2013 for an overview). 
 
(333) Vi (*a) niños en el parque. 
 saw at  children in the park 
 
The ban extends to indirect objects, that also are marked with a 'at': bare common nouns 
are rejected in such contexts, independently of the possible prototypicality that one could 
associate to some of these situations. 
 
(334) a. *Di caramelos a niños. 
       gave candy to children 
 b. *Di importancia a problemas. 
       gave importance to problems 
 c. ??Entrego paquetes a clientes. 
        deliver  packages to clients 
 
Of course, nominal expressions that contain modifiers or coordination structures that can 
license determiner-less common nouns in preverbal subject position are allowed, but as we 
have already suggested this is not a real exception: the modifiers or the coordination substitute 
the determiner in these cases. 
 
(335) a. Di caramelos a niños y mayores. 
     gave candy to children and adults 
 b. Di importancia a problemas que no debería haber considerado. 
     gave importance to problems that not should have considered 
 c. Entrego paquetes a clientes millonarios que me dan propina. 
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     deliver packages to clients millionaires that me give tip 
 
With respect to other types of prepositional complements and modifiers, bare common 
nouns typically appear as noun modifiers that define subtypes of the noun (336), manner 
complements of verbs (337), cause complements (338), locative complements (339) and 
temporal complements (340). 
 
(336) a. un ladrón de joyas 
     a   thief    of jewels 
 b. una casa de veraneo 
     a     house of holiday-summer 
 'a summer house' 
(337) a. escribir algo a mano 
     write something at hand 
 'write something by hand' 
 b. comer algo con cuchara 
     eat     something with spoon 
(338) a. muerto por bala 
     dead by bullet 
 b. hacer algo por miedo 
     do    something by fear 
(339) a. estar en clase 
     be    in class 
 b. discutir algo en casa 
     discuss something in house 
 'discuss something at home' 
(340) a. recoger algo en invierno 
     collect something in winter 
 b. entrenar en lunes 
     train in Mondays 
 
A few remarks are in order with each of the classes. About (336), note that these bare 
nouns used to define subtypes are internal to the NP, more internal than for instance 
qualitative adjectives (341), and cannot be substituted by a possessive pronoun because they 
do not introduce new referents. They contrast, then, with nouns combined with determiners in 
the same context (Sánchez 1997). 
 
(341) a. un ladrón de joyas elegante 
     a   thief    of jewels elegant 
 b. #un ladrón elegante de joyas 
       a   thief    elegant of jewels 
(342) a. *el ladrón de las joyas elegante 
      the thief of the jewels elegant 
 b. el ladrón elegante de las joyas 
     the thief elegant of the jewels 
 
With respect to (337), Bosque (1996) emphasises that these modifiers are not instruments, 
but define different manners of performing the event. (337a) cannot answer a question like 
'What did you use to write the letter?', or 'With what did you write the letter?', but a question 
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like 'How did you write the letter?'. With a determiner, the preposition might change, but in 
any case now the pattern reverses and the manner reading is out. 
 
(343) a. escribir algo con la mano 
     write something with the hand 
 b. comer algo con la cuchara 
     eat something with the spoon 
 
Note that (344) is not grammatical, presumably (Bosque 1996: 51) because there is a 
stereotypical notion that using a chair is not a manner of breaking a window. 
 
(344) romper la ventana con silla 
 break the window with chair 
  
In parallel to this, (338) defines a manner while (345), with a determiner, defines rather the 
instrument used to cause death. 
 
(345) matar a alguien con una bala 
 kill at someone with a bullet 
 
With respect to (339) and (340), Masullo (1996) proposes that the notion of prototypicality 
is also relevant in such cases: one does not just express a location or a time period, but rather 
defines a situation at taking place, typically, in a place or in a time frame that repeats 
periodically –remember the examples above of the type Hay examen 'there.is exam'–. When 
one is en clase 'at class' one is not just located in the physical space that is defined by the 
classroom, but is also taking part in the prototypical activities that occur there. When one says 
that a particular fruit is collected en invierno 'in winter', one is defining the nature of the fruit 
as one whose internal properties have an internal disposition to mature typically in winter. 
Contrast this with (346), where no such interpretations are forced. 
 
(346) a. estar en la clase 
     be in the classroom 
 b. recoger algo en un invierno 
     collect something in a winter 
 
Finally, there is a restriction related to argument structure: if the nominal expression 
receives focus, and typically carries contrastive stress, it can be licensed in contexts such as 
the preverbal position: 
 
(347) CHICOS vinieron, no adultos. 
 boys      came,     not adults  
 
Having presented the main contexts and restrictions for bare common nouns, let us now 
see how they have been analysed. We will divide the proposals in two classes: those that 
argue that there is a silent determiner in such cases –at least in the cases where they are 
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10.2. Bare nouns as nominals without determiners 
The first set of proposals treats the common nouns above as containing determiners or 
quantifiers internal to their structure, only that these are phonologically empty. The question 
is orthogonal to the problem of whether the determiner is a head or a specifier; tellingly, 
Contreras (1986) defended that these nominal expressions had a silent quantifier as a specifier 
(348a), while in (1996) he presented an analysis where it is a head (348b). 
 
(348) a. NP 
 
 QP  N 
 
  N  ... 
 
 b. QP 
 
 Q  NP 
 
In both cases, the assumption is –as Stowell (1989) and Longobardi (1994) explicitly 
argued– that a nominal expression cannot be licensed in argument position unless it contains a 
generalised quantifier, be it a strict determiner or a quantifier. 
Contreras' (1986) proposal is that the positional restrictions of (apparently) bare common 
nouns follow from a principle about how a silent head is licensed in the syntactic context. He 
assumes the Empty Category Principle (Chomsky 1981), and proposes that the empty 
quantifier is only licensed when the nominal appears in the complement position of a lexical 
head. This explains why the direct object position is possible, as well as the postverbal 
position of subjects which by hypothesis are merged as internal arguments. In both situations 
one can assume that the nominal expression did not leave the position of complement of V. 
 
(349)  VP 
 
 V  QP 
 
  Q  NP 
  ø 
 
In contrast, the subjects that are interpreted as agents are not in a complement position 
even when they appear postverbally, given that they are merged (by hypothesis) as specifiers 
of VP (or vP). (350) does not satisfy the Empty Category Principle. 
 
(350) * VP 
   
 QP  V 
 
  V  ... 
 
The preverbal subject position is again a specifier not immediately introduced by a lexical 
head, so this would explain why the empty quantifier is not licensed in such cases. 
One can speculate that after prepositions the distribution is even less restrictive because P 
is not a proper licensor for the empty quantifier; the open question is why some adjuncts can 
appear after the preposition –such as those interpreted as manners–, but it is very plausible 
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that these should be seen more as predicates –modifiers of the event– than as arguments. 
Instruments, which as we saw require a determiner, would be proper participants in the event, 
not predicates. 
Contreras (1986, 1996) specifically proposes that the empty category in such cases is a 
quantifier, something that explains why generally count nouns must appear in plural in these 
contexts –the quantity interpretation is not licensed by a single individual–. Bosque (1996: 97) 
correctly points out that this proposal faces the problem (Benincà 1980) that the bare plural of 
a common noun is not always interpreted quantificatively. In contrast to (351a), (351b) is 
compatible with a reading where Juan only takes one pill a day. Consider also (352), which is 
a way of asking if one person has one child, and the plural is not interpreted as a group. 
 
(351) a. Juan toma algunas pastillas todos los días. 
     Juan takes some pills all the days 
 'Juan takes some pills every day' 
 b. Juan toma pastillas todos los días. 
     Juan takes pills all the days 
 'Juan takes pills every day' 
(352) ¿Tienes hijos? 
  have.2sg children? 
 'Do you have any children?' 
 
The proposal, however, has several problems. One of them is that, as we saw, it is not the 
case that bare nominals are licensed in any context where they are governed by a lexical verb 
(remember for instance that the intensional verbs are able to do so in the singular, but other 
verbs are only able to do it if there is a notion of prototypicality or some match between 
object and verb in lexical meaning). It is also unclear that a focus interpretation would license 
the empty quantifier.    
 
10.3. Bare nouns as nominals with silent determiners 
The alternative is that what we see is what we get, and therefore that bare nominals really 
lack a determiner or quantifier. This idea has two versions, depending on whether the bare 
noun is interpreted as a predicate or it is still an argument. 
Masullo (1992) –see also Chung & Ladusaw (2003)– proposes that the bare nominals are 
in fact restrictors of the main predicate that, in the proper sense, act more as predicates than as 
arguments. He proposes a process of incorporation of the bare noun to the predicate. 
Assuming, as Baker (1988) does, that incorporation requires a head-complement 
configuration allows Masullo (1992) to account for the fact that bare nominals tend to appear 
in complement position. The preverbal subject position is a specifier site, and there is no 
incorporation from specifier to head. The restrictions in prepositional contexts naturally 
follow if the intervening P head at least makes the incorporation more difficult.  
The incorporation analysis is better equipped than the analysis involving a silent Q to deal 
with the cases where, as we saw, there is a tight lexical relation between the noun and the 
predicate. If incorporation creates a complex predicate where the incorporated nominal 
restricts the type of event that the verb expresses, the notion of prototypicality naturally 
follows, because then we would only expect incorporation to be natural if the resulting 
predicate is a plausible subtype of the event, one that is already established culturally or by 
other means. The incorporation analysis is also compatible with the observation that bare 
nouns tend to be adjacent to the verb (Bosque 1996: 98): 
 
 
DETERMINERS AND QUANTIFIERS IN SPANISH: TYPES, TESTS AND THEORIES 
  
 97 
(353) a. Le regalé (generosamente) esta cartera a María. 
     her gave generously this wallet to María 
 b. Le regalé (*generosamente) carteras a María. 
     her gave     generously          wallets to María 
 
The proposal is also well-equipped to treat the instances where we saw that the verb is 
lightly interpreted and the bare noun restricts its denotation and even selects the arguments (as 
in tener hambre 'to have hunger, to be hungry'). However, Bosque (1996) points out two 
problems for such account, or better put, for the specific proposal that there is an 
incorporation process between the object and the verb. 
One of them is that the bare noun can be focalised, as we saw, and then it is separated from 
the verb. This extends beyond the preverbal subject position: 
 
(354) PENA me da, no risa. 
 sadness me gives, not laughter 
 'It makes me sad, it does not make me laugh' 
 
The other one is that nothing prevents the bare noun to be externalised in a relative clause: 
 
(355) la pena que me da 
 the sadness that me gives 
 'the sadness that it produces me' 
 
Note, however, that these problems specifically target the claim that there is a syntactic 
incorporation process involved. Chung & Ladusaw (2003) propose that the restriction can be 
performed in semantics, by treating the nominal as a predicate that composes with the verb. If 
they are right, these examples do not contradict the proposal that the bare nominals are 
predicates and not arguments. 
In contrast, Lois (1987) proposes that even though these nominals lack a determiner or 
quantifier in their syntactic structure, they are arguments. In this analysis, having a D or Q is 
not necessary to become an argument, contra Longobardi (1994), but of course there has to be 
something that licenses the nominal expression in that position. In Lois (1987), this is case: in 
particular, the bare nominals receive partitive case, not nominative or accusative. The merit of 
this theory is that it provides an independent syntactic account of why bare nouns cannot 
receive the a marking even when they are objects; it is also well-equipped to deal with the 
restriction that indirect objects (which use dative case) do not license bare nominals, and it 
can be extended to other prepositional contexts provided that the cases where the bare noun is 
allowed are treated as predicates. 
The problem for this theory, however, is that it forces the conclusion that the same 
structure will be able to assign nominative / accusative or partitive depending on the presence 
or absence of determiners in the nominal expression (Contreras 1996). In (356a), the 
argument would receive nominative and in (356b) it would receive partitive, even though in 
both cases there is agreement between subject and verb. 
 
(356) a. Llegaron los trenes. 
     arrived.3pl the trains 
 b. Llegaron trenes. 




As we see, none of the theories is free of problems. It is perfectly conceivable that bare 
noun phrases do not form a homogeneous class: in some of them the analysis as restrictors of 
the predicate is very tempting –particularly when there is a lexical matching between noun 
and verb–, while in other cases the restrictor proposal does not seem to be appropriate –for 
instance, in focus contexts– and it could be the case that for such cases Contreras (1986) was 
right in the claim that there should be a silent Q (or D) –the restriction on datives is a good 
example of this–. This matches our intuitions that in some cases the bare noun seems to define 
a subtype of the predicate, while in others (such as 356b) it is more difficult to imagine what 
prototypical subtype is expressed and an argument analysis seems more appropriate.  
 
11. Conclusions 
It is time to wrap up. In this overview, we have seen that there are some common threads 
in all the discussions about the nature of quantifiers and determiners; here we will sum them 
up and present a few conclusions about each one of them. 
In the more descriptive side, here are the main issues that are still open: 
 
a) What is the relation between a quantifier and a strict determiner?  
b) What is the proper definition of the notion of definiteness? 
c) Which of the many notions of specificity is defined in the grammar of natural 
languages? 
 
With respect to (a), we have seen that there is evidence that quantifiers and determiners 
must form a natural class in some respect: they are able to license particular syntactic 
positions, specifically in Spanish the preverbal subject position. We have also seen that the 
notions of specificity and definiteness, which deal with reference, are relevant to classify 
quantifiers in classes. Conversely, we have seen that at least in the case of the definite and 
indefinite article there is also evidence that some form of quantification is at play –remember 
that indefinites can introduce new variables in the discourse and definites can be related to a 
notion of uniqueness and produce weak referential readings where they can also act as 
variables–. However, despite the claims made in the Generalised Quantifier Theory, there are 
empirical differences between a quantifier and a proper determiner in terms of the scopal 
relations that they define and the impossibility of extending in long distance the referential 
information to other nominal expressions that would be under their scope. Some of the 
theories about these objects have proposed to account for this apparently contradictory 
situation by appealing to the presence of two layers (QP and DP in Gutiérrez 2008, WDP and 
SDP in Zamparelli 1995), attempting to associate the referential information to a layer that 
dominates a quantifier but is distinct from it. In several parts of this article we have seen that 
the division is not clean, with for instance the definite article being able to be base merged in 
both of them. The relation between quantifiers and determiners is, therefore, still not cleanly 
captured in the existing proposals. 
With respect to definiteness, we have seen that an old philosophical tradition has 
associated it to uniqueness as a specific form of quantification, but such theory has to face the 
problem that the same common noun can be used twice, referring to two different entities, in 
the same sentence –therefore contradicting uniqueness in its literal interpretation–. This has 
prompted pragmatically-based theories about definiteness that appeal to notions such as 
salience, but these theories leave open the issue of which information the definite codifies 
grammatically in order to trigger the appropriate pragmatic interpretation. Conversely, if we 
lack a clear grammatical definition of definiteness, what we understand as an indefinite is also 
unclear.  
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Note that the problem affects what we understand as definiteness within one single 
language. A cross-linguistic definition of definiteness is even more complicated to find, but at 
least one would have the option to propose that different languages grammaticalise different 
ways of expressing identification –in vague terms–, and therefore that what we call a definite 
in language X might not be identical to what we call a definite in language Y. It is difficult to 
maintain that the same variable definition of definiteness would apply within one single 
language, in a way that some uses of the same morphological exponent (el / un) appeal to one 
notion and other uses appeal to a different notion. It seems plausible that part of the problem 
is that there is no agreement with respect to how the pragmatic interpretation connects to the 
formal semantic information associated to items and structures as entailments or 
presuppositions. 
In the case of specificity, the main problem is that, as a term, it has been used to express 
very different notions within distinct linguistic traditions, ranging from definitions based on 
scope to others based on the notion of givenness and topicality. There is a strong sense of 
specificity that is related to a well-defined set of syntactic contexts –intensional verbs, 
negation, etc.– and has to do with whether it is presupposed that there is a referent for the 
nominal expression or not. At least for Spanish and English, this notion is the one that has the 
best chance to be grammaticalised in the syntactic structure. Beyond this, a parallel debate has 
to do with whether the distinction between specificity and non-specificity should be 
accounted in syntax or in semantics –in the second case, as interpretation instructions that are 
not relevant while we build the structure–. If the interpretation is syntactic, then the question 
is whether it is defined in the internal syntax of the nominal expression –as different layers, or 
through different movement configurations– or in the wider syntactic contexts, for instance 
placing non-specific elements within a clause domain and specific elements in another 
domain within the clause. 
These issues are already complex, but the theoretical and analytical questions are even 
more difficult to approach. In this overview we have highlighted the following issues: 
 
a) Are determiners / quantifiers heads within the nominal expression? 
b) Do nominal expressions without a determiner function as arguments? 
 
The first question ultimately connects with the very general problem of whether grammar 
has a reduced set of primitives to build all the existing configurations or not. We have seen 
that determiners do not seem to act like heads with respect to two properties: (i) they do not 
seem to be selected by heads, as for instance CP does and (ii) they do not seem to impose 
formal requirements on the material they introduce, as CP also does. From this respect, the 
syntactic evidence suggests that they should be viewed as specifiers of nominal expressions, 
despite some preliminar evidence for N-to-D movement, which would presuppose –given 
current assumptions– that D is a head that introduces a constituent that contains NP. If D is a 
head, it is clear that definiteness should not be considered a notion that is expressed by a 
feature that somehow can be selected by other heads, and by the same token the information 
associated to D should not have the power to select formally different objects in its 
complement. This position is not unthinkable –perhaps connecting with the idea that 
definiteness is rather a pragmatic notion–, but it certainly weakens the DP-hypothesis 
significantly.  
In fact, the appeal of the DP-hypothesis is rather conceptual more than explanatory of the 
phenomena that define DPs. The proposal that DP is a high functional layer in the nominal 
expression ultimately implies that nominals share the syntactic structure of clauses in relevant 
respects. We have seen that it has been argued that DPs produce the same contrasts as CPs 
with respect to extraction of constituents from their domains, and it has been claimed that the 
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different types of propositions selected by types of predicates are parallel to the different 
types of nominal expressions with respect to their referentiality. In other traditions, DP is 
parallel to TP as a position that introduces the 'subject' of the nominal –its possessor– and is 
used to anchor the expression to the utterance context. If such approaches are successful, one 
could push for the view that natural languages have a very small set of functional heads to 
build complex structures, and these functional heads are basically shared by clauses and 
nominals, even if they are conceptually interpreted in different ways. 
The question of whether Ds are necessary for a nominal expression to become an argument 
is, as we have said repeatedly, orthogonal to the previous question. The debate, in this sense, 
reduces to the issue of whether the role of Ds is to turn a predicate (NP) into an individual that 
can saturate one of the argument positions of the predicate that introduces it. If this is the role 
of determiners, then proper names must carry them –a position that is less controversial, given 
their semantics– as well as bare common nouns used as arguments –a position that is very 
controversial–. If determiners do not play this role, then they would rather be devices used to 
convey notions of definiteness or specificity. 
Empirically, the problem is further complicated by the possibility that some bare noun 
phrases that apparently occupy an argument position are actually used to restrict the predicate, 
not saturating in the proper sense any of the verb's arguments. 
A restriction such as the one that Spanish imposes on preverbal subjects –which 
compulsorily must carry a determiner or quantifier– suggests that determiners must be 
somehow required in specific syntactic positions, beyond the information about referentiality. 
In contrast, we have also seen other cases where intuitively the noun and the predicate must 
match in some sense, supporting the proposal that in such cases they should be viewed as part 
of the predicate rather than as arguments; in this second case, an analysis based on syntactic 
incorporation is problematic, but there are other technical ways of making the restriction 
possible. We have seen that the conflicting evidence suggests that bare common nouns do not 
form a unified and homogeneous class. In some instances the idea that they carry a determiner 
with specific licensing conditions is plausible (remember for instance indirect objects), and it 
could be the case that in such instances the presence of the determiner is directly related to 
their use as arguments. In other instances, they are completely non-referential and plausibly 
used to restrict the predicate (remember in this respect the manner interpretation, as opposed 
to the instrumental one).  
It seems to us that the only way of disentangling this issue is to clarify how definiteness 
and specificity are expressed within the language, starting from whether there are formal 
features present in the syntax that directly express these notions. Once this problem is 
addressed, we will be in a better position to understand why determiners are required in some 
syntactic contexts but not others, and at that point we can pose the question of whether the 
restriction has something to do with argumenthood or not.  
Despite all these open questions, we hope to have been able to provide the reader with a 
sufficiently detailed state of the art of what we currently know about determiners and 
quantifiers in Spanish 
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